Voll v. O'Malley

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _________________________

AMANDA E. V.,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 5:23-CV-687 (DEP)

MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant. __________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

FOR PLAINTIFF

LEGAL AID SOCIETY CINDY DOMINGUE-HENDRICKSON, ESQ. OF MID-NEW YORK, INC. 120 Bleecker Street, 2nd Floor Utica, NY 13501

FOR DEFENDANT

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. JASON PECK, ESQ. and OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL 6401 Security Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21235

DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff’s complaint named Kilolo Kijakazi, in her official capacity as the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, as the defendant. On December 20, 2023, Martin J. O’Malley took office as the Commissioner of Social Security. He has therefore been substituted as the named defendant in this matter pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and no further action is required in order to effectuate this change. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ORDER Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff

seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.2

Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on July 18, 2024, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner=s

determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this

appeal. After due deliberation, and based upon the court=s oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

2 This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order, once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ORDERED, as follows: 1) Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. 2) The Commissioner’s determination that the plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED. 3) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based

upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Dated: July 23, 2024 Syracuse, NY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------x AMANDA V., Plaintiff, -v- 5:23-CV-687 MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. ------------------------------------------------------x DECISION TRANSCRIPT BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES July 18, 2024 100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse, NY 13261 For the Plaintiff: LEGAL SERVICES OF CENTRAL NEW YORK 120 Bleecker Street 2nd Floor Utica, New York 13501 BY: CINDY DOMINGUE-HENDRICKSON, ESQ. For the Defendant: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 6401 Security Boulevard Baltimore, Maryland 21235 BY: JASON PECK, ESQ. Hannah F. Cavanaugh, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR Official United States Court Reporter 100 South Clinton Street Syracuse, New York 13261-7367 (315) 234-8545 1 (The Court and all parties present by telephone. Time noted: 1:43 p.m.) THE COURT: Let me begin by thanking counsel for excellent presentations. I've enjoyed working with you and you've presented some interesting and intriguing issues, including with respect to step five, which I'll address

momentarily. Before I address the merits of this case, I wanted to broach the subject of consent. When this case was filed, it was, pursuant to our General Order 18, assigned to magistrate judge -- it was assigned to -- originally to magistrate judge -- I can't find it, but one of my colleague magistrate judges and a consent form was executed by attorney Elizabeth Lombardi on behalf of the plaintiff. It left blank the identity of the magistrate judge and it simply says, "voluntarily consents to have United States magistrate judge blank conduct all further proceedings in this case to disposition." I wanted to make sure, does plaintiff consent to my jurisdiction to hear and decide the case? MS. DOMINGUE-HENDRICKSON: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Plaintiff has commenced this proceeding pursuant to 42, United States Code, Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to challenge an adverse determination by the Commissioner of Social Security finding that plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times and therefore ineligible for the benefits sought. The background is as follows: Plaintiff was born in August of 1986. She is almost 38 years of age. She was 33 years of age at the time of her application for benefits on December 30, 2019, and almost 33 at the time of the alleged onset of her disability on July 3, 2019. She stands 5'7" in

height and weighs approximately 150 pounds. Plaintiff has had various living arrangements throughout the course of this case. At one time she lived with her mother and daughter. This was at the time of the hearing conducted on November 1, 2022. She has also lived in a homeless shelter and at the YMCA, and she also reportedly lived in a rented room in 2020. Plaintiff is unmarried. She has one daughter who was age 13 on November 1, 2022. She is in the custody of the plaintiff's mother. Plaintiff is right-handed. She has a dog. She has a 9th grade education, although the evidence is equivocal as to whether she actually finished 9th grade. At page 665 of the Administrative Transcript, there is indication she completed the 9th grade. She testified at the hearing, however, at page 52 that she had not. She has not received a

GED. While in school, she attended regular classes. Plaintiff does not drive and does not take public transportation. Plaintiff stopped working in December of 2012. She quit at that time. When working, she was a cashier in a pizza parlor. She worked in a convenience store in the deli department. She worked on an assembly line. She was in housekeeping and was a warehouse selector at one point. Physically, plaintiff suffers from several impairments, including lumbar degenerative disc disease post laminectomy, an anoxic brain injury caused by an overdose,

and -- I will spell this out -- she suffers from ankylosing, A-N-K-Y-L-O-S-I-N-G, spondylitis, which I understand is a type of arthritis that causes inflammation in the joints and ligaments of the spine and may also affect peripheral joints, like knees, ankles, and hips. She also suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, or COPD, neck pain, arthritis in her back, leg, and hands, irritable bowel syndrome, and hearing loss for which she uses hearing aids and a recommendation has been made for a cochlear plant. Mentally, plaintiff has suffered from a drug overdose that occurred in or about May of 2016. She also suffers from bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, and dysthymic disorder. There was a reported suicide attempt by her in May of 2016. Plaintiff's activities of daily living, as indicated

at page 698 and other portions of the Administrative Transcript, include plaintiff's ability to dress, bathe, groom, care for her support dog, clean, do laundry, shop seven days a week. She socializes a little, she builds jewelry, she watches television, she plays video games. Plaintiff is a smoker and has smoked one pack of cigarettes per day on average. Procedurally, plaintiff applied for Title XVI benefits on December 30, 2019, alleging an onset date of July 3, 2019. There are prior unfavorable decisions based on earlier applications. Those decisions were from October 19, 2016, and

July 2, 2019. In support of her current application, she alleges disability based upon PTSD, bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, a traumatic brain injury, hearing loss, COPD, lower back issues, and arthritis. A hearing was conducted on July 12, 2022, by Administrative Law Judge Bruce Fein, F-E-I-N. It was adjourned to give plaintiff an opportunity to seek representation. A subsequent hearing was held with a vocational expert on November 1, 2022, by ALJ Fein who then issued a subsequent unfavorable decision on November 16, 2022. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for review on May 23, 2023. This action was commenced on June 8, 2023, and is timely. In his decision, ALJ Fein applied the familiar five-step sequential test for determining disability. At step

one, he concluded plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December of 2019 and noted that she last worked, apparently, in 2012. At step two, he concluded that plaintiff does suffer from severe impairments that impose more than minimal limitations on plaintiff's ability to perform basic work functions, including bilateral sensorineural hearing loss, lumbar degenerative disc disease, post lumbar laminectomy, a toxic brain injury, ankylosing spondylitis, COPD, bipolar disorder, dysthymic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and

At step three, he concluded that plaintiff's conditions do not meet or medically equal any of the listed presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the regulations of the Commissioner, specifically considering listings 1.15, 2.10, 3.02, 11.18, 14.09, 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15. Reviewing the evidence, ALJ Fein next concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing the following residual functional capacity notwithstanding her impairments: She can perform light work, except she can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and frequently handle, finger, and feel bilaterally. She should avoid concentrated exposure to noises at the louder higher level as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the Selected Characteristics of

Occupations, and concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, gases, dust, poorly ventilated areas, and she will need to have ready access to restroom facilities in the workplace. She can perform work limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with only occasionally interaction -- that's a typographical error -- with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. She can work in a low stress job defined as having only occasional decisionmaking, changes in the work setting, and judgment required on the job. Counsel, if you could mute your phone. We're getting

a ringing on the phone. Applying that RFC at step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has no past relevant work to consider and thus proceeded to step five where, with the benefit of a vocational expert's testimony, he concluded that there is available work in the national economy that plaintiff is capable of performing, citing as representative positions garment sorter, dispatcher/router, and mail clerk/mail sorter. As you know, my task is limited in this case to determining whether correct legal principles were applied and the resulting determination is supported by substantial evidence, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find sufficient to support a conclusion. It is an extremely deferential standard, as the Second Circuit noted in Brault v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, 683 F.3d

443 from the Second Circuit, 2012. In that case, the Second Circuit noted that the standard is even more deferential than the clearly erroneous standard and observed that under that standard, once an ALJ finds a fact, it can be rejected only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise. The standard was later and more recently reiterated in Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4d 64 from April 6, 2022. In this case, plaintiff has raised several contentions, two of which I treated in tandem. In the first, she alleges error in the weighing of medical opinions,

specifically citing the opinions of Dr. Geoffrey Hopkins, who is reportedly a treating physician, and gave an opinion together with Nurse Practitioner Hayley Craner, the opinion of consultive examiner Dr. David Schaich, S-C-H-A-I-C-H, and the prior administrative medical findings of doctors J. Ochoa and H. Ferring. Secondly, she cites alleged error in the evaluation of her hearing impairment. And thirdly, she challenges the RFC reasoning level and portrays an alleged potential conflict in respect of the reasoning level between the testimony of the vocational expert and the DOT that required the ALJ to probe and resolve. Turning first to the evaluation of the medical opinions. As the Commissioner correctly argues, because this application was filed after March 27, 2017, the case is subject to the amended regulations regarding opinion evidence. Under

those regulations, the Commissioner will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinions, including those from medical sources, but instead must consider whether those opinions are persuasive by primarily considering whether they are supported by and consistent with the record in the case, 20 C.F.R. Section 416.920c. When an ALJ weighs a medical opinion, he or she must articulate how persuasive he or she finds the opinions and explain how he or she considered the factors of supportability and consistency.

In this case, the first medical opinion addressed was that of Dr. Hopkins and Nurse Practitioner Craner. It was dated October 7, 2022. It appears at pages 1449 to 1454. It notes that plaintiff's treatment began with Dr. Hopkins on July 7, 2022, and was monthly. There are several marked limitations defined as 11 to 20 percent of the workday or workweek, including two in the domain of understanding, remembering, or applying information, two in the domain of interacting with others, and five in the domain of concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace. The opinion also finds one marked limitation in adapting or managing oneself and indicates that plaintiff would be absent more than four days per month and late more than four days per month. The Administrative Law Judge addressed that medical opinion at page 28 and found it to be, quote, "less persuasive."

As reasons, he stated that the marked limitations opined are not supported by clinical records of those providers, which there are none, or by objective medical evidence as a whole, and specifically noted plaintiff's activities of daily living. The plaintiff argues that although it is a checkbox form, that is not alone a sufficient reason to reject the opinions noted on the form, she further maintains that while the treating source rule has been abrogated, there are cases that suggest that a treating source perspective is still important, particularly if there's a lengthy treatment relationship.

Clearly, a treatment relationship is a factor that the regulations speak to. In this case, however, plaintiff was only seen by Dr. Hopkins approximately four times and there are no records of treatment in the -- in the Administrative Transcript from which the Court could review whether they support or not the opinions. It is a checkbox form. There is minimal discussion. On the front page, there are diagnoses noted, there are some statements concerning clinical findings, and it was noted that plaintiff was seen monthly for medication management and that symptoms are responding well to current medications. At the end of each section, however, the form requests an explanation or examples that would elaborate upon the check boxes in each of those domains and those are blank. I recognize that in Colgan v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4d 353,

from January 3, 2022, that the Second Circuit has noted that the mere fact that an opinion is on a checkbox form in and of itself is not a basis to fully discount it. In that case, however, it was noted that the checkbox form was supported by voluminous treatment notes gathered over the course of nearly three years of clinical treatment by the physician whose opinion was in question, and this case is entirely different. There's no explanation in addressing the specifics of each of those domains and no treatment notes in the record whatsoever from Dr. Hopkins, and so I don't find any error in discounting Dr.

Hopkins' opinion. I'll note that that conclusion is also supported by Heaman v. Berryhill, and that is at 765 F. App’x 498, from March 13, 2019, Second Circuit. The next opinion that was addressed is Dr. David Schaich. That is from June 1, 2020. It appears at pages 695 to 700 of the Administrative Transcript. And the opinion notes several, what I would characterize as, marked limitations, including in the ability to use reason and judgment to make work-related decisions, in the ability to interact adequately with supervisors, coworkers, and the public, marked limitation in ability to sustain concentration and perform a task at a consistent pace, and marked limitation in the ability to regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain wellbeing. The Administrative Law Judge found that opinion to be less persuasive. The discussion is at pages 27 and 28 of the

Administrative Transcript and the Administrative Law Judge noted that the clinical findings of the consultative exam did not completely support the conclusion concerning the marked limitations. And although I will note that there's certainly some portions of the clinical findings that may arguably support it, judgment poor, insight limited, the findings also show that plaintiff's affect was of a full range and appropriate to speech and thought content, mood was reported as okay, sensorium was clear, plaintiff was oriented to person, place, and time, attention and concentration were intact, and recent and remote

memory skills were only mildly impaired due to cognitive difficulties. So it doesn't -- I can't say that that reason is invalid. It also is pointed out by the Administrative Law Judge that the limitations are inconsistent with objective medical evidence, including claimant's course of treatment and reported activities. And as the Administrative Law Judge noted at pages 26 to 27, they are robust. Plaintiff lived in an apartment by herself with her dog, has friends in the building and on Facebook, regularly goes to the Family Dollar store near her building. She walks her dog, she shops, she walks, she plays games on her phone, she lives independently, takes care of activities of daily living. She told the consultative examiner she could dress, bathe, groom herself, prepare food, clean, do laundry, shop. She reported she socialized a little. Family

relationships were good and her hobby was building jewelry. She plays video games, she watches television, she shops seven days a week. At one point, she lived with roommates, watched movies, and played games on her phone. So a fairly robust indication of the ability to perform activities of daily living. Once again, I am unable to say that the Administrative Law Judge erred in the weight given to this medical opinion. The last is from Drs. Ochoa and Dr. Ferring. Dr. Ochoa on June 6, 2020, gave an opinion concerning plaintiff's mental capacity. It appears at 107 to 124 of the Administrative

Transcript. In terms of the so-called B criteria, Dr. Ochoa indicated a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information, a moderate limitation in interacting with others, a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and maintaining pace, and a moderate limitation in adapting or managing oneself. In terms of the mental RFC, he stated the following at 122 -- he or she, I don't know which: Totality of the evidence indicates the claimant can understand and remember detailed instructions and procedures, sustain concentration to complete ordinary work tasks on a sustained basis, interact in an appropriate manner, and adapt to routine work-related changes and make work-related decisions. The ALJ found that opinion to be more persuasive at page 28 and found that it is supported by a review of the

medical evidence, including the report of the consultative examiner, noted that the person giving that prior administrative medical finding was familiar with the agency's disability programs, and there was support for the assessment with references to clinical findings. The finding of Dr. Ochoa was later affirmed in an opinion given by Dr. Ferring on April 9, 2021. It appears at 126 to 153. It was addressed by the Administrative Law Judge together with Dr. Ochoa's opinion. I'll note that although I understand that there are cases that suggest, particularly in mental health cases, that

the opinion of a non-examining consultant should be looked at carefully. Nonetheless, the case law is clear that a prior administrative medical finding can provide substantial evidence if it is supported, Woytowicz v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2016 WL 6427787, from the Northern District of New York, October 5, 2016, report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge William B. Carter, adopted at 2016 WL 6426385, and that's October 28, 2016. I agree with the plaintiff that perhaps it might be entitled, as I said, a little bit less weight because it involves an inherently subjective situation, Dana F. V. Berryhill, 2019 WL 7067060, and that is from the Northern District of New York, December 23, 2019. Nonetheless, I am unable to say that the Commissioner erred in relying on the opinions of Dr. Ochoa and Dr. Ferring. Plaintiff argues that

those opinions are stale and did not have the benefit of subsequent evidence, but I did not see any evidence of significant deterioration in plaintiff's condition such that would undermine the opinions of Dr. Ochoa and Dr. Ferring. The plaintiff complains of the residual functional capacity and the sufficiency of dealing with plaintiff's hearing condition. An RFC represents a finding of the range of tasks a plaintiff is capable of performing notwithstanding the impairments at issue, 20 C.F.R. Section 416.945(a). That means that an RFC represents a claimant's maximum ability to perform

sustained work activities in an ordinary setting on a regular and continuing basis, meaning eight hours a day for five days a week or an equivalent schedule, Tankisi v. Commissioner of Social Security, 521 F. App’x 29, Second Circuit, 2013. And, of course, an RFC must be informed by all of the evidence of record, including opinion evidence, treatment notes, and other relevant evidence. In this case, plaintiff clearly has hearing issues. She has hearing aids and is a candidate for a cochlear implant in her left ear. There's an opinion from Dr. Putcha, the agency consultant, that does not include any limitations with regard to hearing. At page 118, Dr. Putcha opined that with regard to noise, plaintiff was unlimited. In Dr. Siddiqui's subsequent residual functional capacity prior administrative medical finding, he did specifically state that plaintiff will be

precluded from jobs requiring perfect binaural hearing. That's at page 143, and also indicated at 144 that plaintiff needs to avoid even moderate exposure to noise. Dr. Elke Lorensen examined the plaintiff and issued a report on July 27, 2020, at page 758 through 764. She noted the hearing loss issue on the first page, but did not include any limitation addressing either noise or plaintiff's ability to hear. It seems to me that there are two issues here. One is plaintiff's ability to hear. And of course, the backdrop is

that it's plaintiff's burden to establish limitations associated with any impairments that she may have. In this case, the plaintiff did not show any difficulty at the time of the hearing to communicate. Page 41 of the Administrative Transcript indicates that she proceeded in the hearing without hearing aids. The Administrative Law Judge did touch upon hearing and stated on page 25, as for claimant's bilateral sensorineural hearing loss, as well as others, the evidence of record does not support the allegations regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effect of those conditions. So I find that plaintiff has not carried her burden of demonstrating that there should have been a limitation in the RFC concerning her ability to hear. In terms of noise level, that appears to be an issue and was addressed in the residual functional capacity, as I

indicated previously. So if, in fact, as plaintiff argues that a quiet job is required for the plaintiff because of her sensitivity to noise, as defendant argues, the router position is, under the DOT, listed as a noise level two, quiet, and the router is 222.587-038. And so there appear to be -- if you eliminate the other two jobs, there's sufficient number nonetheless, of jobs available to the plaintiff to satisfy the Commissioner's burden at step five, Bavaro v. Astrue, 413 F. App’x 382, from the Second Circuit, 2011. So if there is error in that regard, it is harmless.

Which brings me to the last issue, which, frankly, intrigued me and perplexed me a little bit. There are three positions cited in the ALJ's decision. As I indicated, the router is one. And a router under reasoning is listed as level two, which is defined as, "apply common sense, understanding, to carry out detailed, but uninvolved written or oral instructions, deal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations." The position of garment sorter, which is DOT 222.687-014, is also a level two reasoning position, and so it would be subject to the same explanation. The third is mail clerk. That position is a level three reasoning position, which is defined as follows: Apply common sense, understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form, deal with problems involving several concrete variables in or from standard deviations.

Plaintiff argues that it is the defendant's burden, which, of course, is true at step five and that it was not met in this case. It is well accepted that elicitation of testimony from a vocational expert is a proper means of fulfilling the agency's burden at step five of the disability test to establish the existence of jobs in sufficient numbers in the national and regional economy that plaintiff is capable of performing, Bapp v. Bowen, 803 F. 2d 601, from the Second Circuit, 1986. And, of course, that depends on the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert being identical to the residual functional capacity

finding. In this case, that burden was satisfied. The argument of plaintiff is that she's not capable of performing at level three reasoning and, secondly, based upon Gibbons v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2023 WL 3830774, from the Second Circuit, June 6, 2023, and under Lockwood v. Commissioner of Social Security, 914 F.3d 87, from January 23, 2019, and Social Security Ruling 00-04P, there was a potential conflict between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT that resulted in a burden to the Administrative Law Judge to flush out and resolve. Let me say first that the courts in this case have made it clear that level two jobs, which I indicated the router and garment sorter are, level two reasoning is consistent with simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, Edwards v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3701776, Northern District of New York, September 16, 2010,

Timothy M. v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 4307455, from September 22, 2021 -- and I'll note that that decision also collects several other cases standing for that proposition -- and Reynolds v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2012 WL 2050410, Northern District of New York, June 6, 2012. There are matters, including, for example, access to the bathroom facilities that are not addressed in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. At page 56 of the Administrative Transcript, the Administrative Law Judge stated the following: "So I will assume that your testimony," that being the

vocational expert, "will be based upon your knowledge, education, training, and experience and is consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles unless you tell me otherwise. All right?" And the response was, "yes, your Honor." And, of course, during the testimony there was no indication of any such conflict. The Second Circuit's decision in Gibbons presented me a little bit of a challenge as to whether or not it is inconsistent with the cases cited above by implication. It clearly dealt with level three jobs, and so I am not relying on the reasoning level three job to find that the Commissioner satisfied his burden. I'm dealing with garment sorter and router only, but I don't believe Gibbons should be followed in this case because it is distinguishable. In that case, first of all, the plaintiff's counsel signaled, at least implicitly, that

there was a potential conflict and that the client in that case might not be able to perform at that level three reasoning. In this case, as I indicated previously, the level two requirement is that the plaintiff can apply common sense, understanding to carry out detailed, but uninvolved, written or oral instructions, deal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations, and I don't find that to be in conflict with the RFC in this case, which limited the plaintiff to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and that she work in a low stress job defined as having only occasional

decisionmaking, changes in the work setting, and judgment required on the job. So I don't find that Gibbons required the Administrative Law Judge to probe any potential conflict because I don't believe there was one, and so I'm going to follow Timothy M., Edwards, and Reynolds and find that there is no conflict between the RFC in this case and plaintiff's ability to meet level two reasoning. So in summary, I don't find any error with regard to addressing the hearing issue. I don't find any error with regard to the medical opinions. I view plaintiff's challenge as simply requesting that I reweigh the opinions, which is not a proper function of the Court, and I don't find any issue with the Commissioner's meeting his burden at step five, so I will grant judgment on the pleadings to the defendant and order dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

I hope you both have a good rest of your summer. Thank you. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Court is adjourned. MS. DOMINGUE-HENDRICKSON: Thank you, your Honor. (Time noted: 2:26 p.m.)

I, HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR, Official U.S. Court Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Dated this 22nd day of July, 2024. s/ Hannah F. Cavanaugh______________________ HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR Official U.S. Court Reporter