W. Frazer v. Deutsche Bank National Trust C

585 F. App'x 539
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 21, 2014
Docket12-35502
StatusUnpublished

This text of 585 F. App'x 539 (W. Frazer v. Deutsche Bank National Trust C) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
W. Frazer v. Deutsche Bank National Trust C, 585 F. App'x 539 (9th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Chapter 7 debtors W. Mark Frazer and Konilynn Frazer appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment dismissing the Frazers’ adversary proceeding against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review independently the bankruptcy court’s decision without deference to the district court’s determinations. Leichty v. Neary (In re Strand), 375 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir.2004). We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and for clear error its factual findings. Id. We affirm.

The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment to appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust because the Frazers’ loan is in default, and appellee had physical possession of the mortgage note indorsed in blank and therefore had the power to enforce the mortgage note. See Wash. Rev.Code § 61.24.030(7) (a declaration by the beneficiary stating that the beneficiary is the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation secured by the deed of trust shall be sufficient proof for nonjudicial foreclosure); Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., 181 Wash.App. 484, 326 P.3d 768, 774 (2014) (holding that “[ajbsent conflicting evidence, the declaration [of a note holder under Wash. Rev.Code § 61.24.030(7) ] should be taken as true”).

We reject the Frazers’ contentions concerning allegedly inadequate discovery, alleged due process violations, and claims arising from the pooling and servicing agreement to which they were not parties.

We do not consider any documents attached to the Frazers’ opening brief that are not part of the district court record. See Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1988).

The Frazers’ motion to strike Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s answering brief, set forth in the Frazers’ reply brief, is denied.

The Frazers’ motion to remove or disqualify Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s counsel, Lane Powell, PC, and *541 Mr. Spellman, on the basis of Spellman’s previous representation, set forth in the Frazers’ reply brief, is denied. See Wash. R. Profl Conduct 1.9(a) (no violation of an attorney’s duty to a former client where current representation is not “substantially related” to previous representation).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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585 F. App'x 539, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/w-frazer-v-deutsche-bank-national-trust-c-ca9-2014.