Wade DeBerry v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 28, 2023
DocketDE-3330-17-0405-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Wade DeBerry v. Department of Defense (Wade DeBerry v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wade DeBerry v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

WADE T. DEBERRY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-3330-17-0405-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: April 28, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Wade T. DeBerry, Castle Rock, Colorado, pro se.

Yolanda Hernandez, Chantilly, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied corrective action in his Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judg es are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The following facts are undisputed. The appellant is a preference-eligible veteran with a 30% service-connected disability. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 5 at 10. During all times relevant to this appeal, he was employed by the agency’s Defense Contract Management Agency as an NH -III Information Technology Specialist. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, Tab 5 at 10. On April 26, 2017, the agency issued a vacancy announcement for one excepted-service GG-13 Project Manager position in the National Reconnaissance Office, under its 10 U.S.C. § 1601 appointing authority. IAF, Tab 10 at 10. The announcement indicated that it was being issued under both Title 10 public and merit promotion procedures. Id. The appellant applied for the position and was found qualified. His name appeared on both the Title 10 “non-traditional” and merit promotion certificates. Id. at 6-9. Although the appellant was interviewed, he was not selected. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. Another individual from the nontraditional certificate was selected instead. IAF, Tab 10 at 8. ¶3 After exhausting his administrative remedies with the Department of Labor (DOL), the appellant filed a VEOA appeal with the Board and requested a 3

hearing. 2 IAF, Tab 1 at 2-4, 14-15. He argued that the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights by failing to afford him any veterans’ preference at all. Id. at 5. After issuing a close of the record order, the administrative judge issued an initial decision denying the appellant’s request for corrective action without a hearing. IAF, Tab 8, Tab 13, Initial Decision (ID). She found that the appellant established jurisdiction over his appeal and that it was undisputed that the agency did not afford him veterans’ preference. ID at 2 -3. She further, found, however, that the agency was not required to do so because appointments under 5 U.S.C. § 1601 are exempt from Title 5 veterans’ preference requirements, and the agency’s implementing rules, found in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1400.25, Volume 2005, do not require the application of veterans’ preference under these circumstances. 3 ID at 3-5. ¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing among other things that the administrative judge misinterpreted DoDI 1400.25, and that a careful reading of the rule shows that veterans’ preference should have applied in his situation. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-15. He has included with his petition another copy of the vacancy announcement and some documentation pertaining to his qualifications, credentials, and veterans’ preference. Id. at 15-29. The agency has not filed a response.

ANALYSIS ¶5 Although Title 5 veterans’ preference requirements apply to Federal hiring in general, there are certain appointing authorities, including 10 U.S.C. § 1601, that allow for appointment without regard to these requirements. Boston v.

2 The appellant expressly stated that he did not wish to raise a claim under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 . IAF, Tab 11. 3 The agency filed a copy of DoDI 1400.25, Volume 2005 below. IAF, Tab 5 at 17-41. This copy indicates some changes that were made on August 21, 2017—after the conclusion of the hiring process at issue. We have analyzed DoDI 1400.25 without regard to these changes, but in any event, we find that they would not affect the outcome of this appeal. 4

Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 577, ¶ 9 (2015). That section authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish excepted-service positions in the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) and, “after taking into consideration the availability of preference eligibles,” appoint individuals to those positions without regard to the provisions of any other law relating to appointment. 10 U.S.C. § 1601. In keeping with the mandate to consider the availability of preference eligibles, the agency has issued rules in DoDI 1400.25, Volume 2005 to provide certain hiring preferences for veterans new to Federal service. Boston, 122 M.S.P.R. 577, ¶ 11. The Board has upheld these rules as a reasonable and permissible construction of the statute. Id., ¶¶ 7, 11. Under DoDI 1400.25, Volume 2005, Enclosure 2, ¶ 18.a, veterans’ preference is not applicable to recruitment from internal candidate sources. However, when staffing from external sources, preference eligibles will be given preference for employment in accordance with DoDI 1400.25, Volume 2005, Enclosure 2 § 15. DoDI 1400.25, Volume 2005, Enclosure 2, ¶ 1.a. ¶6 On petition for review, the appellant argues that he is an external candidate because he is not an employee of the National Reconnaissance Office and has never been employed under DCIPS. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. However, under the terms of DoDI 1400.25, “external” candidates are those who are “not currently serving in permanent or DCIPS positions in the Federal service.” DoDI 1400.25, Volume 2005, Glossary, Part II.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Wade DeBerry v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wade-deberry-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2023.