Vose v. Taylor
This text of Vose v. Taylor (Vose v. Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT j Cumberland, ss. Location: Portland
PAMELA W. VOSE, Personal Representative of the Estate of William T. Dean, Jr.
Plaintiff
v. Docket No. BCD-CV-14-14
JAMES P. TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants
ORDER ON DEFENDANT TAYLOR'S PENDING MOTIONS
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff James P. Taylor has filed a Motion to
Strike Plaintiffs Request for Jury Trial and a Motion For Leave To Amend Third
Party Complaint. Both motions are opposed. The court elects to decide both
without further argument. See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(7).
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Request for Jury Trial
Defendant Taylor's motion asserts that, because .Plaintiff Vase's claim is for
equitable relief only, not for damages, Plaintiff has no right to a jury trial.
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint asserts two counts against Defendant
Taylor, one seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating the deed by which the
Maine Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) as temporary
conservator transferred the property to Defendant Taylor, and the other asking for a
constructive trust to be imposed upon the property in the hands of Defendant
I Taylor. The relief sought under both theories of liability is for rescission of the
DHHS conveyance to Defendant Taylor. The effect of rescission would be to vest
title in Plaintiff Vose, who initially succeeded DHHS as conservator for William T.
Dean, Jr. and who now serves as personal representative of Mr. Dean's estate.
Defendant Taylor seeks to strike Plaintiffs jury demand on the ground that
her claims are equitable and there is no right to a jury trial on purely equitable
claims. The Maine Constitution establishes a right to trial by jury "in all civil suits,
and in all controversies concerning property . . . except in cases where it has
heretofore been otherwise practiced." ME. CONST. art. I, § 20. Maine courts have
interpreted this provision in specific cases by "look[ing] behind the action to see ifit
was historically tried without a jury." Harriman v. Maddocks, 560 A.2d 11, 13 (Me.
1989), quoting 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE§ 38.1 at 550
(2nd ed. 1970) (internal quotes omitted).
Legal claims are usually triable to a jury, whereas equitable claims generally
are not, and ''[w]hether a claim is equitable or legal depends on the basic nature of
the issue presented and the remedy sought by the plaintiff." Avery v. fVhatley, 670
A.2d 922, 924 (Me. 1996)(internal quote omitted).
"It is well settled that rescission is an equitable remedy." Harriman v.
Maddocks, supra, 560 A.2d at 13, citing First ef Maine Commodities v. Dube, 534 A.2d
1298, 1.301 (Me. 1987); Arbour v. Hazelton, 534 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Me. 1987). Even
when a rescission claim raises factual issues that could be tried to a jury in the
context of a claim for damages, if the cause of action is equitable in nature, trial on factual issues is to the court. For example, in Harriman, the plaintiffs' rescission
claim included allegations of fraud-an issue that in the context of a damages claim
would be decided by the jury-but the Law Court held that the trial court correctly
determined that "while the fact of fraud does not preclude trial by jury, a request for
rescission transformed the action into a request for equitable relief" Harriman v.
Maddocks, supra, 660 A.2d at 13. Accordingly, the Law Court concluded that the
issL1e of fraud for purposes of the plaintiffs' rescission claim was appropriately
decided by the court rather than by a jury. Id.
PlaintiffVose's opposition to Defendant Taylor's Motion to Strike notes that
her claim for declaratory judgment raises issues that in certain instances are tried to
a jury. However, the inclusion of a count for declaratory judgment does not create a
right to jury trial where none would otherwise exist. In Thompson v. Pendleton, the
Law Court held that plaintiff landowners who brought an action for declaratory
judgment to establish their right to use a right of way did not have the right to a
jury trial because their cause of action rested on equitable claims for reformation of
deed and enforcement of an equitable servitude. 1997 ME 127, ~ 10, 697 A.2d 66,
58. The fact that the plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment claim did not
create a right to jury trial. See id.
Because Plaintiff Vose's claim against Defendant Taylor sounds in equity and
seeks equitable relief only, there is no right to jury trial. Accordingly, Defendant
Taylor's Motion to Strike will be granted.
s l\!Iotionfor Leave to Amend Third-Party Complaint
Defendant Taylor's Motion for Leave to Amend seeks to add a breach of
contract count to his third-party claim against the DHHS. DHHS objects
essentially on timeliness grounds. It is quite true that the action has been pending
for a long time. On the other hand, Defendant Taylor and DHHS and the court have
agreed that resolution of Defendant Taylor's third-party claims be deferred until
after the trial of Plaintiff Vase's claims against Defendant Taylor, so the proposed
amendment will not cause delay. Also, the addition of this count would not appear
to open whole new factual vistas for purposes of additional discovery. Because
leave to amend should be granted liberally, the Motion for Leave to Amend will be
granted.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
l. Defendant James P. Taylor's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Request for Jury
Trial is granted.
2. Defendant James P. Taylor's Motion For Leave To Amend Third-Party
Complaint is also granted. Defendant Taylor's proposed Amended Third-Party
Complaint is deemed filed as of this date, and the State will file an amended answer
within the time prescribed by M.R. Civ. P. 15. ··f
Order by reference in the docket.
Dated July 25, 2017 A.M. Horton, Justice
Entered on the Docket: 1·J5' ·/J 4 Copies sent via Mail_Elec:!ronically.lL. ,, ·· Pamela W. Vose, Conservator for William Dean, Jr. v. James P. Taylor, et al.
BCD-CV-2014-14
Pamela W. Vose, Conservator for William Dean, Jr. Plaintiff
Counsel: Cynthia Dill, Esq. 511 Congress Steet PO Box 9711 Portland, ME 04101-5011
James P. Taylor Defendant
Counsel: Zachary Greenfield, Esq. 361 US Route 1 Falmouth, ME 04105
DHHS 3rd Party Defendant Chistopher C. Taub, Esq. 6 State House Station Augusta, ME 04333-0006
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