Walck v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.

267 A.2d 508, 56 N.J. 533, 1970 N.J. LEXIS 270
Supreme Court of New Jersey·Decided July 20, 1970·Published·Cited by 41 cases

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Francis, J.

This is a heart death workmen’s compensation case. The Division of Compensation made an award in favor of petitioner Katherine E. Walck, widow of decedent. The County Court and Appellate Division (in unreported opinions) affirmed and we granted respondent’s application for certification. Walck v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 55 N. J. 358 (1970).

An original and an amended petition for compensation were filed. The first, which was filed on December 11, 1963, simply alleged that on March 14, 1962 at 9 :00 a.m. “[D]ecedent suffered a heart attack at his office desk and was taken to [the] plant dispensary [from which] he was taken to Somerset Hospital where [he] expired at approximately 10:20 a.m.” The amended petition, which was filed three months later, alleged that “during the course of his employment, [decedent] was subjected to various stresses and strains and conditions, arising out of and in the course of his employment, which caused and aggravated a cardiovascular condition which culminated in a fatal heart attack on March 14th, 1962.”

At the hearing in the Division, petitioner sought to establish the employer’s liability on two theories. The first thesis was that the deceased employee, Claude W. Walck, *538 had been subjected to certain employment-connected emotional tension which so acted upon an underlying condition of heart disease as to cause or contribute to his fatal heart attack on March 14, 1962. The second theory was that on many occasions during the course of Walck’s employment he was treated and examined at the plant dispensary “for certain complaints” and that there was a “failure to properly evaluate and diagnose the decedent’s health status and by reason of that failure * * * the decedent suffered injury which contributed to his death.” By way of explanation of the precise nature of this charge, petitioner’s attorney advised the Judge of Compensation that he had used the term “failure * * * advisedly * * * in a legal sense,” and that he had no intention of imputing “any carelessness or any negligence.” He was simply alleging a non-negligent mistaken diagnosis.

The trial judge found that a right to recover had been established on both theories. The county court judge affirmed on the ground that the evidence showed employment-induced emotional strain which caused or contributed to Walck’s heart attack and death. Having sustained the award on that basis, he declared it unnecessary “to pass upon the applicability of the humane instincts doctrine,” which was enunciated by our Court in Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 32 N. J. 479 (1960) and on which petitioner relied. The Appellate Division affirmed on the same basis.

Walck became employed in respondent’s industrial relations department on June 16, 1951. He was 41 years of age at the time and 51 years old when he died. In the 10 years and nine months of service, his wages had increased from $5,000 to $10,150 annually. In 1962, he was Supervisor of Employment and Employee Relations; it was a desk job. Like all other employees, he was given a pre-employment medical examination. That examination, including a fluoroscopic study of his chest, was negative. His only complaint was that he suffered from occasional indigestion. This examination was repeated annually thereafter.

*539 The only fact witness produced in support of petitioner’s ease was decedent’s widow, Katherine E. Walck. She testified that, as far as she knew, during the two or three years before his death her husband had been in good health except for nerves and tension. She was not aware of any heart condition, but said that her husband had been treated by the family doctor for the nerves and tension. She testified that over a year before the fatal heart attack Miller Naylor, respondent’s manager of industrial relations, retired. He had been Walek’s superior from the inception of her husband’s employment. On his retirement, one Grote was appointed to succeed him. After this event, Mrs. Walck said her husband seemed nervous and tense. This condition showed itself in the evening after he came home, when he “would seem aggravated, a bit irritable.” He would want to relax, watch television or read the newspaper. Sometimes he would fall asleep before dinner which he had not done in earlier years. He told her he was concerned that he might lose his job. When Naylor was his superior he had never “evidenced these feelings of nervousness and tension.” However, no testimony was offered to show that Walck and Grote ever had words, or a dispute or any kind of a disagreement, or that Grote had ever criticized WalcFs work, or reported him for anything, or ever had him “on the carpet.” No employee was produced to say that Grote and Walck did not get along together. In the voluminous records of respondent’s clinic, which describe Walck’s many visits and the many kinds of complaints which brought him there over the years (of which more later), not one complaint related to an employment condition or a problem with a superior — Grote or anyone else. In fact, it does appear that, during the period after Grote became manager of the department, Walck received a $600 wage increase.

According to Mrs. Walck, her husband did not tell her why he was concerned about his job. She put it this way: “I suppose on certain days an insecurity feeling, not knowing how he stood, that type of thing.” She described a single *540 incident which he mentioned to her. About six months or a year before his death, one day when Walck was working at his desk Grote suddenly appeared “and stood at the desk and when [Walck] looked up and spoke to him he sort of eased his way out. He [Walck] couldn’t figure out why he had come in there.” There was nothing further to that episode and no explanation as to why Grote’s presence in the office near Walck’s desk was of any significance — beyond the routine appearance of a superior.

It may be well to note at this point that the trial court criticized respondent for failing to produce Grote as a witness. In our view, the criticism was unwarranted; we see nothing of significant consequence in this isolated, momentary episode, or in the remainder of Mrs. Walek’s testimony, to rebut or to explain.

At any rate, Mrs. Walck asserted that, in addition to her husband’s nervousness and tension during the year or so before the fatal heart attack, he began to complain of pains and pressure in the chest area and pains in his right arm. He consulted their family physician, Dr. Robert C. Wilson of Somerville, a specialist in internal medicine, for the nerves and tension. The doctor is a Diplómate of the American Board of Internal Medicine, Eellow of the American College of Physicians and Director of Medicine at the Somerset Hospital. Eifty percent of his practice involved the treatment of patients with cardiovascular complaints or heart conditions. He had known Walck quite well socially over a 12-year period and had examined and treated him for over six years before the fatal heart attack. It is appropriate to note here that the doctor could not recall any occasion over the six-year period when W’alck made a complaint referable to his employment, to his fellow employees or to any superior. Dr. Wilson’s office records showing all visits, complaints and treatments during the six years were marked in evidence.

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Walck v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 267 A.2d 508, 56 N.J. 533, 1970 N.J. LEXIS 270 (N.J. 1970).

267 A.2d 508 (Walck v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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