Von Herten v. Land Reclamation Inc.

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: March 2, 2010
• Docket: CUMcv-09-211
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE CUMBERLAND, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-09-2 11 j 1':.01/.)- C vt fY\ _;f/d 0 SELDEN VON HERTEN, et al.,

Plaintiffs v. ORDER

LAND RECLAMATION INC.,

Defendant

Before the court is a motion by plaintiffs Selden Von Herten and Von Herten's

Auto Body Inc. (collectively, the "Von Herten parties") for partial summary judgment.

The basis of the motion is that the Von Herten parties entered into a written settlement

agreement with defendant Land Reclamation Inc. (LRI) and that LRI has breached the

settlement agreement.

Summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering a

motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to consider only the portions of

the record referred to and the material facts set forth in the parties' Rule 56(h)

statements. Jig., Iohnson v. McNeiL 2002 ME 99 <]I 8, 800 A.2d 702, 704. The facts must

be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Thus, for

purposes of summary judgment, any factual disputes must be resolved against the

movant. Nevertheless, when the facts offered by a party in opposition to summary

judgment would not, if offered at trial, be sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment

as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 1997

ME 99

enti tled "Settlement Agreement" at a mediation on March 10, 2008. Response to Request

for Admissions 16. The signature line on the settlement agreement is in the name of

"Land Reclamation Inc. by Keith Hildenbrand, President." Moreover, LRI also does not

dispute that Keith Hildenbrand was the President of LRI when he signed the settlement

agreement. Response to Request for Admissions 18. Finally, there is no dispute that LRI

has not made the payments called for under the settlement agreement.

However, LRI disputes that the settlement agreement was a binding contract and

also argues that its obligations under that agreement were conditioned on events that

have not occurred.

The Law Court has made clear that settlement agreements are analyzed as

contracts, and the first question is whether the parties have reached an agreement that

reflects their mutual intention to be bound by terms sufficiently definite to be enforced.

Muther v. Broad Cove Shore Association, 2009 ME 37 16, 968 A.2d 539, 541. In contrast,

where the parties have only reached an agreement in principle - "an agreement to

agree" - but do not intend to be bound until a formal contract is subsequently executed,

no enforceable contract exists. Cf. White v. Fleet Bank, 2005 ME 72 112, 875 A.2d 680,

683.

The settlement agreement in this case is not ambiguous and places definite

obligations upon LRI. Under the parol evidence rule, LRI cannot offer testimony to

contradict or vary the terms of the agreement. However, there is one possible indication

that the parties did not intend to be bound by the settlement agreement: a statement in

its final paragraph that counsel shall prepare "the final document to complete the

settlement within 30 days." Whether this is alone sufficient to generate a sufficient

factual dispute for trial as to the enforceability of the settlement agreement is a close

2 question. The court concludes that summary judgment on this issue should be denied,

particularly because there is an additional factual dispute that also requires a trial.

Specifically, paragraph 4 of the settlement agreement provided that LRI would

provide evidence of corporate authorization of the settlement. Hildenbrand's affidavit

states that there was no corporate authorization. It would be a fair inference that since

Hildenbrand was the President of LRI and signed the agreement as president of LRI, he

was either authorized to sign the agreement or had apparent authority to sign. See Bay

View Bank N.A. v. The Highland Golf Mortgagees Realty Trust, 2002 ME 178 126 n.1,

814 A.2d 449,453 n.1. However, on summary judgment all inferences must be drawn in

favor of the party opposing summary judgment. If Hildenbrand's authority was clear,

there is a question why a corporate authorization was requested. This issue is also

sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

The court notes that several of the other issues raised by LRI do not create factual

disputes for trial. SpeCifically, the contingency that Hildenbrand and LRI provide

certain documentation satisfactory to the Von Herten parties is a condition for the

benefit of the Von Herten parties and a condition that the Von Herten parties can

excuse. The requirement of mutual releases is also not a bar to enforcement.

Given that there are factual disputes for trial, the remaining question is how to

proceed. When a plaintiff asserts that a defendant is liable on various underlying claims

but also asserts that the parties have reached a settlement and asserts, as a separate

cause of action, that there has been a breach of the settlement agreement, the usual

procedure is to bifurcate the cause of action for enforcement of the settlement

agreement and proceed to trial on that issue first.

Accordingly, the court proposes to call in Count IV of the complaint for trial. The

parties are directed to advise the clerk within 10 days if they have any objection to this

3 procedure and also to advise the clerk, if no enforceable settlement agreement is found

whether they would be prepared to proceed during the same trial term to address th remaining causes of action in the complaint.

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied. Procedural order

entered. The clerk is directed to incorporate this order in the docket by reference pursuant to Rule 79(a).

Dated: March 2-,2010 --- Thomas #s.. D. Warren Justice, Superior Court

4 bl1~LU~N VUN l1~l{'l'~N ~'1' l-\L Vb Li\NU l{~CLi\l'1i\·l·.iUN .iNC UTN:AOCSsr -2009-0039195 CASE #:PORSC-CV-2009-00211

01 0000001325 STILLMAN, NEAL 97 A EXCHANGE STREET PORTLAND ME 04101 F LAND RECLAMATION INC DEF RTND 05113/2009 - 02 0000004211 THORNTON, PATRICK D 95 EXCHANGE ST PO BOX 7046 PORTLAND ME 04112-7046 F SHELDEN VON HERTEN PL RTND 04113/2009 F VON HERTENS AUTO BODY INC PL RTND 04/13/2009