W. R. Davis, Inc. v. State

176 S.W.2d 978
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 18, 1943
DocketNo. 11572.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 176 S.W.2d 978 (W. R. Davis, Inc. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
W. R. Davis, Inc. v. State, 176 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943).

Opinion

GRAVES, Justice.

This appeal is from a $6,809.44 judgment of the 126th District Court of Travis County, sitting without a jury, in favor of the appellee, the State of Texas, against the appellants (W. R. Davis, Inc., a dissolved corporation, and James Lee Kauffman, ancillary executory of the will and estate of W. R. Davis, deceased), as for the aggregate amount of occupation taxes, penalties, interest, and auditor’s fees found by it to be due the State from the Davis estate as gas-production taxes under Article 7047b, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, as amended by Article II of House Bill No. 8, c. 184, p. 269, Acts 1941, 47th Legislature.

The gas was produced by Earl Callaway and some 80 others (a few of whom were royalty owners only) from leases on gas-producing lands they held at Alice, Texas, and was processed for them by the appellants in their recycling plant there, under contracts between such parties, in which the appellants were given ½ of the distillates so extracted from the gas in return for such processing and, in addition, they agreed to and did buy the remaining ⅛ interest in such distillates or products of Callaway et al.; whereupon, appellants by recycling methods, returned — through “intake-wells” provided by Callaway et al.— the leftover or residue gas to the same gas-producing formation underlying the lands, from which it had first been extracted; such operations having thus disposed of all the gas produced from such lands during the period from May 1, 1941, -to February 1, 1942.

The part of the statute, upon which alone the suit was thus founded, that is, Article 7047b, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, as amended by Article II of House Bill No. 8 of the 47th Legislature in 1941, Sec. 1. (1), fourth paragraph, was in his verbis (except as to punctuation), as follows: “The market value of gas produced in this State shall be the value thereof plus any bonus, or premium, or anything of value paid therefor, or any sum of money that such gas will reasonably bring if produced and sold in accordance with the laws, rules and regulations of this State, provided, that notwithstanding any other pro *980 vision herein to the contrary, where gas is processed for its liquid hydrocarbon content and the residue gas is returned by recycling methods to .the same gas-producing formation underlying the land from which the gas is produced, the taxable value of such gas shall be three-fifths (⅜) of the gross value of all products extracted, separated and saved from such gas.”

In inveighing here against the judgment so adverse to them, appellants attack the constitutionality of such entire Article 7047b, and particularly of the quoted portion thereof, supra, which is the only part, on the facts, directly involved here, as being violative of Article I, Sections 16, 17 and 19, and Article VIII, Sections 1 and 2, of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon’s Ann.St., as well as of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Regarding this claim of constitutional invalidity as lying at the threshold of the controversy, it will be disposed of first.

Since the State’s action was predicated solely, as indicated, upon the quoted part of the amended statute — that having to do with processed gas — and since the controversy was tried out and the judgment rendered wholly upon the applicability of that particular provision, it follows that the facts do not bring any other provision of amended Article 7047b under review by this court, except subsidiarily; its deliverance will, therefore, be so confined, especially as the act itself, in preceding Section 8, Article 7047a — 20, expressly provides that the striking down of any other detailed parts or portions thereof shall not affect the validity of the remaining ones.

This court is unable to see that appellants’ objections point out any definite showing of the claimed invalidity; concluding, rather, that none is made to appear; indeed, it is thought this whole controversy — being so controllingly referable to the quoted portion of the act dealing with one specified kind of “processed” gas only, is relieved of any of the murk, uncertainty, or doubtfulness appellants at great length find in other detailed provisions dealing with distinctly different conditions, and finds quite a reasonable solution in its very clearly stated “Proviso”; that is, where the gas has been processed and the residue returned to the strata from which the natural product came, as all that is involved here had been, by the simple and undisputed facts, the act makes a reasonable, understandable, and easy-to-be-applied taxable basis for all that kind of gas, by providing that it shall be “three fifths (3/S) of the gross value of all products extracted, separated and saved from such gas.”

That is made further clear in the beginning of such quoted paragraph where “market value”, obviously used as synonymous with the “last mentioned” taxable value, is defined to be such value thereof, plus any bonus, premium, or anything else, paid as a consideration therefor.

It seems to this court, under the simple facts in this record, most of which were agreed upon, and the others established by undisputed evidence, that these provisions made a workable system, which the Comptroller of the State had no difficulty in carrying out; in fact, the oral testimony of his auditor, Mr. Brown, which, outside of written stipulations and documents, was all the trial court had before it, seems to this court to nullify appellants’ secondary contention — after alleging the statute to be so uncertain, vague, and indefinite as to render it void — that the act “as enacted and applied by the Comptroller violates the principle of equality and uniformity of taxation in Texas.” Being undisputed and uncontroverted on that direct point, it was this:

“Q. Do you know of any other contract between the producer and the plant operator where the producer gets, as his receipts, a price different from the price at which the plant operator sells the liquids, other than in this W. R. Davis situation? A. We have not found any other case, no.

“Q. The peculiarity of this situation, then, arises out of the peculiarity of the contract here involved? A. That’s right.

“Q. Have you applied your principle in computing the tax any differently in this case than you have in the other 27 recycling plant situations in the State? A. No, we have applied exactly the same -theory.

“Q. What is that theory? A. The theory is that we have interpreted the law literally; that the taxable value, regardless of what the producer receives, would be 3/5ths of the gross value, which we interpret to mean at the plant.”

Thus there is no discernable discrimination or unjust taxation, where the same rule applies to all of the products extracted from the gas, and where the residue of the gas so treated had been returned to *981 the same producing formation in the ground, from whence the gas in its original wet state was produced.

On this feature, it seems reasonably in-ferable that the Legislature put this taxable value at 3/5 of the real value of the distillates, or products extracted from the natural gas, and left the other 2/5 to cover the expenses of the processing.

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Related

W. R. Davis, Inc. v. State
180 S.W.2d 429 (Texas Supreme Court, 1944)

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Bluebook (online)
176 S.W.2d 978, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/w-r-davis-inc-v-state-texapp-1943.