Vrain Scott v. Department of Corrections State of Florida

Eleventh Circuit

Vrain Scott v. Department of Corrections State of Florida

408 F. App'x 341

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

DecidedJanuary 19, 2011

Docket10-11873

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 408 F. App'x 341 (Vrain Scott v. Department of Corrections State of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Vrain Scott v. Department of Corrections State of Florida, 408 F. App'x 341 (11th Cir. 2011).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This is the second time we have reviewed the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus sought by Vrain Scott. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Scott petitioned for relief on the ground that a Florida court resentenced him based on a finding of fact not made by the jury at trial, in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The district court denied Scott’s petition as successive and untimely, but we vacated that decision and remanded for further proceedings. Scott v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 307 Fed.Appx. 347 (11th Cir.2009). On remand, the district court ruled that the decision of the state court was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. We affirm.

Scott argues that the state court violated his right to a trial by jury by adjudicating him guilty of robbery with a weapon without a specific finding to that effect by a jury, but this argument fails. Under the Florida statute, a defendant is guilty of robbery in the first degree whether he “carried a firearm or other deadly weapon,” Fla. Stat. § 813.12(2)(a), or “carried a weapon,” id. § 813.12(2)(b). The jury found Scott guilty of “armed robbery,” but the jury did not make a special finding that he carried a firearm. After collateral review, Scott was resentenced as guilty of robbery with a weapon instead of robbery with a firearm. See Mashburn v. State, 745 So.2d 453, 454 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999). We will not review how the state courts reconciles the robbery statute and jury verdicts. See Marshall v. Sec., Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 576, 583 (11th Cir.2010) (“ ‘[Federal courts do not sit to revisit a state supreme court’s judgment as to whether *342 the trial court complied with state law.’ ”) (quoting Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1570 (11th Cir.1994)).

The district court correctly denied Scott habeas relief because the state court reasonably concluded that Scott’s sentence did not violate Apprendi. The Supreme Court held in Apprendi that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. The state court reasonably relied on the verdict of the jury that Scott committed armed robbery to adjudicate Scott guilty of robbery with a weapon.

We AFFIRM the denial of Scott’s petition.

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PER CURIAM:

This is the second time we have reviewed the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus sought by Vrain Scott. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Scott petitioned for relief on the ground that a Florida court resentenced him based on a finding of fact not made by the jury at trial, in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The district court denied Scott’s petition as successive and untimely, but we vacated that decision and remanded for further proceedings. Scott v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 307 Fed.Appx. 347 (11th Cir.2009). On remand, the district court ruled that the decision of the state court was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. We affirm.

Scott argues that the state court violated his right to a trial by jury by adjudicating him guilty of robbery with a weapon without a specific finding to that effect by a jury, but this argument fails. Under the Florida statute, a defendant is guilty of robbery in the first degree whether he “carried a firearm or other deadly weapon,” Fla. Stat. § 813.12(2)(a), or “carried a weapon,” id. § 813.12(2)(b). The jury found Scott guilty of “armed robbery,” but the jury did not make a special finding that he carried a firearm. After collateral review, Scott was resentenced as guilty of robbery with a weapon instead of robbery with a firearm. See Mashburn v. State, 745 So.2d 453, 454 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999). We will not review how the state courts reconciles the robbery statute and jury verdicts. See Marshall v. Sec., Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 576, 583 (11th Cir.2010) (“ ‘[Federal courts do not sit to revisit a state supreme court’s judgment as to whether *342 the trial court complied with state law.’ ”) (quoting Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1570 (11th Cir.1994)).

The district court correctly denied Scott habeas relief because the state court reasonably concluded that Scott’s sentence did not violate Apprendi. The Supreme Court held in Apprendi that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. The state court reasonably relied on the verdict of the jury that Scott committed armed robbery to adjudicate Scott guilty of robbery with a weapon.

We AFFIRM the denial of Scott’s petition.

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