Walker Hospital v. Pulley

127 N.E. 559, 74 Ind. App. 659, 1920 Ind. App. LEXIS 286
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 26, 1920
DocketNo. 10,303
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 127 N.E. 559 (Walker Hospital v. Pulley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker Hospital v. Pulley, 127 N.E. 559, 74 Ind. App. 659, 1920 Ind. App. LEXIS 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1920).

Opinions

DAUSMAN, J.

Appellee instituted this action to recover damages for malpractice. It^js averred in the complaint that appellant is a corporation, maintaining its place of business at the city of Evansville; that its.. business is to furnish for hire medical and surgical aid to the afflicted, and for that purpose has in its employ a number of physicians, surgeons, and nurses; that by its agents and servants it performed a surgical operation on the person of appellee; that in the course of the operation a deep incision was made in her left leg; that [661]*661in the subsequent treatment and care of the wound caused by the incision gauze was placed therein; that the gauze should have been removed before the wound was allowed to heal superficially; that appellant negligently permitted the gauze to remain in the wound, and allowed the wound to heal over and inclose the gauze in the flesh and around the bone; that the gauze was negligently permitted to rot and decay in the flesh at the bone; that the negligent failure to remove the gauze from the wound resulted in blood poisoning and fever, thereby causing appellee to become sick and sore, to suffer physical pain and mental anguish, and to become permanently injured and crippled.

Answer in denial. Verdict and judgment for $2,100. The only error assigned is the action of the court in overruling the motion for a new trial.

1. (1) Under separate headings counsel for appellant urge two propositions: (1) That the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence; and (2) that the verdict is contrary to law, because there is no evidence whatever tending to prove certain ultimate facts which are essential to a recovery. These two propositions will be considered together, since on appeal they present but one question. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Madden (1893), 134 Ind. 462, 34 N. E. 227; Deal v. State (1895), 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. E. 930; Elkhart Paper Co. v. Fulkerson (1905), 36 Ind. App. 219, 75 N. E. 283.

The following facts are not disputed: Mrs. Pulley is a resident of Harrisburg, Illinois. On July 12, 1915, in the Walker Hospital at Evansville, Indiana, she submitted to an operation for necrosis of the femur. The operation was performed by Dr. Welbom and his assistants. On August 1, she left the hospital and returned to her home. When she left the hospital Dr. Welbom transmitted a letter to Dr. Parish, her local physician at Harrisburg, in which he stated:

[662]*662“Your patient, Mrs. Pulley, has done exceedingly well. She walks around on crutches, and the wound is about closed. She never has the severe pain and is getting less nervous and seems to be stronger in every respect. I think though, she ought to have a building-up tonic for sometime. •
_ “You might have to redress the wound a few times; it is just merely a sinus and ought to be closed within the week. I hope she will soon be completely recovered.”

When she arrived home Dr.- Parish dressed the wound. The first time he dressed it there was a slight discharge; but. the second time the wound had entirely closed. Then trouble developed. Her limb became greatly swollen from hip to ankle, inclusive. She had some fever and suffered much pain. In the night of August 8, Dr. Blackard was called in consultation with Dr. Parish. She then complained of pain in the thigh, ankle and pelvis. The wound was closed, but was tender. In about a week thereafter the wound reopened of its own accord. The wound discharged pus for a time, and later a yellow serum. It was a serious discharge. She suffered pain continuously, and was very nervous. She insisted that the doctors at the hospital had left a piece of gauze in the sinus; and, on August 24, because of her insistence, Drs. Blackard and Parish probed for gauze. At that time a dressing forceps was used, which proved to be too large for the opening of the wound and could not be inserted far enough to make a satisfactory test. Dr. Blackard promised her that the next time he came he would bring a more suitable instrument and would try again. On the next day he used a smaller instrument and succeeded in drawing out of the sinus a piece of gauze one-half inch in width and about fifteen inches in length. From that time the patient improved; bút she continued to complain of pain in the ankle and pelvis. Dr. Blackard -saw her every day from August [663]*66315 to September 9, but not so frequently thereafter. Later she went to Lake View Hospital, Chicago.

After a careful consideration of its brief, we are unable to determine with certainty whether or not appellant is contending that there is no evidence tending to prove that the failure to remove the gauze from the sinus constitutes negligence. As to that point, therefore, it is sufficient to say that there is an abundance of evidence tending to sustain the conclusion of the jury as expressed by their verdict.

Appellant’s first distinct contention is that there is no competent evidence tending to prove that the presence of the gauze in the sinus, for the length of time and under the conditions disclosed by the evidence, resulted in any injury to the patient. In other words, the contention is that the causal relation, if any, between the negligence and the pathological conditions of the patient, which developed after she returned to her home, Gan be proved only by the testimony of experts; and that there is no expert testimony on that subject. Counsel earnestly insist that whether the presence of the gauze in the sinus, which was permitted to heal superficially and inclose the gauze in the flesh for a period of at least thirty days, was the cause of the unfortunate conditions which followed, and of the suffering endured by the patient, is a question which can be answered only by men skilled in medical science.

2. The questions ordinarily involved in malpractice cases, such as whether a surgical operation was negligently performed, or whether the care and attention following the operation was negligent, and the like, are questions of science; and necessarily the evidence from which those questions are to be determined must come from physicians and surgeons. The general rule is that, where negligence is predicated on lack of skill or attention, the court and jury must [664]*664depend on expert • evidence. Longfellow v. Vernon (1915), 57 Ind. App. 611, 105 N. E. 178; Ewing v. Goode (1879), 78 Fed. 442. We cannot concede, however, that the general rule is applicable in all respects to the case at bar. By that statement we mean to say that, in our opinion, jurors of ordinary intelligence, sense, and judgment, although not skilled in medical science, are capable of reaching a conclusion without the aid of expert testimony as to whether-it is good surgery to permit a wound to heal superficially with nearly half a yard of gauze deeply imbedded in the flesh, and likewise are capable of determining whether or not injurious consequences of some character would probably result. The exact nature and extent of the evil consequences resulting therefrom, of course, laymen would not be competent to determine without the aid of medical science. But the jurors - were not without expert assistance. We glean the following from the testimony of the men skilled in medical science.

Dr. Welborn: “I performed the operation July 12. The incision was from 6 to 10 inches long. We packed the cavity around the bone with iodoform gauze. We put in 20 to 30 inches of the gauze.

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Bluebook (online)
127 N.E. 559, 74 Ind. App. 659, 1920 Ind. App. LEXIS 286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-hospital-v-pulley-indctapp-1920.