Wainwright v. Thomas

250 F. Supp. 963, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6929
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedJanuary 31, 1966
DocketCiv. A. No. 7758
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 250 F. Supp. 963 (Wainwright v. Thomas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wainwright v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 963, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6929 (D.S.C. 1966).

Opinion

SIMONS, District Judge.

This action was originally commenced in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County, South Carolina by Clara Wainwright, plaintiff, against W. C. Thomas, d/b/a Ocean Pines Motor Court, defendant, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when she fell at defendant’s motel in Myrtle Beach, Horry County, South Carolina, on March 10, 1961. In due course defendant removed the action to this court pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, U.S.C.A., § 1332, based upon the diversity of citizenship between plaintiff, a resident and citizen of the state of New Jersey, and the defendant, a resident and citizen of the state of South Carolina; and the amount in controversy exceeding $10,-000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. Subsequent to joinder of issues herein both plaintiff and defendant died; and by appropriate orders their respective personal representatives have been substituted as parties plaintiff and defendant in their stead.

In her complaint plaintiff alleges that at about 7:45 a. m. on March 10, 1961 while she was a paying guest at defendant’s Ocean Pines Motor Court in Myrtle Beach she fell out the doorway of the cottage in which she had spent the night as she started outside to get into her automobile to leave. The complaint further alleges that the fall and her resulting injuries and damages were occasioned by the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep the walkway adequately lighted so that she could see where she was walking; in constructing the step and walkway surface of the same color, thus giving the optical appearance of being the same level, creating a dangerous condition; constructing the cottage so that the step was shaded by the roof over the walk so that it could not be clearly seen; and in failing to warn the plaintiff of these conditions when he knew, or should have known of their existence. She further alleged that as a direct and proximate result of such negligence of the defendant she suffered serious, severe, painful, and permanent injuries to her right hip and body necessitating hospitalization, surgery and confinement in bed for several months; that she suffered myocardial insufficiency resulting from arteriosclerotic heart disease, which was precipitated from the stress and strain of her said injuries; that she suffered temporary total and partial permanent disability and continuous pain; and that as a result of said injuries she has incurred great medical, hospital, nursing, and other expenses; and she asks for actual damages from defendant in the amount of $100,000.00.

In his answer defendant sets up the following defenses: 1) A general denial wherein all of the material allegations of plaintiff’s complaint are contraverted; 2) sole negligence, recklessness and wilfulness of the plaintiff in the several particulars set forth in the answer; and 3) contributory negligence and recklessness of plaintiff in the particulars set forth in said answer. Defendant also pleaded two additional defenses, both of which were stricken by the court upon plaintiff’s motion at trial upon ground they were not relevant and did not constitute a legal defense.

The case was heard before me without a jury at the December 1965 term of this court at Florence, South Carolina pursuant to Rule 39(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As required by Rule 52(a) of said Rules I find the facts specially and state separately my conclusions of law thereon.

FINDINGS OF FACT

At the time of plaintiff’s fall, and for a number of years prior thereto, the [965]*965Ocean Pines Motor Court, located at Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, was owned and operated by W. C. Thomas. Prior to his ownership and operation, it had been owned and operated’ for a number of years by one C. N. Talbot who testified for defendant. Defendant’s court was located on the west or southwest side of U. S. Highway No. 17, which extends generally in a North-South direction through the City of Myrtle Beach.

On the afternoon of March 9, 1961, plaintiff, in company with her husband, H. A. Wainwright, and her daughter, Muriel Wainwright, arrived at the Ocean Pines Motor Court at about 5:45 o’clock, registered, and became a paying guest. Mrs. Wainwright and her husband occupied room number 5, while their daughter occupied room number 6.

That same night room number 7, an adjoining room to that occupied by plaintiff’s daughter, was occupied by John G. Leach and his wife of Wilmington, Delaware, who were also overnight guests.

The room arrangements were such that each room opened outside to a covered walkway which had a width of approximately twelve feet. The surface of the walkway was elevated about four to six inches above ground level, and was constructed of tile squares, approximately eight inches by eight inches, laid flat, and consisting of varying shades of red color. This walkway was covered by a roof which was approximately nine feet above the surface of the walkway, and which extended over the same. The walkway was not enclosed, but was completely open on the driveway [or northern] side. The door opening of the motel room was approximately three feet by six feet-eight inches, and there was a single colonial type wood door which controlled this opening for entrance or exit. This door was hung so as to open to the inside of the room. The floor of the motel room was covered by wall-to-wall carpet of beige color, and this carpet was secured at the threshold by a metal strip, which was virtually flush with the threshold. The threshold itself was constructed of wood and was painted green. The floor level of the room was approximately ten inches above the surface of the outside walkway, and there was a single brick step or riser from the walkway to the opening of the room. This step or riser was approximately forty-five inches long, had a tread of about sixteen [16] inches, was about six [6] inches above the level of the walkway, and about four [4] inches below the floor level of the room. The step was constructed of brick of a red color range, laid on edge, with a single eight-by-eight inch tile square in each of the front corners. Immediately in front of the step or riser and located upon the surface of the walkway was a red rubber mat having the word “WELCOME” across its center.

The evidence is conflicting in reference to the design, construction and coloring of the walkway, steps and entrances into the rooms at the motel. Plaintiff’s witnesses generally admitted that the steps and walkway were somewhat different in design and materials, but stated that the brick steps and the tile walkway were about the same or similar in color. On the other hand defendant’s witnesses asserted that there was a substantial difference and variation in the design, color, and texture of the materials between the steps and the walkway. After a careful consideration of this most vital issue I have concluded that there was a definite and a readily discernable difference in the color and/or shade, texture and design between the brick steps immediately in front of the doorway of each motel room and the walkway six inches below the step level. The steps are made of brick laid on edge which are a darker red color than the reddish eight-by-eight inch tile of which the walkway is constructed. There was also a noticeable difference in the shade of the red rubber mat placed immediately in front of the steps on the walkway, which contrasted with the colors of the step and walkway.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
250 F. Supp. 963, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6929, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wainwright-v-thomas-scd-1966.