Waid v. Snyder

District Court, E.D. Michigan·Decided December 2, 2022·No. 5:16-cv-10444·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

In re Flint Water Cases. Judith E. Levy United States District Judge __________________________/

This Order Relates To:

ALL CASES

__________________________/

ORDER MODIFYING MELVIN JONES’ ENJOINMENT ORDER, ENJOINING JONES FROM USING THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN’S PRO SE PORTAL, AND DENYING HIS REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

On November 15, 2022, non-party Melvin Jones filed a request for leave to file a document in the main Flint water case docket. (No. 16-cv-10444 ECF No. 2264.) Jones is a prolific filer in this and other Flint water cases. He is subject to an enjoinment order in this litigation applicable to all Flint water cases. (See Case No. 16-cv-10444, ECF No. 2062 (enjoinment order), 2054 (excluding notices of appeal from enjoinment

order).) The Clerk of the Court properly struck Jones’ filings from

Case No. 16-10444 because he is an enjoined filer. The Clerk indicated that if Jones wishes to file documents in the Flint

water cases, he must identify docket no. 22-mc-51723 only. (See Case No. 16-10444, ECF No. 2268.) Between November 15, 2022

and today, Jones has filed seven items on the docket in Case No. 22-mc-51723.

Jones has also made numerous filings in the Flint water

case docket for the Bellwether I and other individual cases, Case No. 17-10164. (See, e.g., Case No. 17-10164, ECF Nos. 956, 970,

973, 977, 982, 987, 991, 994, 996, 1000, 1002, 1003, 1009.) Jones is not a party to any of the Flint water litigation, and has no role in the Bellwether cases (which involved four minor children and

two engineering companies), whatsoever.1 This Order clarifies and reiterates that the enjoinment

orders entered in Case No. 16-10444 are equally applicable to Case No. 17-10164 and all of the other Flint water cases.

Accordingly, with the exception of notices of appeal, which this Court does not have jurisdiction to prohibit, see Griggs v.

Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58–59 (1982), the Clerk of the Court is directed to strike Jones’ filings in Case

No. 17-10164.2

1 It is the Court’s understanding that Jones has submitted a claim in the partial settlement in these cases, however, he is not a party to the litigation. 2 So far, the only filing in Case No. 17-10164 that Jones has not entitled “Notice of Appeal” is ECF No. 1002. The Clerk is directed to strike the filing in accordance with this Order and the enjoinment orders in Case No. 16-10444. Notably, almost without exception, Jones’ documents entitled “Notice of Appeal” fail to meet the criteria for a notice of appeal. For example, in Jones’ latest filing, entitled “Corrected Notice of Appeal” he writes: Again, the process and procedure that Jones must follow

under this enjoinment order is: all items he submits for filing must contain the Case No. 22-mc-51723 or they will be rejected.

The Court will periodically review the docket in Case No. 22-mc- 51723. If the Court determines that Jones has satisfied the

criteria for obtaining leave to file a particular item, the Court will direct the Clerk’s office to place any such filings on the

appropriate Flint water case docket. Otherwise, Jones’ filings will remain on docket 22-mc-51723 only.3

Here—here my question for Judge LEVY is that looking @ my filings . . . is it possible that the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals was TOO harsh in preventing me from sending a simple EMAIL so as to file my intended appeal briefs and such to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals? (17-10164, ECF No. 1009, PageID.70454.) This filing, which is mainly a question to the district court, cannot reasonably be construed as a notice of appeal of any district court order. However, because it is entitled “Notice of Appeal,” this Court defers to the Court of Appeals to address the filing. 3 Thus far, none of Jones’ filings satisfy the criteria of the enjoinment order. The filings do not include the required certification, do not set forth a claim for relief or a basis for the same, and exceed the Jones’ history of repeated nonsensical and improper filings

establishes that he is a vexatious litigant. This Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned Jones regarding

his conduct. (See October 21, 2022 Order, 6th Cir. Case No. 22- 1540/1609.) The Sixth Circuit has prohibited Jones from using

the pro se e-filing e-mail box in order to curtail his vexatious filings. (Id.) Curtailing Jones’ filings is necessary in this Court,

too. Accordingly, Jones is prohibited from using the pro se portal system in the Eastern District of Michigan.4

Finally, the Court will address Jones’ request for in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) status. On November 15, 2022, the Sixth Circuit sent Jones a letter indicating that Jones has until

December 15, 2022 to pay the $505.00 filing fee or file a motion

length limitation. (See Case No. 22-mc- 1723, ECF Nos. 1–7.) None warrant filing on any of the Flint Water case dockets. 4 Under Eastern District of Michigan Administrative Order 22-AO- 041, pro se filers “may file documents” either via regular mail or through pro se portal. Accordingly, if Jones wishes to file a document in Case No. 22-mc-51723, he may do so only via regular mail. to proceed IFP. (6th Cir. Case No. 22-2042, Document: 1.) Jones

filed a document in Case No. 16-10444 seeking IFP status (despite his appeal purporting to originate from Case No. 17-

10164). The Clerk’s Office properly struck Jones’ filing and removed it to Case No. 22-mc-51723, where it resides as ECF

No. 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes the Court to permit an appeal

without prepayment of fees: by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement . . . that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

The statute provides that “[a]n appeal may not be taken in

forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c). Moreover, the statute

states that: “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—the . . . appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Additionally,

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 sets forth the requirements for a motion to proceed IFP.

Jones’ IFP application does meet the criteria set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) or Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4. Jones states that his financial status remains unchanged from the time he sought (and was granted) IFP

status in Case No. 21-10937. (See Case No. 5:22-mc-51723, ECF

No. 4, at PageID.53.) He seeks to have this Court grant him an “IFP ‘continuing request.’” (Id. at PageID.55.) He does not cite

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Related

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.
459 U.S. 56 (Supreme Court, 1982)