Wager v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided May 5, 2023·No. 3:22-cv-05737·Unknown

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 8 FAWN W., 9 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C22-5737-MAT 10 v. 11 ORDER RE: SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DISABILITY APPEAL 12 Defendant. 13

14 Plaintiff appeals a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 15 (Commissioner) denying Plaintiff’s applications for disability benefits after a hearing before an 16 administrative law judge (ALJ). Having considered the ALJ’s decision, the administrative record 17 (AR), and all memoranda of record, this matter is AFFIRMED. 18 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 19 Plaintiff was born on XXXX, 1986.1 Plaintiff has at least a high school education and 20 previously worked as an intake coordinator, billing assistant, office clerk, and collection agent. AR 21 27. Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and an application for 22 Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on August 22, 2019, alleging disability beginning April 1, 23

1 Dates of birth must be redacted to the year. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(2) and LCR 5.2(a)(1). 1 2018. AR 13. The applications were denied at the initial level and on reconsideration. On April 9, 2 2021, the ALJ held a hearing and took testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE). AR 3 37–72. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to November 6, 2018. AR 13, 41.

4 On June 20, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. AR 13–29. Plaintiff 5 timely appealed. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on August 4, 2022, 6 making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1–6. Plaintiff appeals this 7 final decision of the Commissioner to this Court. 8 JURISDICTION 9 The Court has jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 10 STANDARD OF REVIEW 11 This Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the decision is in 12 accordance with the law and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 13 whole. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993). “Substantial evidence” means more

14 than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable 15 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 16 (9th Cir. 1989). If there is more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 17 decision, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th 18 Cir. 2002). 19 DISCUSSION 20 The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining 21 whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 22 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 23 the amended alleged onset date. AR 15. 1 At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: seizure 2 disorder; right shoulder disorder, migraine headaches; hearing loss; obesity; PTSD; and anxiety. 3 AR 16. The ALJ also found the record contained evidence of hypertension and hyperlipidemia;

4 however, the ALJ found these conditions did not rise to the level of severe. AR 16. 5 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 6 impairments that meet or equal the criteria of a listed impairment. AR 16–18. 7 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform 8 light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the following limitations: 9 occasional lifting and/or carrying of 20 pounds, frequent lifting and/or carrying of 10 pounds, pushing/pulling of the same, standing 10 and/or walking 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and sitting 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She can perform frequent overhead reaching 11 with the right (dominant) upper extremity, frequent climbing of ramps and stairs, no climbing of ladders and scaffolds, frequent 12 balancing, frequent stooping, and occasional crawling. She should work in a quiet noise environment, with no concentrated exposure 13 to airborne irritants, and no exposure to hazards. She can perform work with simple and detailed but not complex tasks; and can have 14 occasional brief interaction with coworkers, and no public interaction. She cannot set goals independently (goals must be set 15 by supervisor); and can perform work with few changes in a routine work setting. 16 AR 18–19. With that assessment, the ALJ found Plaintiff unable to perform any past relevant work. 17 AR 27. 18 At step five, the ALJ found Plaintiff capable of making a successful adjustment to other 19 work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. AR 28–29. With the assistance of 20 a VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing the requirements of representative 21 occupations such as assembler of small products, production assembler, and routing clerk. AR 28– 22 29. 23 Plaintiff raises the following issues on appeal: (1) Whether the ALJ provided clear and 1 convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony about her seizures, migraines, and shoulder 2 pain; and (2) whether the ALJ provided germane reasons for rejecting the lay witness testimony. 3 Plaintiff requests remand for further administrative proceedings. The Commissioner argues the

4 ALJ’s decision has the support of substantial evidence and should be affirmed. 5 1. Subjective Testimony 6 The ALJ must provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons, supported by substantial 7 evidence, for rejecting a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony.2 Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 8 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1286 (9th Cir. 1996). An ALJ may reject 9 a claimant’s symptom testimony when it is contradicted by the medical evidence, but not when it 10 merely lacks support in the medical evidence. See Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 11 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for 12 rejecting a claimant’s subjective testimony.”); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 13 2005) (“[L]ack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony.”).

14 Plaintiff alleges she cannot work because she experiences seizures, frequent 15 headaches/migraines, medication side effects, high eye pressure, light sensitivity, extreme anxiety 16 and PTSD, and constant stress. AR 322. Plaintiff alleges she is unable to drive, hold conversations, 17 or follow directions; her multiple appointments interfere with work; and she wears sunglasses all 18 day and finds it difficult to be in stores, doctor offices, home, or outside due to light sensitivity. 19 AR 322. Plaintiff further alleges she experiences trouble sleeping, chronic right shoulder pain, 20 difficulty focusing and counting money, and back pain. AR 323–27. In a September 2019 seizure 21

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