Vose v. Taylor

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJuly 25, 2017
DocketCUMbcd-cv-14-14
StatusUnpublished

This text of Vose v. Taylor (Vose v. Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vose v. Taylor, (Me. Super. Ct. 2017).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT j Cumberland, ss. Location: Portland

PAMELA W. VOSE, Personal Representative of the Estate of William T. Dean, Jr.

Plaintiff

v. Docket No. BCD-CV-14-14

JAMES P. TAYLOR, et al.

Defendants

ORDER ON DEFENDANT TAYLOR'S PENDING MOTIONS

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff James P. Taylor has filed a Motion to

Strike Plaintiffs Request for Jury Trial and a Motion For Leave To Amend Third­

Party Complaint. Both motions are opposed. The court elects to decide both

without further argument. See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(7).

Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Request for Jury Trial

Defendant Taylor's motion asserts that, because .Plaintiff Vase's claim is for

equitable relief only, not for damages, Plaintiff has no right to a jury trial.

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint asserts two counts against Defendant

Taylor, one seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating the deed by which the

Maine Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) as temporary

conservator transferred the property to Defendant Taylor, and the other asking for a

constructive trust to be imposed upon the property in the hands of Defendant

I Taylor. The relief sought under both theories of liability is for rescission of the

DHHS conveyance to Defendant Taylor. The effect of rescission would be to vest

title in Plaintiff Vose, who initially succeeded DHHS as conservator for William T.

Dean, Jr. and who now serves as personal representative of Mr. Dean's estate.

Defendant Taylor seeks to strike Plaintiffs jury demand on the ground that

her claims are equitable and there is no right to a jury trial on purely equitable

claims. The Maine Constitution establishes a right to trial by jury "in all civil suits,

and in all controversies concerning property . . . except in cases where it has

heretofore been otherwise practiced." ME. CONST. art. I, § 20. Maine courts have

interpreted this provision in specific cases by "look[ing] behind the action to see ifit

was historically tried without a jury." Harriman v. Maddocks, 560 A.2d 11, 13 (Me.

1989), quoting 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE§ 38.1 at 550

(2nd ed. 1970) (internal quotes omitted).

Legal claims are usually triable to a jury, whereas equitable claims generally

are not, and ''[w]hether a claim is equitable or legal depends on the basic nature of

the issue presented and the remedy sought by the plaintiff." Avery v. fVhatley, 670

A.2d 922, 924 (Me. 1996)(internal quote omitted).

"It is well settled that rescission is an equitable remedy." Harriman v.

Maddocks, supra, 560 A.2d at 13, citing First ef Maine Commodities v. Dube, 534 A.2d

1298, 1.301 (Me. 1987); Arbour v. Hazelton, 534 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Me. 1987). Even

when a rescission claim raises factual issues that could be tried to a jury in the

context of a claim for damages, if the cause of action is equitable in nature, trial on factual issues is to the court. For example, in Harriman, the plaintiffs' rescission

claim included allegations of fraud-an issue that in the context of a damages claim

would be decided by the jury-but the Law Court held that the trial court correctly

determined that "while the fact of fraud does not preclude trial by jury, a request for

rescission transformed the action into a request for equitable relief" Harriman v.

Maddocks, supra, 660 A.2d at 13. Accordingly, the Law Court concluded that the

issL1e of fraud for purposes of the plaintiffs' rescission claim was appropriately

decided by the court rather than by a jury. Id.

PlaintiffVose's opposition to Defendant Taylor's Motion to Strike notes that

her claim for declaratory judgment raises issues that in certain instances are tried to

a jury. However, the inclusion of a count for declaratory judgment does not create a

right to jury trial where none would otherwise exist. In Thompson v. Pendleton, the

Law Court held that plaintiff landowners who brought an action for declaratory

judgment to establish their right to use a right of way did not have the right to a

jury trial because their cause of action rested on equitable claims for reformation of

deed and enforcement of an equitable servitude. 1997 ME 127, ~ 10, 697 A.2d 66,

58. The fact that the plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment claim did not

create a right to jury trial. See id.

Because Plaintiff Vose's claim against Defendant Taylor sounds in equity and

seeks equitable relief only, there is no right to jury trial. Accordingly, Defendant

Taylor's Motion to Strike will be granted.

s l\!Iotionfor Leave to Amend Third-Party Complaint

Defendant Taylor's Motion for Leave to Amend seeks to add a breach of

contract count to his third-party claim against the DHHS. DHHS objects

essentially on timeliness grounds. It is quite true that the action has been pending

for a long time. On the other hand, Defendant Taylor and DHHS and the court have

agreed that resolution of Defendant Taylor's third-party claims be deferred until

after the trial of Plaintiff Vase's claims against Defendant Taylor, so the proposed

amendment will not cause delay. Also, the addition of this count would not appear

to open whole new factual vistas for purposes of additional discovery. Because

leave to amend should be granted liberally, the Motion for Leave to Amend will be

granted.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

l. Defendant James P. Taylor's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Request for Jury

Trial is granted.

2. Defendant James P. Taylor's Motion For Leave To Amend Third-Party

Complaint is also granted. Defendant Taylor's proposed Amended Third-Party

Complaint is deemed filed as of this date, and the State will file an amended answer

within the time prescribed by M.R. Civ. P. 15. ··f

Order by reference in the docket.

Dated July 25, 2017 A.M. Horton, Justice

Entered on the Docket: 1·J5' ·/J 4 Copies sent via Mail_Elec:!ronically.lL. ,, ·· Pamela W. Vose, Conservator for William Dean, Jr. v. James P. Taylor, et al.

BCD-CV-2014-14

Pamela W. Vose, Conservator for William Dean, Jr. Plaintiff

Counsel: Cynthia Dill, Esq. 511 Congress Steet PO Box 9711 Portland, ME 04101-5011

James P. Taylor Defendant

Counsel: Zachary Greenfield, Esq. 361 US Route 1 Falmouth, ME 04105

DHHS 3rd Party Defendant Chistopher C. Taub, Esq. 6 State House Station Augusta, ME 04333-0006

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Related

Avery v. Whatley
670 A.2d 922 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1996)
Arbour v. Hazelton
534 A.2d 1303 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1987)
First of Maine Commodities v. Dube
534 A.2d 1298 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1987)
Harriman v. Maddocks
560 A.2d 11 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1989)
Capul v. Fleet Bank of Maine
1997 ME 140 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
Thompson v. Pendleton
1997 ME 127 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)

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