Volpe v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJuly 19, 2022
Docket16-1422
StatusUnpublished

This text of Volpe v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Volpe v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Volpe v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2022).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 16-1422V Filed: June 22, 2022 UNPUBLISHED

SHARON VOLPE Special Master Horner Petitioner, v. Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent.

Jeffrey Golvash, Golvash & Epstein, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, for petitioner. Ryan Pyles, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 1

On November 4, 2021, petitioner moved for an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs. (ECF No. 107.) Respondent filed a response deferring to my discretion regarding the amount and appropriateness of an award of such fees and costs. (ECF No. 108.) Petitioner requests $67,880.00 to be paid for attorney and paralegal fees with an additional $31,707.83 to be paid for other costs for a total of $99,595.83. For the reasons discussed below, I award petitioner the total requested amount.

I. Procedural History

On October 28, 2016, filed a petitioner for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act alleging that she suffered undifferentiated connective tissue disease (“UCTD”) caused by her November 8, 2013 influenza (“flu”) vaccination. (ECF No. 1.) This case was originally assigned to then Chief Special Master Dorsey on

1 Because this decision contains a reasoned explanation for the special master’s action in this case, it will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the decision will be available to anyone with access to the Internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If the special master, upon review, agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, it will be redacted from public access.

1 October 31, 2016. (ECF Nos. 3.) Petitioner filed her petition pro se, but later substituted Jeffrey A. Golvash as her attorney on September 8, 2017. (ECF No. 14.)

Petitioner subsequently filed a series of medical records on January 16, 2018, and an amended petition on March 7, 2018. (ECF Nos. 21, 22, 25.) Respondent filed a Rule 4(c) report recommending against compensation on March 29, 2018. (ECF No. 26.) Petitioner filed additional medical records and an expert report from rheumatologist Dr. Lige Rushing on October 4, 2018. (ECF No. 36.) Respondent filed his responsive expert reports on March 5, 2019 and May 6, 2019 along with accompanying medical literature on May 28, 2019. (ECF Nos. 39, 40, 43, 45, 46.) This case was reassigned to my docket on June 7, 2019. (ECF No. 50.) Petitioner then filed an additional expert report from immunologist Dr. James DeAngelo on October 7, 2019, with a supplemental report from Dr. DeAngelo filed on March 21, 2020 (ECF Nos. 52-54, 59-60.) Respondent filed additional expert reports on June 3, 2021. (ECF No. 80.)

A two-day entitlement hearing was held in this case on September 21, 2021. (ECF No. 104.) Petitioner then filed the present motion on November 4, 2021. (ECF No. 107.) Respondent filed his reply on December 22, 2021. (ECF No. 108.) This case is now ripe for decision on interim fees and costs.

II. Awards of Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Section 15(e)(1) of the Vaccine Act allows for the special master to award “reasonable attorneys' fees, and other costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(e)(1)(A)–(B). Petitioners are eligible for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if they are entitled to compensation under the Vaccine Act, or, even if they are unsuccessful, if the special master finds that the petition was filed in good faith and with a reasonable basis. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Additionally, the Federal Circuit has concluded that interim fee awards are permissible and appropriate under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352. In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted and costly experts must be retained.” 515 F.3d at 1352. In Shaw, the Federal Circuit clarified that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is proper for the special master to award interim attorneys’ fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375; see also Chinea v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-95V, 2019 WL 3206829 at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 11, 2019) (citing Knorr v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1169V, 2017 WL 2461375 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 17, 2017)) (observing three factors that have been considered when exercising discretion to award interim attorney’s fees: (1) whether the fee request exceeds $30,000, (2) whether the expert costs exceed $15,000, and (3) whether the case has been pending for over 18 months.)

In light of the above, I exercise my discretion to allow an award of interim fees and costs. This petition was filed nearly five years ago. In that time, petitioner has incurred significant costs relative to securing medical records and expert support for his

2 claim. Moreover, respondent has not objected, but instead deferred to my discretion as to whether the standard for an interim award of fees and costs is met in this case.

III. Amount of Reasonable Fees and Costs

The determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees is within the special master's discretion. See, e.g. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Special Masters have “wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs.” Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (Fed. Cl. 1991). Moreover, special masters are entitled to rely on their own experience and understanding of the issues raised. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 483 (Fed. Cl. 1991) aff’d in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). However, petitioner “bears the burden of establishing the hours expended” and the reasonableness of the requested fee award. Id. at 484. Notwithstanding that respondent has not raised any specific objections to petitioner’s fee application, “the Special Master has an independent responsibility to satisfy himself that the fee award is appropriate and [is] not limited to endorsing or rejecting respondent’s critique.” Duncan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99- 455V, 2008 WL 4743493 (Fed. Cl. 2008); see also McIntosh v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 139 Fed Cl. 238, 250 (2018) (finding that the special master “abused his discretion by failing to independently review the petitioner’s counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of case costs to determine if the requested fees and costs were reasonable.”).

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