Wade v. Oakmont Borough

30 A. 959, 165 Pa. 479, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 1029
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 7, 1895
DocketAppeal, No. 151
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 30 A. 959 (Wade v. Oakmont Borough) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wade v. Oakmont Borough, 30 A. 959, 165 Pa. 479, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 1029 (Pa. 1895).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mb. Justice Dean,

By a decree of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny county, on March 4th, 1889, defendant was created a municipality by the name of Borough of Oakmont. The greater part of its territory came off the borough of Verona, and the proceedings to constitute the new one were had under act of June 1st, 1887. The municipal indebtedness of the old borough was $23,376.75, and under the same act, the proportion of this, fixed as that of the new borough, was $13,680. This was specifically determined by the decree of incorporation. The rate of interest on this debt, and date of payment of interest and principal, were of course settled by the contract of the old borough, with its creditors, when the debt was created; therefore, these matters were beyond the reach of either the new borough or the court. But no direction was given the new borough as to levying a special tax, as the act authorizes, to pay the interest of this debt, or discharge the principal as it matured. Oakmont’s proportion of the interest and principal, has, up to the date of this proceeding, been met out of the annual taxes levied under the general borough act of 3d of April, 1851. In 1893, the borough council of Oakmont, believing the lighting of the streets by natural gas insufficient for the needs of the citizens, determined to introduce electric lights, and accordingly passed an ordinance authorizing the burgess to contract with the Oakmont & Verona Heat, Light and Power Company, to furnish such light. The burgess was authorized to conti'act for twenty lights at the price of $80 per light, $1,600 annually, payable monthly for a term of seven years, and the contract was made.

Although the adoption of the ordinance was in Juty, the [483]*483new step had been practically resolved upon more than a month before; so, at a meeting of council, 2d of June, 1893, provision was made to meet by taxation the current expenses and obligations, including this one. The assessed valuation of the borough was $1,135,655. A tax of five mills was levied for borough purposes, and, in addition, a special tax of three mills; of this last, $1,180.95 was appropriated to meet debt and interest of the apportioned part of the Verona borough indebtedness, falling due in spring of 1894, and the balance, $2,254, to contingencies. The five mill tax, by computation, produced the sum of $5,725; $3,615 nf this was appropriated for borough purposes, and the balance, $2,110, for contingencies ; making altogether for contingent expenses, the large sum, relatively, to borough expenses, of $4,364. It was out of this contingent fund, that it was intended to provide for the light contract authorized by ordinance on 31st of July following.

On October 3d, 1893, plaintiffs filed this bill, averring the foregoing facts, and concluding therefrom : 1. That there was no authority in law for the levy of the three mill tax, amounting to $3,435, because, in the decree incorporating the borough, and apportioning the debt of Verona borough, no order was made by the court for the levy of a special tax under the act of 1887 to meet that part imposed on the new borough. 2. That the sum raised by the three mill tax, even if authorized, was largely in excess of any sum required for the annual payment of interest and the fraction of maturing principal, and was therefore illegal. 3. That the amount specified to meet “ contingencies ” is largely in excess of any requirements for current purposes, and therefore, to the extent of such excess, is illegal. 4. That the purpose of setting aside so large an amount for contingencies, was to provide means to fulfill the contemplated contract for the electric light; that this was not an antecedent appropriation for a specific debt, nor a specific tax for a special purpose ; that such contract being the creation of a debt to a large amount, for a particular purpose, it could not be provided for by a contingent fund, which last could only be authorized for uncertain incidental expenses of the borough, that could not reasonably be foreseen. Therefore, the levy of a special tax, for these reasons, was unlawful. 5. That a contract by the council of the borough for electrio light, without the approval of the voters, is ultra vires.

[484]*484Afterwards the bill was amended so as to aver that the indebtedness of the borough, at the date of the ordinance, was $10,023.96; that the aggregate debt for the electric light, seven years at $1,600 per year, would amount to $11,200. That- this added to the debt then existing, would make the whole debt largely in excess of that allowed by law, unless concurred in by a vote of the electors of the borough, which was not had thereon; therefore, for that reason, was illegal.

The prayer was for an injunction restraining the collector from collecting the three mill tax, the council from proceeding to carry out the contract, that the ordinance authorizing the same be declared void, and that the borough be ordered to refund the amount of tax, where already collected.

The facts- as averred in the bill were, in substance, admitted by the defendant; the inferences sought to be drawn from them, and all the conclusions of law, that the ordinances of 2d of June and 31st of July 1893 were illegal and void, were denied. The case was set down for argument on bill and answer.

The court below found that the levy of the three mill tax, to meet the interest and principal of Oakmont’s share of the Verona borough debt, was necessary and proper under the circumstances, and was legal. That the contract with the Light, Heat & Power Company was within the scope of the powers granted boroughs by the act of 1851, “ to light the streets,” and was wholly within the discretion of councils. That the $1,600 per year for seven years for the light, was not a new indebtedness within the meaning of article 9, sec. 8, of the constitution, or of the 2d section of act of assembly of 1874, but was only a part of the current expenses of the borough from year to year. Further, that even if this tax were, within the meaning of the constitution and act of 1874, a new indebtedness, it would not, when added to the previous indebtedness, equal two per cent of the assessed valuation, and therefore, under the decision in borough of Rainsburg v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74, it was not necessary to file a statement in the office of the clerk of the quarter sessions before incurring the debt. That the placing of a part of the proceeds of the three mill tax in the appropriation for contingencies, was improper and illegal, and the borough should be restrained from applying any part [485]*485of this to payment of other than the interest and bonded indebtedness. Accordingly, as to this last conclusion the borough was restrained from making any other use of the three mill tax, but as to all other complaints, the bill was dismissed.

From this decree the plaintiff appeals, alleging error in finding : 1. That the levy of the three mill tax was legal. 2. In finding that the constitutional limit of indebtedness was not exceeded by such levy.

Other errors embraced in the 3d and 4th general assignments are brought to our attention in the argument, but it seems to us the case turns upon the first two.

The payment of the interest and part of the principal annually of the bonded debt, was not voluntarily assumed by virtue of any corporate action of the new borough; it was born with this burden, and there was no escape from it, when it chose to adopt an independent existence.

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Bluebook (online)
30 A. 959, 165 Pa. 479, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 1029, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wade-v-oakmont-borough-pa-1895.