Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1400
ADRIANNA WADSWORTH,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
CHUCK NGUYEN,
Defendant, Appellant,
MSAD 40/RSU 40, ANDREW CAVANAUGH, and MEDOMAK VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Lynch, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
John J. Wall, III, with whom Monaghan Leahy, LLP, was on brief, for appellant. Eric R. LeBlanc, with whom Zachary H. Hammond and Bennett & Belfort, P.C., were on brief, for appellee.
November 13, 2024 PER CURIAM. Defendant-appellant Chuck Nguyen appeals
from the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment
as to plaintiff-appellee Adrianna Wadsworth's tort claims against
him.1 This case arises from Wadsworth's allegations of sexual
harassment and sex discrimination against her then-high school
principal, Andrew Cavanaugh. Relevant to this particular appeal
are Wadsworth's allegations against Nguyen, a social worker at the
school. In her complaint, Wadsworth alleges that Nguyen was aware
of at least some of Cavanaugh's conduct and that Nguyen failed to
adequately address the harassment. Specifically, she alleges
equal protection and substantive due process claims, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as Maine state-law negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims. For the reasons that
follow, we dismiss Nguyen's appeal.
I. Background
A detailed rendition of the underlying facts is not
necessary to our resolution of this interlocutory appeal. In
brief, Wadsworth alleges in her complaint that, while she was a
minor and student at Medomak Valley High School and over the course
Wadsworth later cross-appealed the district court's grant 1
of summary judgment, as well as its grant of a motion to dismiss, on various claims in favor of various defendants, including Chuck Nguyen, Case No. 23-1463 ("companion case"). These cases were briefed and argued together; however, the opinions in this appeal and the companion case will issue separately.
- 2 - of many months, Cavanaugh subjected her to non-physical sexual
harassment and discrimination. She reported some of Cavanaugh's
behavior to Nguyen, asking if it was "normal," and Nguyen informed
her that "there was nothing inappropriate" about Cavanaugh's
behavior. She also claims that Nguyen was aware of some instances
of Cavanaugh's harassment and discrimination. Finally, despite
Nguyen's status as a mandatory reporter and despite his authority
to implement corrective measures, Wadsworth claims Nguyen never
took any steps to report Cavanaugh or protect Wadsworth from
further mistreatment.
At issue here is a portion of the district court's
decision denying Nguyen's motion for summary judgment. In his
summary judgment motion, Nguyen argued, among other things, that
the tort claims against him could not stand because (1) Wadsworth
did not comply with the Maine Tort Claims Act's ("MTCA") notice
requirements and (2) he was entitled to discretionary function
immunity under the MTCA. The district court rejected these
arguments and denied summary judgment with respect to the tort
claims against Nguyen.2 Nguyen timely appealed.
2The district court granted Nguyen summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 substantive due process claim (the district court had previously dismissed the equal protection claim at the motion to dismiss stage). Wadsworth's § 1983 claims are at issue in the companion case and not here.
- 3 - II. Analysis
We begin with the firmly settled principle that "[t]he
burden of establishing jurisdiction rests with the party who
asserts its existence." Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 83 (1st
Cir. 2010) (quoting Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp.,
407 F.3d 546, 551 (1st Cir. 2005)). As we explain below, Nguyen
has failed to satisfy this burden.
This case involves the final decision rule. "Generally
speaking, appeals are permitted only from final judgments of the
district court." Lee-Barnes v. Puerto Ven Quarry Corp., 513 F.3d
20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Asociación de Subscripción Conjunta
del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Flores Galarza, 484
F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007)). The final decision rule for appellate
jurisdiction provides, in relevant part: "The courts of appeals
. . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States . . . ." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. "An order denying a motion for summary judgment is
generally not a final decision within the meaning of § 1291 and is
thus generally not immediately appealable." Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765, 771 (2014).
In his briefing, Nguyen acknowledges that the district
court's order denying summary judgment is not a final judgment and
is thus not automatically appealable. He instead argues that,
because of the nature of the legal questions at issue, his appeal
- 4 - may proceed under an exception to the final judgment rule: the
collateral-order doctrine. As we explain below, Nguyen's
arguments fail for several reasons, and, consequently, he has
failed to sustain his burden of establishing appellate
jurisdiction. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 83.
Under federal law, "[f]or the collateral-order doctrine
to apply, a district court order must: '[(1)] conclusively
determine the disputed question, [(2)] resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and [(3)] be
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.'"
Lee-Barnes, 513 F.3d at 25 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345,
349 (2006)). This doctrine is to be "applied narrowly and
interpreted strictly." Id. at 26 (quoting United States v.
Quintana-Aguayo, 235 F.3d 682, 684 (1st Cir. 2000)). Maine has
also adopted a final judgment rule and also provides an exception
to the finality requirement under a similar, but not identical,
collateral-order doctrine. See Bond v. Bond, 30 A.3d 816, 819-21
(Me. 2011).
In asserting that the collateral-order doctrine applies,
Nguyen relies on Maine cases discussing Maine's collateral-order
doctrine. However, these cases are not relevant to our analysis
because, regardless of whether the underlying dispute is one of
federal or state law, questions regarding the final decision rule
in federal court are governed by federal law. See Budinich v.
- 5 - Becton Dickenson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198-99 (1988) (explaining
that determining whether district court order on merits of
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Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1400
ADRIANNA WADSWORTH,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
CHUCK NGUYEN,
Defendant, Appellant,
MSAD 40/RSU 40, ANDREW CAVANAUGH, and MEDOMAK VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Lynch, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
John J. Wall, III, with whom Monaghan Leahy, LLP, was on brief, for appellant. Eric R. LeBlanc, with whom Zachary H. Hammond and Bennett & Belfort, P.C., were on brief, for appellee.
November 13, 2024 PER CURIAM. Defendant-appellant Chuck Nguyen appeals
from the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment
as to plaintiff-appellee Adrianna Wadsworth's tort claims against
him.1 This case arises from Wadsworth's allegations of sexual
harassment and sex discrimination against her then-high school
principal, Andrew Cavanaugh. Relevant to this particular appeal
are Wadsworth's allegations against Nguyen, a social worker at the
school. In her complaint, Wadsworth alleges that Nguyen was aware
of at least some of Cavanaugh's conduct and that Nguyen failed to
adequately address the harassment. Specifically, she alleges
equal protection and substantive due process claims, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as Maine state-law negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims. For the reasons that
follow, we dismiss Nguyen's appeal.
I. Background
A detailed rendition of the underlying facts is not
necessary to our resolution of this interlocutory appeal. In
brief, Wadsworth alleges in her complaint that, while she was a
minor and student at Medomak Valley High School and over the course
Wadsworth later cross-appealed the district court's grant 1
of summary judgment, as well as its grant of a motion to dismiss, on various claims in favor of various defendants, including Chuck Nguyen, Case No. 23-1463 ("companion case"). These cases were briefed and argued together; however, the opinions in this appeal and the companion case will issue separately.
- 2 - of many months, Cavanaugh subjected her to non-physical sexual
harassment and discrimination. She reported some of Cavanaugh's
behavior to Nguyen, asking if it was "normal," and Nguyen informed
her that "there was nothing inappropriate" about Cavanaugh's
behavior. She also claims that Nguyen was aware of some instances
of Cavanaugh's harassment and discrimination. Finally, despite
Nguyen's status as a mandatory reporter and despite his authority
to implement corrective measures, Wadsworth claims Nguyen never
took any steps to report Cavanaugh or protect Wadsworth from
further mistreatment.
At issue here is a portion of the district court's
decision denying Nguyen's motion for summary judgment. In his
summary judgment motion, Nguyen argued, among other things, that
the tort claims against him could not stand because (1) Wadsworth
did not comply with the Maine Tort Claims Act's ("MTCA") notice
requirements and (2) he was entitled to discretionary function
immunity under the MTCA. The district court rejected these
arguments and denied summary judgment with respect to the tort
claims against Nguyen.2 Nguyen timely appealed.
2The district court granted Nguyen summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 substantive due process claim (the district court had previously dismissed the equal protection claim at the motion to dismiss stage). Wadsworth's § 1983 claims are at issue in the companion case and not here.
- 3 - II. Analysis
We begin with the firmly settled principle that "[t]he
burden of establishing jurisdiction rests with the party who
asserts its existence." Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 83 (1st
Cir. 2010) (quoting Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp.,
407 F.3d 546, 551 (1st Cir. 2005)). As we explain below, Nguyen
has failed to satisfy this burden.
This case involves the final decision rule. "Generally
speaking, appeals are permitted only from final judgments of the
district court." Lee-Barnes v. Puerto Ven Quarry Corp., 513 F.3d
20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Asociación de Subscripción Conjunta
del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Flores Galarza, 484
F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007)). The final decision rule for appellate
jurisdiction provides, in relevant part: "The courts of appeals
. . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States . . . ." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. "An order denying a motion for summary judgment is
generally not a final decision within the meaning of § 1291 and is
thus generally not immediately appealable." Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765, 771 (2014).
In his briefing, Nguyen acknowledges that the district
court's order denying summary judgment is not a final judgment and
is thus not automatically appealable. He instead argues that,
because of the nature of the legal questions at issue, his appeal
- 4 - may proceed under an exception to the final judgment rule: the
collateral-order doctrine. As we explain below, Nguyen's
arguments fail for several reasons, and, consequently, he has
failed to sustain his burden of establishing appellate
jurisdiction. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 83.
Under federal law, "[f]or the collateral-order doctrine
to apply, a district court order must: '[(1)] conclusively
determine the disputed question, [(2)] resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and [(3)] be
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.'"
Lee-Barnes, 513 F.3d at 25 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345,
349 (2006)). This doctrine is to be "applied narrowly and
interpreted strictly." Id. at 26 (quoting United States v.
Quintana-Aguayo, 235 F.3d 682, 684 (1st Cir. 2000)). Maine has
also adopted a final judgment rule and also provides an exception
to the finality requirement under a similar, but not identical,
collateral-order doctrine. See Bond v. Bond, 30 A.3d 816, 819-21
(Me. 2011).
In asserting that the collateral-order doctrine applies,
Nguyen relies on Maine cases discussing Maine's collateral-order
doctrine. However, these cases are not relevant to our analysis
because, regardless of whether the underlying dispute is one of
federal or state law, questions regarding the final decision rule
in federal court are governed by federal law. See Budinich v.
- 5 - Becton Dickenson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198-99 (1988) (explaining
that determining whether district court order on merits of
state-law claims was final for purposes of § 1291's final decision
rule is governed by federal law). And, because the
collateral-order doctrine falls within the ambit of the final
decision rule, its applicability is similarly governed by federal
law. See id.; Lee-Barnes, 513 F.3d at 25 ("The collateral[-]order
doctrine . . . is best understood not as an exception to the 'final
decision' rule laid down by Congress in § 1291, but as a practical
construction of it." (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 349)). Thus, to
determine whether this appeal falls under an exception to the final
decision rule, we look to federal law. As Nguyen only relies on
cases discussing Maine's collateral-order doctrine, he has failed
to explain how the federal collateral-order doctrine applies to
his appeal.3
Nguyen does attempt to tether his argument to federal
principles: he seeks to connect MTCA discretionary function
immunity to qualified immunity, arguing that because, "[i]n an
analogous context, the United States Supreme Court has held that
3Indeed, Nguyen has not even established that Maine's collateral-order doctrine would apply here. Nguyen cites various Maine Law Court decisions but provides little to no analysis before claiming that Maine case law supports application of the collateral-order doctrine. Neither his arguments nor the cited cases establish that Maine courts would find the exception applicable.
- 6 - the general rule against appeals from non-final orders 'does not
apply when the summary judgment motion is based on a claim of
qualified immunity,'" this court may exercise jurisdiction here.
(Quoting Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 771.) Without support, Nguyen then
asserts that MTCA discretionary function immunity is equivalent to
qualified immunity, meaning it is included in the federal
collateral-order exception as laid out in Plumhoff.
We reject that argument. First, aside from noting that
both doctrines provide immunity from suit, Nguyen has not explained
how the MTCA's discretionary function immunity doctrine is similar
enough to the doctrine of qualified immunity such that case law on
one doctrine should necessarily apply to the other. Further,
Plumhoff does not support the exercise of jurisdiction here. As
the Court in Plumhoff explained, a denial of a motion for summary
judgment based on a claim of qualified immunity does not
automatically fall under the collateral-order doctrine. See 572
U.S. at 772-73. Rather, a denial of summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds only falls under the collateral-order doctrine if
it presents a pure question of law as opposed to a factual dispute.
See id.; Brown v. Dickey, 117 F.4th 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2024) ("[N]ot
all orders denying summary judgment premised on qualified immunity
are immediately appealable. Only '[p]urely legal rulings'
implicating qualified immunity receive expedited appellate
consideration. Thus, a challenge to a district court's ruling
- 7 - that the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
demonstrate a violation of clearly established law may be
considered on interlocutory appeal. When, however, the court's
order denying qualified immunity is based only on 'an issue of
fact or an issue perceived by the trial court to be an issue of
fact,' we do not have appellate jurisdiction." (first alteration
added) (quoting Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir.
2017))). Further, Nguyen has not explained how Plumhoff's
pure-legal-question requirement is met. Indeed, the district
court explained that its decision on discretionary function
immunity was based on "remain[ing] disputed issues of material
fact" that could allow a jury to find that Nguyen was not acting
within the scope of his professional judgment. Therefore, Nguyen
cannot sustain his burden to establish interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction over this case because the district court's denial of
summary judgment relied on issues of fact.4 See Brown, 117 F.4th
at 6.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, Nguyen has failed to establish that
this Court has jurisdiction over his appeal, and, accordingly, the
appeal is dismissed.
4 Even if we were to accept Nguyen's argument regarding discretionary function immunity, he has failed to explain how this reasoning could extend to his claim regarding the district court's decision on the separate MTCA notice issue.
- 8 -