Vonalst v. Royal

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 30, 2024
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00400
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 NICKOLAS VONALST, Case No. 3:24-cv-00400-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 T. ROYAL, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Nickolas Vonalst brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 13 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Ely State 14 Prison. (ECF No. 1-1.) On September 20, 2024, this Court ordered Vonalst to file a fully 15 complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee on or 16 before November 20, 2024. (ECF No. 5.) The Court warned Vonalst that the action could 17 be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis 18 or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 2.) 19 The Court’s order came back as undeliverable to Vonalst’s address. (ECF No. 6.) 20 However, Vonalst subsequently filed an updated address. (ECF No. 10.) In light of 21 Vonalst filing an updated address, the Court resent its previous order and extended the 22 deadline for Vonalst to file a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis until 23 December 17, 2024. (ECF No. 11.) That extended deadline expired and Vonalst did not 24 file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $405 filing fee, 25 or otherwise respond. 26 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 27 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 28 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 2 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 3 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 4 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 5 Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 6 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 7 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 8 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition 9 of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 10 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 11 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 12 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 13 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Vonalst’s 14 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 15 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 16 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 17 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 18 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 19 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 20 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 21 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 22 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 23 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 24 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 25 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 26 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 27 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 28 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 1 || case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 2 || F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 3 || unless Vonalst either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or 4 || pays the $405 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter another order 5 || setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 6 || delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here 7 || do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Vonalst needs 8 || additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s second order. Setting 9 || another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 10 || factor favors dismissal. 11 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 12 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 13 || prejudice based on Vonalst’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 14 || pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s October 18, 2024, 15 || order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 16 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Vonalst wishes to pursue his 17 || claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 18 DATED THIS 30" Day of December 2024.

20 MIRANDA M. DU 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28