Walker, Cedasha v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families, Division of Family Services TPR

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CEDASHA WALKER,1 § No. 35, 2026 § Respondent Below, § Court Below—Family Court Appellant, § of the State of Delaware § v. § File Nos. 25-07-2TK, 25-07-3TK, § 25-07-4TK, and 25-07-5TK DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES § FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND § Petition Nos. 25-16590, 25-16607 THEIR FAMILIES, DIVISION OF § 25-16616, and 25-16623 FAMILY SERVICES, § § Petitioner Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: July 24, 2026 Decided: August 5, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s brief and the motion to withdraw filed

by the appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), the responses, and the

Family Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant (“Mother”) filed this appeal from the Family Court’s

order terminating her parental rights as to her three children (the “children”). The

Family Court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the children’s respective

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the appellant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). fathers, one of whom never appeared for or participated in the proceedings and two

of whom are deceased. We focus on the facts in the record as they relate to Mother’s

appeal.

(2) In July 2024, a senior investigator from the Department of Services for

Children, Youth and Their Families, Division of Family Services (“DFS”) went to

the home where Mother and the children had been living to investigate an urgent

report about the children’s welfare. Mother and the oldest child were not there. The

younger two children, then approximately two and six years old, were there with

Mother’s significant other. The children were dirty and smelled of urine and other

body odors; their feet were dark and grimy with dirt; and they had several red marks

on their bodies. Dirty diapers and other trash were scattered throughout the interior

of the home; the home smelled strongly of feces and urine; and cockroaches were

inside the refrigerator. DFS filed for, and was granted, emergency custody of the

children. The Family Court granted the petition. The Court appointed counsel for

Mother, and the mandated hearings ensued.2

(3) At the preliminary protective hearing, Mother stipulated that the

children were dependent in her care because she did not have adequate housing for

2 See Kline v. Del. Div. Family Servs., 2023 WL 2259101, at *1 n.3 (Del. Feb. 28, 2023) (“When a child is removed from home by DFS and placed in foster care, the Family Court is required to hold hearings at regular intervals under procedures and criteria detailed by statute and the court’s rules.” (citing 13 Del. C. § 2514; DEL. FAM. CT. R. CIV. PROC. 212-19)).

2 them. The children were placed in foster care, and DFS worked with Mother to

develop a case plan for reunification. Mother made little progress on her case plan

over the next eleven months—for example, the housing situation deteriorated;

Mother acknowledged daily illegal drug use and did not engage in offered treatment;

she did not attend mental health treatment; she attended some visits with the children

and missed others; and she did not complete the required parenting course. In June

2025, the Family Court approved DFS’s request to change the plan from

reunification to termination of parental rights (“TPR”).

(4) DFS filed a TPR petition, and the Family Court scheduled a TPR

hearing for September 15, 2025. At the hearing, Mother tendered her written consent

to the termination of her parental rights. DFS stipulated to accept Mother’s consent

as the sole basis for termination so long as she did not rescind consent within the

time permitted by statute,3 but requested that the court nevertheless receive evidence

on the failure to plan ground. The court engaged in a colloquy with Mother to ensure

that she had an opportunity to consult with counsel as to consent; was not pressured

or threatened to consent; understood her right to revoke consent; and understood that

DFS would still have an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing as to failure

3 See 13 Del. C. § 1106B(a)(1) (providing that a parent’s consent to TPR may be revoked if “[w]ithin 14 days of executing the consent, the parent who executed the consent delivers written notification of revocation to the agency or individual to which the parental rights are to be transferred”).

3 to plan, based on which the court would rule if Mother revoked consent. The court

then accepted the consent. At her request, Mother was permitted to leave the hearing

before evidence was presented, and her counsel was also excused from further

participation in the hearing.

(5) Mother revoked her consent within the statutory period. The court

therefore considered the evidence that had been presented and entered a written

decision terminating Mother’s parental rights on December 22, 2025. The Family

Court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had failed to plan

adequately for the children during the approximately fourteen months that they had

been in DFS custody.4 The court determined that DFS had made reasonable efforts

toward reunification. Applying the best-interest factors,5 the Family Court found that

DFS had established, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was in the children’s

best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

(6) On appeal, Mother’s counsel has filed an opening brief and a motion to

withdraw under Rule 26.1(c). Counsel asserts that, based upon a conscientious

review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues. Counsel provided

Mother with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief and

4 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)a. 5 See id. § 1103(a) (providing that parental rights may be terminated if one of several statutory grounds is established and termination “appears to be in the child’s best interest”); id. § 722 (setting forth factors that the court may consider when determining the best interests of a child).

4 informed her of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c) and her right to supplement counsel’s

presentation. Mother did not provide issues for the Court’s consideration. DFS as

appellee and the children’s attorney from the Office of the Child Advocate have

responded to the Rule 26.1(c) brief and argue that the Family Court’s judgment

should be affirmed.

(7) Having carefully reviewed the record on appeal, we find that the Family

Court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and we can discern no error in

the Family Court’s application of the law to the facts. We therefore conclude that

Mother’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable

issues. We are also satisfied that Mother’s counsel made a conscientious effort to

examine the record and the law and properly determined that Mother could not raise

a meritorious claim in this appeal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice