Walker v. Cameron

88 A.D.3d 1307, 930 N.Y.2d 385
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedOctober 7, 2011
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 88 A.D.3d 1307 (Walker v. Cameron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. Cameron, 88 A.D.3d 1307, 930 N.Y.2d 385 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

Memorandum:

Respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, granted the petition seeking to modify the custody and visitation provisions of the judgment of divorce by awarding primary physical custody of the parties’ children to [1308]*1308petitioner father. We note at the outset that the mother failed to include in the record on appeal the judgment of divorce. “Although [such an] ‘omission . . . ordinarily would result in dismissal of the appeal . . . , there is no dispute’ ” concerning the custody provisions contained in the judgment, and we therefore reach the merits (Matter of Carey v Windover, 85 AD3d 1574, 1574 [2011]; see Matter of Dann v Dann, 51 AD3d 1345, 1346-1347 [2008]).

We agree with the mother that Family Court erred in awarding primary physical custody of the parties’ children to the father. Even assuming, arguendo, that the father made “ ‘a sufficient evidentiary showing of a change in circumstances to require a hearing on the issue whether the existing custody [provisions] should be modified’ ” (Matter of Hughes v Davis, 68 AD3d 1674, 1675 [2009]), we nevertheless conclude that it is in the best interests of the children for primary physical custody to remain with the mother (see generally Matter of Louise E.S. v W. Stephen S., 64 NY2d 946, 947 [1985]). The record establishes that the mother has been the children’s primary caregiver throughout their lives (see Sitts v Sitts, 74 AD3d 1722, 1723 [2010]). In addition, the record establishes that the children have a close relationship with the half sibling residing in the mother’s home. Although “the presence of [a] half sibling[ ] ... is not dispositive, . . . it is a factor to be considered in making custody determinations” (Matter of Slade v Hosack, 77 AD3d 1409 [2010]; see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 173 [1982]). We therefore reverse the order and dismiss the petition. Present — Fahey, J.E, Peradotto, Lindley, Sconiers and Green, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

G.O. v. S.O.
2025 NY Slip Op 50537(U) (New York Supreme Court, Richmond County, 2025)
Matter of Kennell v. Trusty
170 N.Y.S.3d 429 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2022)
Matter of Driscoll v. Mack
2020 NY Slip Op 2559 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2020)
Prall v. Prall
2017 NY Slip Op 8959 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2017)
EAST, RONALD J. v. GILES, RACHEL L.
134 A.D.3d 1409 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2015)
GILMAN, JR., FRANCIS J. v. GILMAN, VICTORIA P.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2015
Gilman v. Gilman
128 A.D.3d 1387 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2015)
DINGELDEY, JOSEPH v. DINGELDEY, ARLENE B.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2012
Dingeldey v. Dingeldey
93 A.D.3d 1325 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2012)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
88 A.D.3d 1307, 930 N.Y.2d 385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-cameron-nyappdiv-2011.