Wagoner v. UnitedHealthCare

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedFebruary 13, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-00827
StatusUnknown

This text of Wagoner v. UnitedHealthCare (Wagoner v. UnitedHealthCare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wagoner v. UnitedHealthCare, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Gary L. Wagoner, No. CV-22-00827-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 UnitedHealthCare,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Defendant UnitedHealthCare (“Defendant”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss pro se 16 Plaintiff Gary L. Wagoner’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (Doc. 5). Plaintiff filed a Response in 17 Opposition and a Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 8)1, and Defendant filed a Reply 18 (Doc. 10). The Court must now decide whether Plaintiff’s state law claims for breach of 19 contract and unjust enrichment are preempted by Section 514(a) of the Employee 20 Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). 21 I. Background2 22 This case concerns Defendant’s denial of benefits under an employee welfare 23 benefit plan (the “Plan”) governed by ERISA. (Doc. 1-3 at 4–16). Ms. Sadedra Johnson

24 1 The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 8) because Plaintiff did not first obtain an entry of default from the Clerk of the Court under Rule 55(a). Defendant 25 also has not failed to plead or otherwise defend this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead 26 or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.”) 27 2 Unless otherwise noted, these facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1-3). The 28 Court will assume the Complaint’s factual allegations are true, as it must in evaluating a motion to dismiss. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). 1 (“Johnson”) is insured by Defendant. Plaintiff is an out-of-network health care provider 2 for Johnson who provided anesthesia services to her. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges Defendant 3 has failed to pay benefits under the Plan for these services. (Id.) 4 Plaintiff now brings breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims against 5 Defendant. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he has “been appointed by the insured member Sadedra 6 Johnson as her Designated Representative for this collection action of a past due medical 7 payment.” (Id.) He claims Ms. Johnson “signed an Assignment of Benefits and a Power 8 of Attorney contract to allow the Designated Representative all rights under the United 9 HealthCare Plan policy, including appeal rights, direct payment collection rights, 10 disclosure access and litigation, have been transferred to the provider [Plaintiff] Dr. Gary 11 Wagoner.” (Id. at 6). 12 Defendant removed the case from the Maricopa County Justice Court, arguing that 13 the Court has original jurisdiction because ERISA governs this matter. (Doc. 1). 14 Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing 15 Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by Section 514(a) of ERISA. (Doc. 5). 16 II. Legal Standard 17 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Cook 18 v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). A claim that is preempted by federal law 19 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Stewart v. U.S. 20 Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (motion to dismiss based on ERISA 21 preemption is a merits decision on the pleadings, not a motion to dismiss for lack of 22 jurisdiction). 23 III. Discussion 24 ERISA governs the administration of employee benefit plans and protects the 25 interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries with uniform guidelines and rules. 29 26 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 436 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 27 2006). Two ERISA preemption provisions defeat state-law causes of action: complete 28 preemption under Section 502(a), and conflict preemption under Section 514(a). Aetna 1 Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004). Defendant contends the latter provision, 2 Section 514(a), preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims for breach of contract and unjust 3 enrichment. Defendant also argues that even if Plaintiff were to bring an ERISA claim, he 4 lacks standing to do so. The Court will address each of Defendant’s arguments in turn. 5 A. Section 514(a) Preemption 6 Section 514(a) provides that ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as 7 they may . . . relate to any employee benefit plan.” § 1144(a). The issue is whether 8 Plaintiff’s breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims relate to the Plan. A law “relates 9 to” an employee benefit plan . . . if it has a “connection with” or “reference to” such a plan. 10 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). 11 Although separate prongs, Defendant lumps together the “reference to” and “connection 12 with” an ERISA plan. (Doc. 5 at 5). 13 a. “Reference to” ERISA Plan 14 First, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff’s claims “reference to” an ERISA 15 Plan. A state law demonstrates the forbidden “reference to” an ERISA plan when it [1] 16 “acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . or [2] where the existence of 17 ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.” Cal. Div. of Labor Standards 18 Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997). Defendant argues 19 Plaintiff’s benefit coverage determination letter states the Plan’s administrator made its 20 coverage decisions based on the terms of Ms. Johnson’s ERISA benefit plan. (Id.) 21 Defendant thus contends that Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted because his 22 challenge to Defendant’s decision falls under the ERISA plan. (Id.) The Court disagrees. 23 Plaintiff’s state law claims are common law claims for breach of contract and unjust 24 enrichment. (Doc. 1-3 at 4). These claims neither act “immediately and exclusively upon 25 ERISA plans” nor do the claims rely on “the existence of ERISA plans” to operate. This 26 is because the claims arise from “state law doctrines of general application.” Arizona State 27 Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Citibank (Arizona), 125 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir.1997). 28 Plaintiff’s state law claims therefore survive the “reference to” preemption prong of 1 Section 514(a). See Blue Cross of California Inc. v. Insys Therapeutics Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2 3d 996, 1004 (D. Ariz. 2019) (finding plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim was not 3 preempted under Section 514(a) because it arose from state law doctrines of general 4 application); Nationwide DME, LLC v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 5 1085 (D. Ariz. 2015) (same finding as to plaintiff’s breach of contract claim). 6 b. “Connection with” ERISA Plan 7 Next, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff’s claims have a “connection with” 8 an ERISA Plan.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
463 U.S. 85 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
504 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila
542 U.S. 200 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Cook v. Brewer
637 F.3d 1002 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Lee v. City Of Los Angeles
250 F.3d 668 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Paulsen v. CNF INC.
559 F.3d 1061 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Nationwide DME, LLC v. Cigna Health & Life Insurance
136 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (D. Arizona, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Wagoner v. UnitedHealthCare, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wagoner-v-unitedhealthcare-azd-2023.