Wagner v. Shasta County

Opinion

CINDY WAGNER, No. 2:20-cv-00403-JAM-DMC Plaintiff, v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SHASTA COUNTY; SHASTA COUNTY DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; and DOES 1 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS through 20, inclusive, Defendants. On January 23, 2020, Cindy Wagner (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Shasta County, the Shasta County Sheriff’s Department, and Does 1-20 in Shasta County Superior Court, alleging several civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Shasta County (“Defendant”) removed the case to federal court, see Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, on February 21, 2020, and now moves for judgment on the pleadings. Mot. for JOP (“Mot.”), ECF No. 21. Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF No. 22, to which Defendant replied, ECF No. 23. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.1 On April 17, 2019, Cindy Wagner (“Plaintiff”) and her husband were taken into custody at the Shasta County Jail due to an alleged verbal dispute. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1. While in the booking cell, Plaintiff was given a pen to write down the code for telephone calls. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16. When it was time to handcuff Plaintiff and escort her out of the room, one of the Shasta County Sheriff’s Deputies told her to leave the pen behind. Compl. ¶ 16. In response, Plaintiff tossed the pen back toward the room she was being escorted from. Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges that, as soon as she did this, the deputy who was handcuffing her pulled her left hand behind her back, shoved her face and head into the wall, threw her on the ground, and got on top of her. Compl. ¶ 18. Several other deputies got on top of Plaintiff as well. Compl. ¶ 19. At the time, Plaintiff weighed 113 pounds and was 5’5” tall. Compl. ¶ 20. Plaintiff sustained a large contusion and hematoma to her forehead, a broken C-3 vertebra in her neck, a broken nose, a concussion, and lacerations to her face and lip as a result of the deputies’ use of force. Compl. ¶ 22. Despite these serious injuries, the deputies dragged her to the jail’s infirmary only to get the bleeding under control. Compl. ¶ 23. After the infirmary visit, Plaintiff was escorted to a cell where she was

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for September 15, 2020. ordered to undress while the cell door was open. Compl. ¶ 24. Sensing that she was seriously injured, Plaintiff pleaded for help from her cell. Compl. ¶ 25. Eventually the deputies called an ambulance and Plaintiff was transported to the Mercy Medical Center Emergency Department. Compl. ¶ 26. After Plaintiff was treated for her injuries, she was transported back to the jail where she spent a night in custody. Compl. ¶ 28. She was released the next day. Id. A. Judicial Notice Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s August 2, 2019, tort claim against Defendant. Request for Judicial Notice (“RJC”), ECF No. 21-2. Plaintiff does not oppose this request. Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute,” because it (1) “is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction”; or (2) “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)-(b). Plaintiff’s tort claim is part of Defendant’s claim file and is a public document not subject to reasonable dispute. See Clarke v. Upton, 703 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (finding California Government Tort Claims and their rejections the proper subject of judicial notice). It is the proper subject of judicial notice only to the extent that the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that this claim was filed. The Court cannot and does not take judicial notice of the truth or falsity of the allegations in the tort claim. B. Legal Standard A party may move for a judgment on the pleadings as soon as the pleadings are closed, but no so late as to delay trial. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c). The time of filing is the principal difference between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b). Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). Otherwise, the motions are functionally identical. Id. Thus, a Rule 12(c) motion may be based on either: (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff need allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For the purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “the allegations of the non-moving party must be accepted as true, while the allegations of the moving party which have been denied are assumed to be false.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issues of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. It is improper when the court must go beyond the pleadings to resolve the issue. Id. However, on a Rule 12(c) motion, a court may consider “facts that are contained in materials of which the court may take judicial notice.” Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 981 at n.18 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). C. Analysis 1. Monell Municipalities can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show (1) he possessed a constitutional right and was deprived of that right, (2) the municipality had a policy, (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right, and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Sweiha v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. 19- CV-03098-LB, WL 48482227 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)). A plaintiff can establish the existence of a policy or custom with: (1) proof that a municipal employee committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal government policy, or a “longstanding practice or custom,” which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity; (2) proof that the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority and that the challenged conduct was thus an act of official government policy; or (3) proof that an official with “final policymaking authority” ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it. Gillete v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992). As an initial matter, Plaintiff asserts Monell claims against Defendant Shasta County and the Shasta County Sheriff’s Department. See Compl. ¶¶ 36, 37, 41, 52, 63, 75, 84, 113. However, the Shasta County Sheriff’s Department must be dismissed as a defendant. Although municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under Monell, departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; therefore, the Sheriff’s Department—a local law enforcement department—is not a proper party. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791–92 (9th Cir. 1995). As such, Plaintiff cannot pursue her remaining § 1983 claims against the Sheriff’s Department. See Boone v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 2:16- cv-1293, WL 117966 at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (“Because the Solano County Sheriff’s Department is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of [§] 1983, plaintiffs cannot maintain their claims against it under that statute as a matter of law.”). In addition, Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim against Defendant under a theory of respondeat superior. See Compl. ¶¶ 36, 37. That theory fails as a matter of law. It is well established that a city or county may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat superior. Board of Cty. Comm'rs. of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Thus, Plaintiff’s attempt to hold Defendant vicariously liable for the actions of its employees is unavailing. The remainder of Plaintiff’s Monell claims against Defendant relies upon either proof of a longstanding unconstitutional practice or custom or proof that an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional actions. See Compl. ¶¶ 41, 52, 63, 75, 84, 113. However, Plaintiff more or less repeats the same boilerplate allegation throughout the complaint. That, “Defendants County and Sheriff are liable as municipal entities and agencies for . . . maintaining a policy, custom or practice of permitting or encouraging” some unconstitutional act. And that, by either “failing to properly hire, train, supervise, or discipline their individual officers” or “failing to properly and adequately investigate complaints of retaliation” they ratified the constitutional violations. Id. These allegations, taken together, are insufficient to support either the existence of an unconstitutional custom or policy or the ratification of a subordinate’s unconstitutional action and fail as a matter of law. An unwritten policy or custom can form the basis of a Monell claim, but it must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. And “[l]iability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). The complaint must “put forth additional facts regarding the specific nature of [the] alleged policy, custom, or practice. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff presents one fact in support of the allegation that Defendant has established unconstitutional customs and ratified the unconstitutional acts of its subordinates. Plaintiff alleges that, during her detention, jail personnel told her that she “needed to do something” about the deputies’ behavior and that this was “not the first time this had happened.” See Compl. ¶ 31; see also Opp’n at 3–4. This lone factual assertion falls far short of establishing a practice “of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency such that the alleged custom or practice has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Harper v. Cnty of Merced, Case No. 1:18- cv-00562, WL 5880786 at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2018). And Plaintiff’s recitation of the basic elements of a Monell claim, supported only by facts specific to her arrest also fails to do so. Insofar as Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim under a theory of ratification, an isolated constitutional violation can give rise to municipal liability if ratified by a person with “final policymaking authority.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999). But Plaintiff does not present any factual allegations suggesting a county official approved or ratified this alleged unconstitutional practice. To show ratification, a plaintiff must prove “that the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” Id. at 1239 (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). Therefore, ratification requires knowledge of the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant ratified the constitutional violation by failing “properly and adequately investigate complaints of retaliation.” See Compl. ¶¶ 37, 41, 52, 63, 75, 84, 113. This conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a cognizable claim. See Hicks v. Cnty of Stanislaus, Case No. 1:17-cv-01187, WL 347790 at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (dismissing a ratification claim where the complaint contained “no factual allegations to support the claim that the County ‘approved, ratified, condoned, encouraged, south to cover up, and/or tacitly authorized’ the conduct . . . .”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 municipal liability claims under Monell. The Court also DISMISSES the Shasta County Sheriff’s Department as a defendant. 2. Civil Code § 52.1 Plaintiff, in her sixth claim, alleges that Defendant has violated California Civil Code § 52.1. See Compl. ¶¶ 91–94. Section 52.1 authorizes a claim for damages “against anyone who interferes, or tries to do so, by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with an individual’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by federal or state law.” Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 331 (1998). However, California Governmental Code § 945.4 (the “Government Claims Act”) provides that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . . .” The purpose of the Government Claims Act is “to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” Stockett v. Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 34 Cal.4th 441, 446 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, a claim need not contain the detail and specificity required of a pleading but need only “fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.” Id. “Unless a specific exception applies, a suit for money or damages includes all actions where the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, regardless whether the action is founded in tort, contract or some other theory.” Lozada v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1152 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Government Code section 905 lists several exceptions to the general rule that public entities must be provided notice of all claims for money or damages.” Id. “[C]laims for damages for violations of section [] 52.1 are not among them.” Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 763 (2002) (finding notice provision applies to a civil action for damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s sixth claim for violation of Civil Code § 52.1 is barred as a matter of law because Plaintiff’s tort claim under the Government Claims Act did not include a specific allegation that § 52.1 had been violated. See Mot. at 7–8. Defendant’s position is “unduly restricting.” Wormuth v. Lammersville Union School District, 305 F.Supp.3d 1108, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2018). The Government Claims Act’s filing requirement serves to alert a public entity that something happened and point the entity’s investigation in the right direction; it is not designed to eliminate meritorious claims. Stockett, 34 Cal.4th at 449 (“[the statutes] should be given a liberal construction to permit full adjudication on the merits.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A complaint’s fuller exposition of the factual basis beyond that given in the claim is not fatal, so long as the complaint is not based on an entirely different set of facts.” Id. at 447 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff provided Defendant with fair notice of her action for damages under California Civil Code § 52.1. See RJN at 4-7. She filed her tort claim pursuant to the Government Claims Act on August 2, 2019, and did not file the instant lawsuit in Sacramento Superior Court until January 23, 2020. See RJN; Compl.; see also Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2(a). Plaintiff’s timely filing notified Defendant of all the relevant circumstances, dates, and parties involved in the incident. See id. It adequately alerted Defendant that something happened and provided more than enough facts and details to point Defendant’s investigation in the right direction. That Plaintiff simply did not specify that she would later allege the incident amounted to a violation of § 52.1 does not render her filing incomplete and does not bar her § 52.1 claim against Defendant in this complaint. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth claim for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1. 3. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision Plaintiff’s seventh claim alleges negligence by Defendant in the hiring, training, and supervision of its sheriff’s deputies. See Compl. ¶ 98. Defendant argues that it is not subject to a negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim in the absence of a statute to impose direct liability on it. See Mot. at 9–10. Defendant is correct. See Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2012) (“California public entities are not subject to common law tort liability; all liability must be pursuant to statute.”); see also Berman v. Sink, 2013 WL 2360899 at *16 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“There is no dispute that the County is not subject to a direct claim for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, training and staffing. Such a direct negligence claim is subject to dismissal.”). California state courts have reached the same result. See de Villers v. Cnty. of San Diego, 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 253 (2007) (“We find no relevant case law approving a claim for direct liability based on a public entity’s allegedly negligent hiring and supervision practices.”). Plaintiff cites to no relevant statute imposing a mandatory duty on Defendant that would give rise to a negligent hiring, training, and supervision cause of action. This claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s seventh claim to the extent it alleges Defendant negligently hired, trained, and supervised its sheriff’s deputies. For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court: 1. GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to the Monell claims eee mE EIEIO IER III IIE III IE IRI OIE IS ESE IE IGE IE eee eee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without prejudice; 2. DISMISSES the Shasta County Sheriff’s Department as a defendant with prejudice; 3. DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to the sixth claim for } violation of California Civil Code § 52.1; and 4, GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to the seventh claim against it for negligent hiring, training, and supervision without prejudice. Dated: November 2, 2020 kA teiren staves odermacr 7008 13