Vyacheslav Mark Bratslavski v. U.S. Attorney General

595 F. App'x 928
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedDecember 23, 2014
Docket14-11540
StatusUnpublished

This text of 595 F. App'x 928 (Vyacheslav Mark Bratslavski v. U.S. Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vyacheslav Mark Bratslavski v. U.S. Attorney General, 595 F. App'x 928 (11th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Vyacheslav Mark Bratslavski petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) final order (1) vacating the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision to the extent the IJ granted Bratslavski asylum, and (2) ordering Bratslavski removed to Israel. Bratslavski, a native of Uzbekistan and citizen of Israel, claimed past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution based on his refusal to serve in the Israeli military as a conscientious objector. The BIA concluded that, based on the IJ’s factual findings, Brat-slavski was ineligible for asylum as a matter of law. After review, we deny Brat-slavski’s petition. 1

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts supporting Bratslavski’s persecution claims are not in dispute. According to Bratslavski’s credible hearing testimony and other record evidence, Israeli citizens who refuse to comply with Israel’s compulsory military service law are subject to prosecution and incarceration. Although there is a conscientious objection exemption from military service, Israeli citizens rarely receive this exemption because the Israeli military uses a very narrow definition of conscientious objection. Alternatively, an Israeli citizen can receive a “Profile 21” exemption by being deemed to have physical or psychological disabilities that render him unfit for military service. Israeli citizens who refuse military service are subject to cycles of short (approximately one-month) prison terms until they either agree to enlist or opt for a psychiatric exemption under Profile 21.

Bratslavski is a follower of Tolstoy’s philosophy of non-violence. In October 1999, while a college student in Israel, Bratslav-ski received notice from the Israeli military for an interview, at which he was told he needed to enlist. When Bratslavski refused, he immediately was arrested and taken to a military prison, where he was housed with other conscientious objectors.

That evening, a three-officer panel conducted a hearing and advised Bratslavski he could either enlist or remain in prison. Based on his moral principles, Bratslavski refused to enlist and was sentenced to a three-month prison term. Bratslavski was told that at the end of his sentence, he would be called before the panel again and asked to enlist. If he refused, Bratslavski would receive another three-month sentence, and that this cycle could go on indefinitely.

According to the military prison’s rules, after Bratslavski refused food and water for three meals, he was administered an *930 IV and placed in solitary confinement with a suicide watch. Two days later, Bratslav-ski used a piece of broken glass to attempt suicide by cutting his arm. Bratslavski’s wound was treated and he was placed back in solitary confinement. Two days later, Bratslavski found more broken glass and again tried to cut himself. After his second suicide attempt, Bratslavski received a certificate of mental disability and Profile 21 exemption and was released.

During his 21-day incarceration, Brat-slavski was never physically harmed. He and the other prisoners were subjected to moral pressure and intimidation tactics, such as being lined up and yelled at.

After his release, Bratslavski returned to the university, but did not graduate due to financial reasons. Bratslavski claims his Profile 21 exemption made it harder for him to find work in Israel. The background material in the record indicates that Israeli citizens who are exempt from military service cannot obtain certain “security sector” jobs that make up a large portion of Israel’s job market. Additionally, although it is illegal, some private employers still consider an employee’s military service record. Because an Israeli citizen exempt from service under Profile 21 receives an exemption certification instead of a discharge certification, private employers can glean an employee’s military service record. As a result, Israeli citizens who receive a Profile 21 exemption can find work in Israel, but their employment options are more limited.

In Bratslavski’s case, he initially had trouble finding employment and worked odd jobs, but eventually obtained a position as a sales agent. In June 2003, Brat-slavski was denied a promotion to sales manager after his interviewer learned he was a conscientious objector. Bratslavski looked for another managerial job, but, when he could not find one, left Israel for the United States in November 2003.

In January 2004, Bratslavski returned to Israel when a friend offered him a managerial job in a grocery store. Bratslavski worked in this position until August 2005, when the grocery store burned down and he returned to the United States on a tourist visa.

Bratslavski overstayed his visa. The Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear charging Bratslavski with removability pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), for having remained in the United States beyond his authorization. Bratzlavski does not dispute his removability as charged, but contends that the BIA erred in denying him asylum.

II. DISCUSSION

To establish eligibility for asylum, an application must show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. INA § 101(a)(42); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1230-31 (11th Cir.2005). To show persecution based on the enforcement of a country’s compulsory military service law, the applicant must prove either: (1) that he was “disproportionately punished for refusing to serve” on account of a protected ground; or (2) that he was “forced to join an internationally condemned military.” See Mohammed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 547 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2008); Matter of A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502, 506 (BIA 1987). Bratslavski does not contend that the Israeli military is internationally condemned. Further, although Bratslavski was imprisoned after he refused to enlist in the Israeli military, he did not present *931 any evidence that he was punished any differently than other non-exempt Israeli citizens who refused to serve.

As the BIA explained, Bratslavski did not contend, and the IJ did not find, that Bratslavski was punished more severely than other Israeli citizens who refused to perform military service for reasons other than religious or political pacifism. To the contrary, the record indicates that Bratslavski was afforded the typical due process for an Israeli military court and was subjected to the usual penalties for refusing to serve in the Israeli military. 2

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A-G
19 I. & N. Dec. 502 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
595 F. App'x 928, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vyacheslav-mark-bratslavski-v-us-attorney-general-ca11-2014.