Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Company v. Federal Trade Commission

D.C. Circuit

Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Company v. Federal Trade Commission

258 F.2d 684, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 3045, 1958 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,050

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit·Decided May 29, 1958·No. 13986·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks review of a Commission order to “cease and desist from representing * * * that [petitioner’s] combs are ‘rubber’ or ‘hard rubber’ or are made of ‘rubber’ or ‘hard rubber,’ unless such combs are in fact made of vulcanized hard rubber.” Over six months after the order had issued, the Commission undertook to construe its order, in a letter to petitioner, to prohibit representing the combs (which are 13% unvulcanized synthetic rubber and 85%' plastic) as “rubber-resin.” Petitioner contends that the order, as construed by the Commission, exceeds the bounds established by the complaint and findings, citing Gimbel Bros., Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 2 Cir., 1941, 116 F. 2d 578. We do not understand the order as written to be challenged, but only the Commission’s subsequent interpretation of its order. However, this interpretation may be changed or it may never be enforced. We hold that there is no controversy calling for judicial review of the interpretation at the present time, See Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 1937, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617.

Dismissed.

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PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks review of a Commission order to “cease and desist from representing * * * that [petitioner’s] combs are ‘rubber’ or ‘hard rubber’ or are made of ‘rubber’ or ‘hard rubber,’ unless such combs are in fact made of vulcanized hard rubber.” Over six months after the order had issued, the Commission undertook to construe its order, in a letter to petitioner, to prohibit representing the combs (which are 13% unvulcanized synthetic rubber and 85%' plastic) as “rubber-resin.” Petitioner contends that the order, as construed by the Commission, exceeds the bounds established by the complaint and findings, citing Gimbel Bros., Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 2 Cir., 1941, 116 F. 2d 578. We do not understand the order as written to be challenged, but only the Commission’s subsequent interpretation of its order. However, this interpretation may be changed or it may never be enforced. We hold that there is no controversy calling for judicial review of the interpretation at the present time, See Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 1937, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617.

Dismissed.

Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 F.2d 684, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 3045, 1958 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,050 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

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