Wages and White Lion Invest v. FDA

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 3, 2024
Docket21-60800
StatusPublished

This text of Wages and White Lion Invest v. FDA (Wages and White Lion Invest v. FDA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wages and White Lion Invest v. FDA, (5th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

Case: 21-60766 Document: 00517019541 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/03/2024

United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

for the Fifth Circuit FILED ____________ January 3, 2024 Lyle W. Cayce No. 21-60766 Clerk ____________

Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C., doing business as Triton Distribution,

Petitioner,

versus

Food & Drug Administration,

Respondent,

consolidated with _____________

No. 21-60800 _____________

Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C., doing business as Triton Distribution; Vapetasia, L.L.C.,

Petitioners,

Respondent. Case: 21-60766 Document: 00517019541 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/03/2024

______________________________

Appeal from the Food & Drug Administration Agency Nos. 21 USC 3871, PM0003531 ______________________________

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Stewart, Elrod, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.* Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, joined by Richman, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Elrod, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges: Over several years, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) sent manufacturers of flavored e-cigarette products on a wild goose chase. First, the agency gave manufacturers detailed instructions for what information federal regulators needed to approve e-cigarette products. Just as importantly, FDA gave manufacturers specific instructions on what regulators did not need. The agency said manufacturers’ marketing plans would be “critical” to the success of their applications. And the agency promulgated hundreds of pages of guidance documents, hosted public meetings, and posted formal presentations to its website—all with the (false) promise that a flavored-product manufacturer could, at least in theory, satisfy FDA’s instructions. The regulated manufacturers dutifully spent untold millions conforming their behavior and their applications to FDA’s say-so. Then, months after receiving hundreds of thousands of applications predicated on its instructions, FDA turned around, pretended it never gave anyone any instructions about anything, imposed new testing requirements without any notice, and denied all one million flavored e-cigarette

_____________________ * Judge Ramirez joined the court after this case was submitted and did not participate in the decision.

2 Case: 21-60766 Document: 00517019541 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/03/2024

21-60766 c/w No. 21-60800

applications for failing to predict the agency’s volte face. Worse, after telling manufacturers that their marketing plans were “critical” to their applications, FDA candidly admitted that it did not read a single word of the one million plans. Then FDA denied that its voluminous guidance documents and years-long instructional processes meant anything. Why? Because, the agency said, it always reserved the implied power to ignore every instruction it ever gave and to require the very studies it said could be omitted, along with the secret power to not even read the marketing plans it previously said were “critical.” It was the regulatory equivalent of Romeo sending Mercutio on a wild goose chase—and then admitting there never was a goose while denying he even suggested the chase. Cf. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 2, sc. 4. FDA justifies its behavior with two principal arguments. First, FDA argues that its years’ worth of regulatory guidance was not worth the paper it was printed on because it was hedged with cautious qualifiers and never guaranteed that any particular submission would be granted. Second, and most disturbingly, FDA argues that its capriciousness should be forgiven as harmless because the agency promises to deny petitioners’ applications even if we remand to make the agency follow the law. Today we reject both propositions. As the Supreme Court recently reminded us: “If men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with them.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021). No principle is more important when considering how the unelected administrators of the Fourth Branch of Government treat the American people. And FDA’s regulatory switcheroos in this case bear no resemblance to square corners. As for the agency’s harmless-error argument, the Supreme Court recently, unanimously, and summarily rejected it. Calcutt v. FDIC, 598 U.S. 623 (2023) (per curiam). We do the same here with the expectation that

3 Case: 21-60766 Document: 00517019541 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/03/2024

FDA will give petitioners the benefit of a full and fair regulatory proceeding on remand, notwithstanding its prior promises to reject their applications no matter what. I. A. In 2009, Congress enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“TCA”) to regulate tobacco products. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 387 et seq. The TCA prohibits manufacturers from selling any “new tobacco product” without authorization from FDA. See id. § 387j(a); id. § 387a(b) (delegating to FDA the authority to determine what constitutes new tobacco products). In 2016, FDA deemed e-cigarettes and their component parts1 to be “new tobacco products.” Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,973 (May 10, 2016) (“Deeming Rule”). The upshot: E-cigarette manufacturers had to submit premarket tobacco applications (“PMTAs”) for FDA approval to sell their products. See id. at 28,977. The TCA directs FDA to review the PMTAs to determine whether “permitting such tobacco product to be marketed would be appropriate for the protection of the public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(A). In making this determination, FDA must consider “the risks and benefits to the population as a whole.” Id. § 387j(c)(4). This includes considering (1) the “increased or decreased likelihood that existing users of tobacco products will stop using such products” and (2) “the increased or decreased likelihood _____________________ 1 The briefs and record materials in this case use a dizzying array of different terms to refer to e-cigarettes and their component parts: electronic cigarettes, e-cigarettes, electronic nicotine delivery devices (“ENDS”), nicotine cartridges, vaping products, vape pens, e-liquids, e-juice, and others. Unless context dictates otherwise, we refer to this list collectively as “e-cigarettes” throughout this opinion.

4 Case: 21-60766 Document: 00517019541 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/03/2024

that those who do not use tobacco products will start using such products.” Id. § 387j(c)(4)(A)–(B). FDA then undertook to clarify these standards. The agency first announced that it would extend the PMTA compliance deadlines for several years so the agency could promulgate application instructions and the manufacturers could comply with them. See FDA, Guidance for Industry, Extension of Certain Tobacco Product Compliance Deadlines Related to the Final Deeming Rule 5–11 (Aug. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/WC42-ALYD (“Deadline Guidance”).2 FDA provided its instructions on five relevant occasions. Warning: the detail that follows might be mind-numbing. But FDA’s detailed instructions are important to explain what e-cigarette manufacturers understood FDA would require of them. These details are important to understand why every single e-cigarette manufacturer in the entire Nation behaved just as petitioners did. And these details are important to explain why FDA cannot now pretend that it gave the regulated community fair notice of the PMTA requirements. 1.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

McBoyle v. United States
283 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1931)
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.
318 U.S. 80 (Supreme Court, 1943)
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.
332 U.S. 194 (Supreme Court, 1947)
Federal Power Commission v. Idaho Power Co.
344 U.S. 17 (Supreme Court, 1952)
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States
371 U.S. 156 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe
401 U.S. 402 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion
470 U.S. 729 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Ventura
537 U.S. 12 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Gonzales v. Thomas
547 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs v. Sanders
556 U.S. 396 (Supreme Court, 2009)
United States v. Johnson
632 F.3d 912 (Fifth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Chrysler Corp.
158 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Circuit, 1998)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Wages and White Lion Invest v. FDA, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wages-and-white-lion-invest-v-fda-ca5-2024.