08-5157-cv "V.S." v. Muhammad
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 4 5 ------------- 6 7 August Term, 2009 8 9 (Argued: October 7, 2009 Decided: February 17, 2010) 10 11 Docket No. 08-5157-cv 12 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X 14 15 V.S., individually and on behalf of her infant child, T.S., 16 17 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 18 19 - against - 20 21 NADIRA MUHAMMAD, individually and as caseworker, NATALIE ARTHUR, 22 individually and as supervisor, BRENDA WILSON, individually and 23 as manager, JOHN B. MATTINGLY, individually and as Commissioner, 24 CITY OF NEW YORK, 25 26 Defendants-Appellants, 27 28 -and- 29 30 DEBRA ESERNIO-JENSSEN, individually and as physician; LONG ISLAND 31 JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER, NORTH SHORE - LONG ISLAND JEWISH HEALTH 32 SYSTEM, INC., 33 34 Defendants. 35 36 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X 37 38 Before: MINER and CABRANES, Circuit Judges, and 39 RAKOFF, District Judge.* 40 41
*
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
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1 Interlocutory appeal by public employees from a ruling of the 2 United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 3 (Dora L. Irizarry, Judge), denying dismissal of these defendants 4 on grounds of immunity from claims against them involving 5 wrongful child removal and malicious prosecution. 6 7 Reversed and remanded.
8 DEBORAH A. BRENNER, Of Counsel, Corporation 9 Counsel of the City of New York (Michael A. 10 Cardozo, Barry P. Schwartz, Of Counsel, 11 Deborah A. Brenner, on the brief), for 12 Defendants-Appellants. 13 14 CAROLYN A. KUBITSCHEK, Lansner & Kubitschek, 15 New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 16
17 RAKOFF, District Judge: 18 This case is one of several recent cases concerned with what 19 degree of protection is afforded municipal employees involved in 20 the often thorny process of determining whether to remove an 21 injured child from the custody of the child’s parents and bring 22 child abuse charges against the parents.1 We state the pertinent 23 facts most favorably to plaintiff. Skehan v. Vill. of 24 Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2006), overruled on 25 other grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 26 2008). 27 On August 19, 2004, plaintiff V.S. and her mother took 28 V.S.’s infant son T.S. to the Schneider Children’s Hospital in 29 New Hyde Park, New York, with a swollen leg, where he was
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See, e.g., Cornejo v. Bell, __ F.3d __, No. 08-3069-cv, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 38 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2010); Graham v.
Mattingly, No. 08-5271-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22908 (2d Cir.
Oct. 19, 2009) (summary order).
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1 diagnosed with a fractured femur.2 On August 20, the hospital 2 reported the injury to the New York State Register of Child Abuse 3 and Maltreatment, and subsequently submitted a second report 4 stating that T.S. also had a frontal skull fracture and old and 5 new retinal hemorrhages. After reviewing the reports, defendant- 6 appellant Natalie Arthur, a supervisor in the New York City 7 Administration of Child Services (“ACS”), directed one of her 8 caseworkers, defendant-appellant Nadira Muhammad, to conduct an 9 investigation. 10 Muhammad interviewed V.S., her mother, and T.S.’s biological 11 father, as well as defendant Debra Esernio-Jenssen, M.D. (the 12 head of the hospital’s Child Abuse Protection team), and several 13 other doctors. Initially, neither V.S. nor her mother was able 14 to provide an explanation for T.S.’s injuries, although V.S., who 15 had been bedridden for six weeks after a complicated pregnancy, 16 asserted that she was physically incapable of inflicting injury 17 upon T.S. Subsequently, however, V.S.’s mother, who had been 18 T.S.’s primary caretaker during this period, admitted that she 19 (the grandmother) had slipped while holding the baby and that his 20 leg had hit the kitchen counter; but she still could not account 21 for the other injuries. 22 While the hospital staff thereafter concluded that T.S. had
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The hospital, or more precisely its parent, the Long Island Jewish Medical Center, North Shore - Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc., along with one of its physicians, Debra Esernio-Jenssen, M.D., are co-defendants in the underlying lawsuit but are not parties to the instant interlocutory appeal.
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1 likely sustained the fracture during the fall described by the 2 grandmother, on August 23, 2004, ACS received a report from Dr. 3 Esernio-Jenssen that concluded that T.S.’s retinal hemorrhages 4 were indicative of “shaken baby syndrome.” Muhammad and Arthur 5 then conferred by telephone with Esernio-Jenssen, following 6 which, on August 24, 2004, ACS commenced child protective 7 proceedings in Queens County Family Court against V.S. and her 8 mother, alleging they had abused T.S. and seeking temporary 9 removal of T.S. from the custody of V.S. and her mother pursuant 10 to Article 10 of the New York Family Court Act. See N.Y. Fam. 11 Ct. Act § 1012 et seq. 12 An initial hearing was held that same day in Family Court, 13 at which V.S. and her mother appeared, represented by counsel. 14 Muhammad testified for ACS that T.S. had suffered unexplained 15 injuries and that the hospital believed that the child was 16 suffering from shaken baby syndrome. Muhammad did not disclose, 17 however, that V.S. had been bedridden for six weeks, or that the 18 hospital had concluded that T.S. had likely suffered the femur 19 fracture while in the care of his grandmother. In reliance on 20 Muhammad’s testimony, the Family Court judge granted a temporary 21 order of removal, as a consequence of which T.S., after being 22 released from the hospital on August 25, 2004, was placed in the 23 custody of his biological father, who did not reside with V.S. 24 V.S. subsequently moved to vacate the order of removal, and 25 the Family Court held a hearing on September 27 and 29, 2004, at
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1 which V.S. was once again present and represented by counsel. At 2 the hearing, defendant Arthur testified that Dr. Eric Shakin, a 3 pediatric retinal specialist who had examined T.S. when he was 4 first brought to the hospital, had indicated that the retinal 5 injuries were consistent with shaken baby syndrome. Arthur did 6 not disclose, however, that Dr. Esernio-Jenssen had informed 7 defendants (on September 14, 2004) that she now believed V.S. had 8 not injured the infant. The Family Court denied the motion, and 9 V.S. did not appeal. 10 ACS then proceeded with the child abuse charges filed 11 against V.S. and her mother. At the trial of these charges, held 12 on various days between January 24, 2005 and June 30, 2005, both 13 Dr. Esernio-Jenssen and Dr. Shakin testified for ACS that T.S. 14 suffered from shaken baby syndrome. For V.S., Dr. Ram Kairam, 15 chairman of pediatrics at Bronx Lebanon Hospital, testified that 16 although the infant had signs of retinal and vitreous 17 hemorrhaging, they did not resemble the hemorrhages associated 18 with shaken baby syndrome but were more consistent with 19 childbirth injuries. This diagnosis was corroborated by medical 20 records of injuries suffered at T.S.’s birth. 21 The Family Court reserved judgment, but on October 17, 2005, 22 before any decision had been rendered, ACS moved, without 23 explanation, to withdraw all allegations against V.S. (but not 24 against her mother). The Family Court granted the motion and 25 released T.S. to V.S.’s care. On November 3, 2005, the petition
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1 against V.S.’s mother was reduced to charges based solely on 2 T.S.’s fractured femur, and on November 29, 2006, the Family 3 Court entered a finding of neglect against V.S.’s mother. 4 Shortly thereafter, on January 16, 2007, V.S. commenced the 5 instant action against caseworker Muhammad, Muhammad’s supervisor 6 Arthur, Arthur’s manager Brenda Wilson, Wilson’s superior John B. 7 Mattingly, and derivatively, the City of New York (collectively, 8 the “City Defendants”), as well as Dr. Esernio-Jenssen and her 9 employer, Long Island Jewish Medical Center, North Shore - Long 10 Island Jewish Health System, Inc. The action alleged violations 11 of V.S.’s and T.S.’s rights under the Fourth Amendment (search 12 and seizure and malicious prosecution) and the Fourteenth 13 Amendment (due process). The action also alleged claims under 14 New York state law for malicious prosecution and abuse of 15 process. In support of these claims, V.S. alleged, in essence, 16 that Dr. Esernio-Jenssen had a long history of giving unreliable 17 and misleading diagnoses of shaken baby syndrome and that ACS, 18 knowing this, should not have proceeded in reliance on Dr. 19 Esernio-Jenssen’s opinions and without disclosing exculpatory 20 evidence to the Family Court. 21 On November 20, 2007, the City Defendants moved for summary 22 judgment on the basis of absolute and/or qualified immunity. 23 While the motion was being briefed, the City Defendants also 24 sought dismissal on the basis of the so-called “Rooker-Feldman” 25 doctrine, which maintains that a federal district court should
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1 not entertain a case brought by a litigant who lost in state 2 court and seeks in effect appellate review of that decision by a 3 lower federal court. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 4 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 5 In an opinion issued September 30, 2008, the United States 6 District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Dora L. 7 Irizarry, Judge) denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion, 8 concluding that essential elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 9 had not been satisfied, that defendants were not entitled to 10 absolute immunity, and that determination of qualified immunity 11 must await discovery on the issues of whether it was objectively 12 reasonable for the City Defendants to rely on Dr. 13 Esernio-Jenssen’s assessments and on whether defendants were 14 proceeding in bad faith. 15 DISCUSSION 16 Interlocutory appeal is available both from a denial of 17 absolute immunity, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985), 18 and, if plaintiff’s essential factual allegations are taken as 19 true, from a denial of qualified immunity, Skehan, 465 F.3d at 20 104-05 (2d Cir. 2006). In such circumstances, interlocutory 21 appeal will also lie from a denial of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 22 if the issue is, as here, inextricably intertwined with the 23 immunity appeal. Id. at 105. 24 A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 25 We agree with the district court that the Rooker-Feldman
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1 doctrine is inapplicable here. To invoke that doctrine, 2 defendants must meet four requirements:
3 First, the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state 4 court. Second, the plaintiff must “complain[] of injuries 5 caused by [a] state-court judgment[.]” Third, the plaintiff 6 must “invite district court review and rejection of [that] 7 judgment[].” Fourth, the state-court judgment must have 8 been “rendered before the district court proceedings 9 commenced” - i.e., Rooker-Feldman has no application to 10 federal-court suits proceeding in parallel with ongoing 11 state-court litigation. 12 13 Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d
14 Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 15 Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Applying these requirements to 16 the context of state-court orders of removal of children from 17 parental custody, this Court, in Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 18 102-03 (2d Cir. 2009), found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did 19 not apply because the Family Court had issued a superseding order 20 returning plaintiff’s child to plaintiff’s custody, and the 21 claims against plaintiff were ultimately dismissed. Thus, 22 plaintiff neither had lost in state court (the first Hoblock 23 requirement), nor did her claims invite district court review and 24 rejection of a state-court judgment (the third Hoblock 25 requirement). Here, as in Green, V.S. is not a “state-court 26 loser,” since, prior to the commencement of the instant action, 27 ACS had withdrawn all its claims against V.S. and the Family 28 Court had released T.S. to V.S.’s custody. Likewise, nothing in 29 the instant action invites district court review and rejection of 30 a final state-court judgment. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman
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1 doctrine is inapplicable here. 2 B. Federal Claims and Qualified Immunity 3 ACS caseworkers and their superiors are generally entitled 4 to qualified immunity from claims under Section 1983 if it was 5 objectively reasonable for the caseworkers to believe their 6 conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or 7 constitutional rights of which a reasonable caseworker would have 8 known. Cornejo v. Bell, __ F.3d __, No. 08-3069-cv, 2010 U.S. 9 App. LEXIS 38, at *15-16 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2010). “If caseworkers 10 of reasonable competence could disagree on the legality of . . . 11 defendant[s’] actions their behavior is protected.” Tenenbaum v. 12 Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 605 (2d Cir. 1999)(internal quotation 13 marks omitted). 14 Here, the district court believed some discovery was 15 necessary before this assessment could be made; but, reviewing 16 the matter de novo, as we are obliged to do, Walczyk v. Rio, 496 17 F.3d 139, 153 (2d Cir. 2007); Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 18 243 (2d Cir. 2007), we disagree. 19 When V.S. was first interviewed, neither she nor her mother 20 could give an explanation, not only for T.S.’s fractured femur 21 but also for T.S.’s other serious injuries that medical tests had 22 revealed. By contrast, Dr. Esernio-Jenssen made a diagnosis of 23 shaken baby syndrome. In the absence of any plausible 24 alternative, this was sufficient to warrant the initial decision 25 to seek a court order permitting T.S.’s removal from V.S.’s
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1 custody. See, e.g., van Emrik v. Chemung County Dep’t of Soc. 2 Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1990). When, at the 3 subsequent hearings, not only Dr. Esernio-Jenssen but also Dr. 4 Shakin reaffirmed the diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome, there 5 remained ample basis for defendants to continue with both custody 6 removal and charges of abuse. The fact that the caseworkers 7 failed to apprise the Family Court that it was V.S.’s mother, 8 rather than V.S., who had custody of T.S. during much of the 9 relevant period is irrelevant, since V.S. and her mother not only 10 were present at all the hearings but were represented by counsel, 11 who could have brought this and other facts favorable to V.S. to 12 the Family Court’s attention. 13 The district court nonetheless believed that qualified 14 immunity could not yet be granted because of V.S.’s allegations 15 that Dr. Esernio-Jenssen was known to defendants to have 16 repeatedly misdiagnosed child injuries as evidence of child 17 abuse. In the district court’s view, the “reliability of Dr. 18 Esernio-Jenssen’s diagnoses . . . is an issue of material fact 19 that goes directly to the objective reasonableness of ACS in 20 seizing and removing T.S. from his mother.” Special App. 49. 21 But to impose on an ACS caseworker the obligation in such 22 circumstances of assessing the reliability of a qualified 23 doctor’s past and present diagnoses would impose a wholly 24 unreasonable burden of the very kind qualified immunity is 25 designed to remove. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d
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1 89, 107-09 (2d Cir. 1999); Defore v. Premore, 86 F.3d 48, 50-51 2 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 3 At all times here relevant, Dr. Esernio-Jenssen was not just 4 a licensed physician, but also the head of the Child Protection 5 Team at the hospital to which T.S. was taken. She based her 6 diagnosis of T.S. on determinations made by another doctor, Dr. 7 Sylvia Kodsi, of retinal hemorrhages, a common indicator of 8 shaken baby syndrome, and her opinion was shared by another well 9 qualified physician, Dr. Shakin. Even if the ACS personnel here 10 involved had been aware of Dr. Esernio-Jenssen’s alleged 11 “reputation” for overdiagnosing child abuse, it still would not 12 have been unreasonable for them to rely on Dr. Esernio-Jenssen’s 13 diagnosis of T.S. in these circumstances. Thus, as a matter of 14 law, the City Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and 15 thus dismissal of all the federal charges against them. 16 C. State Law and Absolute Immunity 17 In Cornejo, this Court held that defendants similarly 18 situated to the City Defendants here were entitled under New York 19 law to absolute immunity for claims of malicious prosecution 20 brought under that law. Cornejo, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 38, at 21 *18. The district court here, not having the benefit of Cornejo, 22 believed that only qualified immunity was available, but this was 23 error. As for the claim of abuse of process under New York State 24 law, the highest New York court to rule on this issue has 25 likewise concluded that defendants are entitled to absolute
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1 immunity from such a claim in circumstances comparable to those 2 presented here. See Carossia v. City of N.Y., 835 N.Y.S.2d 102, 3 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007). This Court is bound to 4 apply the law as interpreted by a state’s intermediate appellate 5 courts unless there is persuasive evidence that the state’s 6 highest court would reach a different conclusion. Pahuta v. 7 Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 1999). There 8 is no such evidence here. 9 Accordingly, the City Defendants are entitled to absolute 10 immunity on the state law claims here made. 11 CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the federal claims against the 13 City Defendants must be dismissed on grounds of qualified 14 immunity and the state claims against the City Defendants must be 15 dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity. The district court’s 16 decision of September 30, 2008 is therefore reversed and the case 17 remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss all 18 claims against defendant-appellants.