Walker v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJuly 14, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00557
StatusUnknown

This text of Walker v. Doe (Walker v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. Doe, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ ROBERT EARL WALKER,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-cv-557-pp

JOHN DOE,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Robert Earl Walker, who is incarcerated at the Wisconsin Resource Center and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violations of his rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On April 23, 2025, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $5.90. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on May 19, 2025. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff sues defendant John Doe, who works at the Wisconsin Resource Center. Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2. The plaintiff alleges that in August 2023, John Doe entered his hospital room at shift change, around 11:00 p.m. Id. at 2. At that time, the plaintiff allegedly “was entering the restroom to toss out swab sticks, John Doe ran behind [the plaintiff] and stated to [him] if you are going to use the bathroom you’re not closing the door and that I’m going to be in there with you!” Id. The plaintiff states that he told both PCTs (presumably, patient care technicians) to call their supervisors, but that John Doe told them not to do that. Id. The plaintiff allegedly got very upset and again asked the PCTs to call their supervisors or for John Doe to leave the room. Id. at 2-3. The plaintiff states that he said that “no one else is going to ever be in the bathroom with me while I’m using it, and that you don’t even have a rule to govern such a thing and I know that’s not legal!” Id. at 3. John Doe allegedly caused a situation that caused the plaintiff’s heart monitor to peak to “alarming highs” and scared his observing nurse. Id. The plaintiff says that security escorted John Doe from the plaintiff’s room. Id. For relief, the plaintiff seeks substantial financial compensation. Id. at 4. C. Analysis The plaintiff alleges that John Doe told him not to close the bathroom door as the plaintiff entered the bathroom and that John Doe said that Doe had to be in the bathroom while the plaintiff used it. The plaintiff states that he refused and got very upset, and that security escorted John Doe from the plaintiff’s room. The plaintiff does not allege that John Doe entered the bathroom. He says that he was at a hospital during the events described in the complaint. It is not clear if he was at the Wisconsin Resource Center, which is a treatment center for state prison residents in need of specialized mental health services, or another hospital. The plaintiff states that John Doe works there. “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects (in a severely limited way) an inmate’s right to bodily privacy during visual inspections, subject to reasonable intrusions that the realities of incarceration often demand.” Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 779 (7th Cir. 2020).

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Albert Johnson v. Richard J. Phelan
69 F.3d 144 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Delores Henry v. Melody Hulett
969 F.3d 769 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Sanders v. Kingston
53 F. App'x 781 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Walker v. Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-doe-wied-2025.