Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. People

105 Ill. 236, 1883 Ill. LEXIS 85
Illinois Supreme Court·Decided January 29, 1883·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

Per Curiam:

We see no reason to depart from the conclusion reached in this case when it was here before. (See People v. Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Ry. Co. 104 Ill. 476.) But to avoid misapprehension, we deem it advisable to state explicitly that we disclaim any idea that Illinois has authority to regulate commerce in any other State. We understand, and simply hold, that, in the absence of anything showing to the contrary, a single and entire contract to carry, for a gross sum, from Gilman, in this State, to the city of New York, implies, necessarily, that that sum is charged proportionally for the carriage on every part of that distance, and that a single and entire contract to carry, for a gross sum, from Peoria, in this State, to the city of New York, implies the same thing; and that therefore, when it is shown that there is charged for carriage upon the same line, less from Peoria to New York (the greater distance) than from Gilman to New York, (the less distance,) and nothing is shown to the effect ■that such inequality in charge is all for carriage entirely beyond the limits of this State, a prima facie case is made out of unjust discrimination, under our statute, occurring within this State. We hold that the excess in the charge for the less distance, presumably affects every part of the line of carriage between Gilman and the State line, proportionally with the balance of the line.

The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Separate opinion by Mr. Justice Walker :

As this case is again before us for decision, I shall, owing to its vast importance and the disastrous and ruinous effects it must produce on our system of government if the claim of plaintiff in error should obtain, add something to what I before said.

If the doctrines contended for were allowed, it would be to release and entirely exempt all corporate bodies in the State from the governing or sovereign power of the State to prevent wrong and oppression of the people by such bodies. It would be to hold that the State, by creating and endowing railroads with the simple and necessary power to fix charges for carrying persons and property, had, through the legislature, without intending it, sold or surrendered the governing power of the State, and that such bodies are empowered to extort from the masses annually, for all time to come, sums greater than the revenues of the Federal government, beyond fair compensation for such carriage. If such bodies can not be controlled, to the same extent and under the same necessities for the general welfare, by the State, as natural persons, then the powers of government have been subverted and the States virtually destroyed, and they have become useless and expensive appendages to our governmental system. They would become powerless to perform the functions and answer the great and all-controlling purpose of organizing government, which is to secure protection. It would undeniably be to recognize and declare such bodies above and beyond legal control,—to create government agencies and instruments greater than the sovereign State, and not amenable to its governing power. Present the question as we may, whether as exempting them from such control under the fiction that the granting of the charter of plaintiff in error was a contract never to control it in its charges and never to control its power to wrong and oppress the people, and that it is protected by the obligation clause of the constitution, or that the regulation of such charges and the prevention of extortion and unjust discrimination are regulations of commerce among the States, and are prohibited under either claim, the power of the States to [protect the people from such oppression would be destroyed, and the States themselves would be destroyed. To admit either proposition must inevitably lead to this result. This, then, is the naked question to be determined.

The provision of our constitution requiring the enactment of the statute under consideration was deliberately framed, and, on full corisideration, was ratified by the people. It was considered by both the convention and the people to be imperatively demanded in the promotion of the general welfare, and to afford the people protection, and security from the invasion of rights the State government was created to protect.

As we seem to forget, or are drifting away from, the great, plain and never denied underlying principles of our government, I may be excused in referring to some of the axiomatic principles that have been supposed to be self-evident,— especially so when we are asked to disregard the plainest doctrines of our government. I shall define a State to be the whole people embraced in a prescribed territory, united into one body politic, for the purpose of mutual protection, and security from wrong and violence from within and from without its borders. A constitution, or foundation of government, embraces and declares the principles, regulates the division and exercise of the governing power, directs to what officers or agencies it shall be confided, and limits and controls its exercise,—in other words, it establishes the government, delegates, limits and defines the manner in which the governing power of the State shall be exercised, and by overpowering necessity compels those who frame government 0 . to confer ample power on its agencies to enforce the protection and security for which government is instituted. And the same necessity imperatively demands that the power thus conferred shall be forever held and exercised for the purposes for which it was delegated to the agencies of the government. It is self-evident that this power must not only be preserved and exercised for the purposes for which it was delegated, but it must be defended so long as the government shall exist. Nor can the powers thus conferred be exercised for any other than the purposes for which they were delegated.

It is axiomatic that in all representative governments the sovereign or governing power belongs to and resides in the people, as the source of all power,—that this power is inherent, inalienable and indestructible, without the subversion or destruction of the government. This is absolutely true, from its inherent nature and the purposes of such government. To surrender or sell such power to its full extent, is to destroy such government. To impair or diminish the sovereign or governing power, is to weaken the power to govern the people and to protect them in their rights, and to that extent defeats the purpose for which government was created and is maintained. The founders of our government conferred such power only as was deemed necessary to answer the purposes of its organization, and to be perpetually held, unless withdrawn by the people when exercising sovereign power.

When the State government was organized, the people of the State delegated governmental powers to the officers created by the organic law, to be held and exercised alone for governmental purposes. It was but a delegation of a trust, and not the title to the power. Officers or governmental agencies take no title to the power, but simply the authority to exercise it for the purposes of government.

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Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. People, 105 Ill. 236, 1883 Ill. LEXIS 85 (Ill. 1883).

105 Ill. 236 (Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. People) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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