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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CHANTISSA D. WADE, CASE NO. C25-0983-KKE 8
Plaintiff(s), DISMISSAL ORDER 9 v.
10 VERNESSA GARLAND et al.,
11 Defendant(s).
12 This matter comes before the Court on the personal injury complaint initiated by Plaintiff 13 Chantissa D. Wade, proceeding pro se. Dkt. No. 6. Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida granted 14 Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(1). Dkt. No. 5. In 15 Judge Tsuchida’s order, he recommended that the complaint be reviewed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) 16 before issuance of the summons. Id. Having reviewed and screened the complaint under § 1915, 17 the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and to 18 establish subject matter jurisdiction. However, the Court provides Plaintiff leave to file an 19 amended pleading by September 8, 2025, to cure the deficiencies described below. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff alleges that around November 2022, Defendants published a book which included 22 “unauthorized references” to Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 6 at 2. According to Plaintiff, these references 23 include her name, place of employment, and “personal history”. Id. Plaintiff has not had contact 24 1 with Defendants, who are her family members, for several years. Id. She did not consent to the 2 use of this information in the book. Id. Plaintiff contends that when she learned about the book, 3 she “made public statements disavowing it, which led to retaliatory actions and threats by
4 Defendant Brandi C. Miller, including threats to contact Plaintiff’s husband’s Navy command.” 5 Id. 6 Plaintiff asserts six claims for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional 7 distress (“IIED”), defamation, harassment and retaliation, and violation of right to publicity. Dkt. 8 No. 6. Plaintiff proceeds pro se, and Magistrate Judge Brian Tsuchida granted her motion for 9 leave to proceed in forma pauperis on June 9, 2025. Dkt. No. 5. 10 II. ANALYSIS 11 When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the district court is required to screen the 12 complaint and determine if the action should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim, raises
13 frivolous or malicious claims, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 14 relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915 15 incorporates the standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 16 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient 17 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft 18 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally, and only 19 dismisses the complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 20 support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 21 (9th Cir. 2014). 22 The Court also considers, on its own accord, whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over
23 this matter. Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] court may raise the 24 question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action.”). 1 Here, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure 2 to state a claim. Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) and 3 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). Dkt. No. 6 at 2. To establish diversity jurisdiction
4 under § 1332, Plaintiff needs to adequately plead facts showing that Plaintiff and Defendants are 5 citizens of different states, and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. § 1332(a). The 6 amount in controversy constitutes the amount at stake in the litigation. Jauregui v. Roadrunner 7 Transp. Servs., 28 F.4th 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff alleges that she is a Washington citizen, 8 and Defendants are Florida citizens. Dkt. No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff seeks “[c]ompensatory damages in 9 an amount to be determined at trial” and “punitive damages for willful and malicious conduct”, in 10 addition to injunctive relief. Id. at 2. Because Plaintiff does not specify the amount of damages 11 and the rest of the complaint does not clarify the scope of possible damages, it is unclear whether 12 the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied to establish diversity jurisdiction over this
13 action. 14 Beyond the jurisdictional issues, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for any cause of action 15 asserted here. The complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations for the Court to assess whether 16 Plaintiff states viable claims for invasion of privacy, IIED, defamation, harassment and retaliation, 17 and violation of right to publicity. For example, to assert a claim for invasion of privacy, Plaintiff 18 must adequately allege facts showing: 19 (1) An intentional intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of plaintiff, or [her] private affairs; (2) With respect to the matter or affair which 20 plaintiff claims was invaded, that plaintiff had a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy; (3) The intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 21 person; and (4) That the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of damage to plaintiff. 22 Doe v. Gonzaga University, 24 P.3d 390, 399 (Wash. 2001), reversed on other grounds, 536 U.S. 23 273, (2002); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (“A person’s ‘right to privacy[ ]’ … is 24 1 invaded or violated only if disclosure of information about the person: (1) Would be highly 2 offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”). Plaintiff 3 alleges that Defendants disclosed her name, place of employment, and “personal history”, but these
4 vague statements do not support a showing that Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy 5 over that information, that the disclosure was “highly offensive to a reasonable person”, or that 6 Defendants’ disclosure caused Plaintiff’s injury. Indeed, Plaintiff also fails to describe what injury 7 she suffered from the disclosure. Conclusory statements, without supporting factual content, 8 cannot state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)’s standard. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. The same 9 conclusion applies to Plaintiff’s other claims for IIED,1 defamation,2 harassment and retaliation,3 10 and violation of right to publicity.4 11 That said, it is unclear whether the complaint’s deficiencies can be cured by amendment. 12 See also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal of a pro se complaint 13 without leave to amend for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that an 14 opportunity to amend would be futile).
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CHANTISSA D. WADE, CASE NO. C25-0983-KKE 8
Plaintiff(s), DISMISSAL ORDER 9 v.
10 VERNESSA GARLAND et al.,
11 Defendant(s).
12 This matter comes before the Court on the personal injury complaint initiated by Plaintiff 13 Chantissa D. Wade, proceeding pro se. Dkt. No. 6. Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida granted 14 Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(1). Dkt. No. 5. In 15 Judge Tsuchida’s order, he recommended that the complaint be reviewed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) 16 before issuance of the summons. Id. Having reviewed and screened the complaint under § 1915, 17 the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and to 18 establish subject matter jurisdiction. However, the Court provides Plaintiff leave to file an 19 amended pleading by September 8, 2025, to cure the deficiencies described below. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff alleges that around November 2022, Defendants published a book which included 22 “unauthorized references” to Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 6 at 2. According to Plaintiff, these references 23 include her name, place of employment, and “personal history”. Id. Plaintiff has not had contact 24 1 with Defendants, who are her family members, for several years. Id. She did not consent to the 2 use of this information in the book. Id. Plaintiff contends that when she learned about the book, 3 she “made public statements disavowing it, which led to retaliatory actions and threats by
4 Defendant Brandi C. Miller, including threats to contact Plaintiff’s husband’s Navy command.” 5 Id. 6 Plaintiff asserts six claims for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional 7 distress (“IIED”), defamation, harassment and retaliation, and violation of right to publicity. Dkt. 8 No. 6. Plaintiff proceeds pro se, and Magistrate Judge Brian Tsuchida granted her motion for 9 leave to proceed in forma pauperis on June 9, 2025. Dkt. No. 5. 10 II. ANALYSIS 11 When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the district court is required to screen the 12 complaint and determine if the action should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim, raises
13 frivolous or malicious claims, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 14 relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915 15 incorporates the standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 16 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient 17 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft 18 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally, and only 19 dismisses the complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 20 support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 21 (9th Cir. 2014). 22 The Court also considers, on its own accord, whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over
23 this matter. Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] court may raise the 24 question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action.”). 1 Here, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure 2 to state a claim. Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) and 3 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). Dkt. No. 6 at 2. To establish diversity jurisdiction
4 under § 1332, Plaintiff needs to adequately plead facts showing that Plaintiff and Defendants are 5 citizens of different states, and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. § 1332(a). The 6 amount in controversy constitutes the amount at stake in the litigation. Jauregui v. Roadrunner 7 Transp. Servs., 28 F.4th 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff alleges that she is a Washington citizen, 8 and Defendants are Florida citizens. Dkt. No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff seeks “[c]ompensatory damages in 9 an amount to be determined at trial” and “punitive damages for willful and malicious conduct”, in 10 addition to injunctive relief. Id. at 2. Because Plaintiff does not specify the amount of damages 11 and the rest of the complaint does not clarify the scope of possible damages, it is unclear whether 12 the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied to establish diversity jurisdiction over this
13 action. 14 Beyond the jurisdictional issues, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for any cause of action 15 asserted here. The complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations for the Court to assess whether 16 Plaintiff states viable claims for invasion of privacy, IIED, defamation, harassment and retaliation, 17 and violation of right to publicity. For example, to assert a claim for invasion of privacy, Plaintiff 18 must adequately allege facts showing: 19 (1) An intentional intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of plaintiff, or [her] private affairs; (2) With respect to the matter or affair which 20 plaintiff claims was invaded, that plaintiff had a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy; (3) The intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 21 person; and (4) That the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of damage to plaintiff. 22 Doe v. Gonzaga University, 24 P.3d 390, 399 (Wash. 2001), reversed on other grounds, 536 U.S. 23 273, (2002); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (“A person’s ‘right to privacy[ ]’ … is 24 1 invaded or violated only if disclosure of information about the person: (1) Would be highly 2 offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”). Plaintiff 3 alleges that Defendants disclosed her name, place of employment, and “personal history”, but these
4 vague statements do not support a showing that Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy 5 over that information, that the disclosure was “highly offensive to a reasonable person”, or that 6 Defendants’ disclosure caused Plaintiff’s injury. Indeed, Plaintiff also fails to describe what injury 7 she suffered from the disclosure. Conclusory statements, without supporting factual content, 8 cannot state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)’s standard. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. The same 9 conclusion applies to Plaintiff’s other claims for IIED,1 defamation,2 harassment and retaliation,3 10 and violation of right to publicity.4 11 That said, it is unclear whether the complaint’s deficiencies can be cured by amendment. 12 See also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal of a pro se complaint 13 without leave to amend for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that an 14 opportunity to amend would be futile). Therefore, the Court will provide Plaintiff leave to amend 15 16 1 To state a claim for IIED, Plaintiff must show “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless 17 infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual result to plaintiff of emotional distress.” Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 336 P.3d 1142, 1151 (Wash. 2014). Though Plaintiff need not prove bodily harm or objective symptomology, the 18 emotional distress must be severe, not transient or trivial. Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 631 (Wash. 2003).
2 “A defamation action consists of four elements: (1) a false statement, (2) publication, (3) fault, and (4) damages.” 19 Duc Tan v. Le, 300 P.3d 356, 363 (Wash. 2013).
20 3 Under WASH. REV. CODE § 10.14.020(2), “unlawful harassment” consists of (1) a knowing and willful (2) course of conduct (3) directed at a specific person, (4) which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to that person, 21 and (5) serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. Sloan v. Benson, No. 77520-1-I, 2019 WL 183822, at *2 (Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2019).
22 4 The Washington Personality Rights Act provides a statutory cause of action for violation of one’s publicity and personality rights. See WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010. To state a claim for violation of one’s right to publicity, a 23 plaintiff must show that the defendant used a living or deceased individual’s or personality’s “name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness ... for purposes of advertising products, merchandise, goods, or services, or for purposes of fund-raising or solicitation of donations ... without written or oral, express or implied consent of the owner of the 24 right[.]” WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.050; see also WASH . REV. CODE § 63.60.060. 1 to allege additional facts about the type of information allegedly wrongfully disclosed, Plaintiff’s 2 injury, and other information necessary to support Plaintiff’s claims. 3 The Court advises Plaintiff that the amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.
4 Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997). This means that once Plaintiff files 5 an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. The 6 amended complaint should show the docket number assigned to this case and be labeled “First 7 Amended Complaint.” 8 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS the following: 9 1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and WITH LEAVE TO 10 AMEND; and 11 2. Plaintiff must file a First Amended Complaint by September 8, 2025. 12 If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order to file an amended complaint, this action may be
13 dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to obey the Court’s order. 14 15 Dated this 6th day of August, 2025. 16 a 17 Kymberly K. Evanson 18 United States District Judge
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