Walker-Ross, Inc. v. Dodwell & Co.

297 F. 257, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1702, 1924 A.M.C. 694
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedMarch 14, 1924
DocketNo. 6991
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 297 F. 257 (Walker-Ross, Inc. v. Dodwell & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker-Ross, Inc. v. Dodwell & Co., 297 F. 257, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1702, 1924 A.M.C. 694 (W.D. Wash. 1924).

Opinion

CUSHMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff sues to recover for freight short-shipped upon the Ohio Maru on a voyage from Puget Sound and' British Columbia to Japan. Defendant had, prior to its agreement to ship logs upon the Ohio Maru,' shipped short of its freight engagements.for voyages of the Ayaha Maru, and Denmark Maru from Vancouver to Kobe and Yokohama. The agreements for freight for the latter named vessels were formally executed instruments, each of which contained the following provision:

“3. You and the above-named shipper shall be jointly and severally liable to us and to tbe owners of the above-named vessel, and/or such substituted vessel, if any, in the full sum of all loss and/or damage that we or it or they severally or jointly shall suffer or sustain by reason of any failure to pay the said freight, or any failure to deliver all of the said commodity to the above-named vessel, or to such substituted vessel, if any, for shipment within the [258]*258time above specified therefor; all railway and all other defaults in connection with such delivery for shipment shall be deemed to be your and the said shipper’s defaults.”

The court has heretofore denied defendant’s prayer that these contracts be reformed by striking out this provision. The defendant denies that it agreed to ship on the Ohio Maru, upon the same terms, the logs that it had failed to deliver for shipment upon the other two vessels ; its contention being that it agreed to deliver as 'much of the short cargo as could be obtained, and that it did not undertake to- deliver any particular amount of cargo. Defendant, in a letter of January 3, 1922, advising plaintiff of its having given direction for the delivery of the cargo contracted to the' Denmark Maru, and before it was known that there would be a shortage, closed as follows:

“Against our bookings of 2,500 M to 3,000 M Brereton feet logs, your contracts 58/59, we have now declared 2,600 M feet. As soon as you can let us know whether you want to lift the entire 3,000 M, we will declare the remainder.”

Dater, in a letter advising plaintiff that it would not be able to make the full shipment, defendant wrote plaintiff:

“We are endeavoring to obtain logs from Vancouver Island and have fairly good prospects of picking up an additional 200 M feet. As soon as we are definitely assured of this we will let you knpw. Needless to say we will make every effort and co-operate with you in every way possible to complete our contract.”

After it was known there would be a short delivery to the Denmark Maru; the last one to sail of these two vessels, plaintiff wrote defendant as follows:

“This wiil confirm arrangement with you whereby we have reduced your booking on the steamship Denmark Maru to 600 M feet of logs, Brereton scale, for Yokohama discharge. Please arrange to have 300 M feet of these logs alongside steamer at the Great Northern dock for loading Wednesday, February 22d, the balance on February 24th. We thank you for your assurance that the balance of your contract will go forward on the steamship Ohio Maru, loading Vancouver about March loth to 20th.”

After the sailing of the Denmark Maru, plaintiff wrote defendant, in part, as follows:

“ * * * ‘You already appreciate the fact that we have suffered considerable loss on account of that nondelivery and the losses which we have suffered will to some extent be offset by your delivery to the steamship Ohio Maru, the full amount of feetage which is represented by the difference between the total amount provided for in the two contracts and the amounts delivered to the steamship Ayaha Maru and Denmark Maru. In case of nondelivery to the Ohio Maru of the full amount df feetage which was short delivered to the Ayaha Maru and Denmark Maru, considerable loss will still rest upon us. It is, therefore, quite essential for our mutual benefit that the full balance of feetage of logs be delivered by you to the steamship Ohio Maru. * * * Please write us fully as to particulars and assurance as to the definite amount of feetage of logs whi'ch you will be able to’ have delivered to the Ohio Maru. at Seattle and Vancouver; also give us advice as to marks, destination,” etc.

Four days later plaintiff wrote defendant another letter, in part as follows;

“ * * * Referring to our contracts with you — No. 058, December 22d, for 1,400 M feet Brereton scale logs; No. 59, December 22d, 1,600 M feet Brere[259]*259ton scale logs: Under these contracts there is .still a considerable amount to be delivered to us, and we are expecting to receive from you some of the logs at Seattle and some at Vancouver. * * t: Will you kindly see that your suppliers are lined up and that they will not fail to have the maximum amounts delivered to the vessel on and during the dates above stated?”

On the same day defendant wrote plaintiff a letter containing the following:

« * * * We also have your favor of the 4th instant, and fully realize and are doing our utmost to obviate the difficult position which our nondelivery to the steamships Ayaha Maru and‘ Denmark Maru have placed you in. You of course realize, as we are prepared to prove, that this nondelivery was due to causes absolutely beyond the control of either ourselves or our suppliers. We are doing everything in our power to make up the full quantity this time by the steamship Ohio Maru, and have even gone so far as to overbuy considerably, and at higher prices, in order to obtain the required amount. We regret that at the moment of writing we cannot give you anything like a definite line-up, but, as the writer stated to both Mr. Ross and Mr. Walker in our office day before yesterday, it now appears that our maximum will not exceed 1,100,000 feet B. M. Brereton.”

Defendant’s witness stated that, having failed to secure the logs which defendant intended for shipment upon the Ohio Maru, inquiries were made among all known shippers of logs in the Vancouver market; that the reason defendant failed to secure the logs was not because of an unwillingness upon its part to pay the price demanded; that they were willing to pay any price for the necessary logs. In view of the foregoing, taken in connection with the testimony as to conversation with defendant’s agent, Evans, it is clear that plaintiff has sustained the burden of proof, and that the contract was one for~ the shipment of all logs short-shipped on the other two vessels, with a condition substantially the same as that of paragraph 3 of the original contracts quoted above.

It is further contended upon defendant’s part that, in calculating the amount of the short shipment that could have been carried on the Ohio Maru, the court should not take into account the space available for deck cargo; that is, that the same rule should be-applied in this case as in that of a clean bill of lading — that is, a bill of lading which, is silent as to the place of stowage imports a contract that the goods are to be stowed under deck. The Delaware, 14 Wall. 579, 20 L. Ed. 779; St. Johns N. F. Shipping Corporation, Owner, etc., v. S. A. Companhia Geral Commercial do Rio de Janeiro, 44 Sup. Ct. 30, 68 L. Ed.—.

It is not necessary to determine whether the evidence in the present case shows a general custom of the port to stow cargo of the character here in question on deck. There would appear to be reasons for not applying the rule invoked in a case such as the- present.

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Bluebook (online)
297 F. 257, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1702, 1924 A.M.C. 694, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-ross-inc-v-dodwell-co-wawd-1924.