Vodonick v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association, Inc.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 3, 2020
• Docket: 2:15-cv-00539
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN VODONICK, No. 2:15-cv-00539-JAM-EFB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND GRANTING 14 FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ASSOCIATION, INC., a JUDGMENT 15 federally chartered corporation, all persons 16 claiming any right, title, or interest in certain real 17 property; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 John Vodonick (“Plaintiff”) moves for leave to file a second 21 amended complaint. See Pl. Mot. to Am. (“Pl. Mot.”), ECF No. 59. 22 Federal National Mortgage Association (“Defendant”) moves for 23 summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first claim for declaratory 24 relief, parts (A) and (B), as well as Plaintiff’s second claim 25 for quiet title easement by implication. See Def. Mot. for Summ. 26 J. (“Def. Mot.”), ECF No. 60. 27 /// 28 /// 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES 2 Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the First Amended Complaint and 3 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.1 4 5 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 6 On March 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against 7 Defendant. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff amended the complaint a 8 few days later to add additional facts but made no changes to the 9 claims for relief. See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 4. 10 Plaintiff owns and resides at 15240 Willow Ridge Court in Nevada 11 City, California. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material 12 Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 1. In August 2014, Defendant was assigned the 13 promissory note to the neighboring property, which was declared 14 to be in default. SUF ¶ 4. In addition to being neighbors, 15 Plaintiff has an easement over a portion of the property. SUF 16 ¶ 3. Defendant posted a copy of the notice of the foreclosure 17 sale—to take place on November 26, 2014, at 12:30 p.m.—at the 18 main entrance of the Nevada County, California, Superior 19 Courthouse. SUF ¶ 5. 20 Plaintiff was out of town on November 26, 2014, and 21 dispatched an agent, Michael Nudelman, to appear at the auction. 22 SUF at ¶ 7. Nudelman showed up for the scheduled sale. SUF at 23 ¶ 13. What follows is in dispute. Plaintiff alleges Nudelman 24 waited at the courthouse for approximately one and a half hours, 25 but the auction did not take place, nor did anyone announce a 26

27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for May 5, 2020. 1 continuance of the auction date and time. FAC ¶ 19. Meanwhile, 2 Defendant alleges the foreclosure sale auctioneer, Dana Haemmig, 3 appeared at the courthouse’s main entrance, at the time and date 4 set for the sale, and announced it was postponed to December 1, 5 2014. SUF at ¶ 10. According to the “Trustees Deed Upon Sale,” 6 the property was sold “at public auction on 12/01/2014 at the 7 place named in the Notice of Sale[.]” Ex. 8 to Def. Req. for 8 Jud. Notice (“Def. RJN”) at 2, ECF No. 61. 9 On March 2, 2016, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for 10 Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to claims three, four, and 11 five, and part of the first claim. See ECF No. 18. The Court 12 denied Defendant’s motion with respect to the part of the first 13 claim seeking a declaration that the deed to Defendant is null 14 and void. Id. On March 31, 2017, the Court denied Defendant’s 15 first Motion for Summary Judgment, which only sought judgment as 16 to the first part (part A) of Plaintiff’s declaratory relief 17 claim. See ECF No. 36. For the surviving claims, Plaintiff 18 first seeks declarations that the purported deed is null, void, 19 and of no effect and that Plaintiff is vested in title and 20 interest to the easement. Second, Plaintiff seeks to quiet title 21 to the easement by implication. See FAC. 22 Currently before this Court is Plaintiff’s request to amend 23 his complaint for a second time, to add claims of private and 24 public nuisance and unfair business practices. See Pl. Mot. 25 Defendant filed an opposition top this motion, ECF No. 62, and 26 Plaintiff replied, ECF No. 65. Defendant seeks summary judgment, 27 but on different grounds and for additional claims than its 28 previous motion. See Def. Mot. Defendant contends there are no 1 triable issues of material fact that would allow for Plaintiff to 2 obtain judgment on either his first or second claims. Plaintiff 3 opposed this motion, ECF No. 63, and Defendant filed a reply, ECF 4 No. 66. 5 6 II. OPINION 7 A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend 8 1. Legal Standard 9 After the Court has filed a pretrial scheduling order, a 10 party’s motion to amend must satisfy Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” 11 requirement. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 12 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). This requirement primarily looks 13 to “the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 14 975 F.2d at 609. “[T]he existence or degree of prejudice to the 15 party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons 16 to deny a motion.” Id. But, unlike Rule 15’s analysis, “the 17 focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for 18 seeking modification [of the schedule].” Id. If the “[moving] 19 party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. 20 2. Judicial Notice 21 Plaintiff suggests the Court “can” take judicial notice 22 that “the foothills and other areas of Northern California have 23 become more and more prone to wildfires.” Pl. Mot at 5. 24 Plaintiff then mentions the Nevada County Hazardous Vegetation 25 Ordinance and refers to his “request to take judicial notice 26 filed concurrently herewith.” Id. However, Plaintiff failed to 27 include a request for judicial notice with his motion. 28 Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice—or lack thereof—is, 1 therefore DENIED. 2 3. Analysis 3 a. Rule 16(b) 4 Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” requirement is typically not met 5 “where the party seeking to modify the pretrial scheduling order 6 has been aware of the facts and theories supporting amendment 7 since the inception of the action.” In re Western States 8 Wholesale Natural Gas (“Western States”), 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th 9 Cir. 2013). Indeed, “carelessness is not compatible with a 10 finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of 11 relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610. 12 Plaintiff’s motion to amend raises issues similar to those 13 before the Ninth Circuit in Western States. In Western States, 14 plaintiffs knew for two years that they had potentially viable 15 federal antitrust claims. 715 F.3d at 737. Yet, they did not 16 move to amend their complaint to include these claims until 17 seven months after the scheduling order’s deadline. Id. As a 18 result, the Ninth Circuit held that “the district court [had] 19 not abuse[d] its discretion in concluding that the Plaintiffs 20 were not diligent.” Id. at 737-38. 21 Plaintiff seeks to add claims that are related to an 22 increased risk of wildfire in the area since the Court’s March 23 1, 2016 Order on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the 24 Pleadings. See Pl. Mot. at 2. However, as in Western States, 25 Plaintiff has been aware of potential claims related to this 26 increased risk as he, admittedly, has had “concerns regarding 27 the [wildfire] prone nature of the maintenance of [the 28 neighboring] property” since “the inception of the litigation.” 1 Pl. Mot. at 4. Nonetheless, Plaintiff failed to amend his 2 complaint in a timely manner. In Plaintiff’s FAC, filed over 3 five years ago, Plaintiff states that a portion of the 4 neighboring property has “historically been used by the dominant 5 tenement to . . . maintain a fire safe perimeter and for 6 purposes of drawing emergency water in the event of fire.” FAC 7 ¶ 8. Plaintiff goes on to mention his use of the property as a 8 “defensible fire protection perimeter and [] an emergency water 9 source” repeatedly thereafter. See FAC ¶¶ 10, 12, 13, 14, 24. 10 In his motion, Plaintiff points to a Nevada County 11 Hazardous Vegetation Ordinance as evidence that the area is at 12 increased risk of wildfire. Pl. Mot. at 5. That ordinance was 13 last updated on March 29, 2019—one year before Plaintiff filed 14 the instant motion. Id. And in his reply, Plaintiff references 15 a letter to Defendant’s attorney as evidence that he requested 16 Defendant take steps to reduce the fuel load on the neighboring 17 property. Pl. Mot at 4–5. In this letter, Defendant discusses 18 the ways in which “the hazard of forest fires has been building 19 lately” and informs Defendant’s attorney that he is “intensely 20 worried about [his] own safety and the security of [his] 21 property due to the increased fire risk posed by the deplorable 22 and unsafe condition of [Defendant’s] property.” Vodonick Decl. 23 at 3–4, ECF No. 65–1. This letter also dates from approximately 24 one year before Plaintiff filed this motion. Presented as 25 justification for an amended complaint, both the ordinance and 26 the letter are, instead, evidence that this request to amend is 27 untimely. 28 /// 1 Plaintiff has had concerns over wildfires since he 2 commenced this action over five years ago and for at least the 3 past year, Plaintiff has been aware of an increase in the 4 frequency and severity of wildfires in the area. Nevertheless, 5 Plaintiff waited until well after this Court’s June 25, 2019 6 pretrial scheduling order, see ECF No. 49, and just before the 7 deadline to file dispositive motions, see ECF No. 57, to file 8 this motion to amend his complaint for the second time. As a 9 result of this significant delay, the Court finds that 10 Plaintiff has failed to satisfy Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” 11 requirement. The Court therefore need not address whether the 12 amendment to the complaint is proper under Rule 15. 13 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Amend 14 the First Amended Complaint. 15 B. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 16 1. Legal Standard 17 A court must grant a party’s motion for summary judgment 18 “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 19 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 20 of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). The movant bears the 21 initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for 22 its motion, and identifying [the documents] which it believes 23 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact.” 24 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is 25 material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the 26 governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 27 248 (1986). Once the movant makes this initial showing, the 28 burden rests upon the nonmoving party to “set forth specific 1 facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. An 2 issue of fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a 3 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 4 Id. 5 2. Evidentiary Objections 6 Plaintiff raises evidentiary objections to the declaration 7 of Dana Haemmig and the documents attached to her declaration, 8 provided in support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 9 See Obj. to Haemmig Decl., ECF No. 63–1. Regarding the Haemmig 10 declaration, Plaintiff argues it is inadmissible because the date 11 of execution is incomplete and the declaration provides it is 12 governed by California law, not the laws of the United States of 13 America. Obj. to Haemmig Decl. at 1–3. However, at the summary 14 judgment stage, courts focus on the admissibility of the 15 evidence’s content, not the admissibility of its form. Fraser v. 16 Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Burch v. 17 Regents of the University of California, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1119 18 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Accordingly, the Court overrules this 19 objection at this time. 20 Plaintiff also contends the documents attached to Haemmig’s 21 declaration are inadmissible because they were not produced by 22 Defendant during discovery. Obj. to Haemmig Decl. at 3–4. The 23 documents attached to Haemmig’s declaration are: (1) the 24 auctioneer’s script for the postponement of the foreclosure sale 25 of Plaintiff’s neighboring property; and (2) the postponement 26 script of another foreclosure sale that was postponed at the same 27 date, time, and location of the neighboring property’s 28 postponement. See Exs. 1–2 to Haemmig Decl., ECF 60–1. These 1 documents are business records of Summit Ridge Services, Inc., 2 the independent contractor foreclosure auctioneer. Haemmig Decl. 3 ¶¶ 2–3, ECF 60-1. Thus, they were not in Defendant’s possession, 4 custody, or control. Defendant had no ability or obligation to 5 produce these documents in its initial disclosures. See Fed. R. 6 Civ. Pro. 26(1)(a)(ii). Plaintiff’s objection to these documents 7 is overruled. 8 3. Judicial Notice 9 Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a court to 10 take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is “not 11 subject to reasonable dispute,” because it (1) “is generally 12 known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction”; or 13 (2) “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 14 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 15 201(a)–(b). A Court may take judicial notice of matters of 16 public record. United States ex rel. Lee v. Corinthian 17 Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011). Matters of public 18 record include “documents on file in federal or state courts.” 19 Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). 20 Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of 21 eight exhibits. See Exs. 1–8 to Def. RJN, ECF No. 61. Those 22 exhibits are: (1) the Grant Deed, dated August 18, 1987 and 23 recorded in the Nevada County Official Records on October 29, 24 1987 as Document No. 87 30610; (2) the First Amended Complaint 25 in this matter, filed by Plaintiff on March 18, 2015; (3) the 26 Grant and Reservation of Easement for Access & Recreation, 27 recorded in the Nevada County Official Records on July 12, 1988 28 as Document No. 88 17719; (4) the Easement Deed, recorded in the 1 Nevada County Official Records on September 27, 1988 as Document 2 No. 88 26119; (5) the Corporation Assignment of Deed of Trust, 3 dated July 14, 2014 and recorded in the Nevada County Official 4 Records as Document No. 20140013517; (6) Notice of Default, 5 recorded in the Nevada County Official Records on August 5, 2014 6 as Document No. 20140014719; (7) the Notice of Trustee’s Sale, 7 dated December 2, 2014 and recorded in the Nevada County 8 Official Records on December 8, 2014 as Document No. 9 20140023981; and (8) the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, dated October 10 29, 2014 and recorded in the Nevada County Official Records as 11 Document No. 20140021214. Id. Meanwhile, Plaintiff requests 12 the Court take judicial notice of “the Court’s files, records[,] 13 and documents in this case,” notably, the Court’s Order on 14 Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. See Pl. Req. 15 for Jud. Notice (“Pl. RJN”), ECF No. 63-2. 16 All the above are matters of public record, and therefore, 17 proper subjects of judicial notice. The Court GRANTS Defendant 18 and Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice. 19 4. Analysis 20 Defendant argues the Court should grant summary judgment 21 with respect to Plaintiff’s first and second claims. See Def. 22 Mot. at 2. The remaining portions of Plaintiff’s first claim ask 23 the Court for: (A) a declaration that Defendant’s interest in the 24 neighboring property is void due to procedural defects in the 25 notice of sale; and (B) a declaration that that Plaintiff is 26 vested in title and interest in an easement over the neighboring 27 property to access Mosquito Creek and Deer Creek for purposes of 28 recreation, to maintain a defensible fire protection perimeter, 1 and as an emergency water source. FAC ¶ 24(A)–(B). Plaintiff’s 2 second claim requests that the Court determine Defendant has no 3 right, title, or interest in the neighboring property that is 4 adverse or superior to Plaintiff’s. FAC ¶¶ 27–31. 5 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 6 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to all the remaining 7 claims against it in this case. 8 a. Declaratory Relief 9 i. Validity of the Sale 10 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s deed over the neighboring 11 property is void because Plaintiff never received notice of the 12 foreclosure sale’s postponement. FAC ¶ 20. Defendant argues 13 that notice of the postponement was given in accordance with 14 California Civil Code § 2924g and that there is no requirement 15 that Plaintiff receive actual notice of the postponement. Def. 16 Mot. at 4. Under California law, a non-judicial foreclosure sale 17 must be preceded by an official notice of sale. Cal. Civ. Code 18 § 2924f. A sale may be postponed at the discretion of the 19 trustee. Cal Civ. Code § 2924g(c)(1)(D). Each postponement must 20 be publicly announced in accordance with the following 21 requirements: 22 The notice of each postponement and the reason therefor 23 shall be given by public declaration by the trustee at 24 the time and place last appointed for sale. A public 25 declaration of postponement shall also set forth the 26 new date, time, and place of sale and the place of sale 27 shall be the same place as originally fixed by the 28 trustee for the sale. No other notice of postponement 1 need be given. 2 Ca. Civ. Code § 2924g(d). Including actual notice. Actual 3 notice is not required “so long as notice is provided . . . in 4 compliance with the statute.” Knapp v. Doherty, 123 Cal. App. 5 4th 76, 88 (2004). 6 Defendant has submitted evidence establishing that notice of 7 the oral postponement was given in accordance with § 2924g(d). 8 As noted above, in a sworn declaration, auctioneer Dana Haemmig 9 attests that, on November 26, 2014, at the entrance to the Nevada 10 County courthouse, she announced that the foreclosure sale would 11 be postponed until December 1, 2014. Haemmig Decl. ¶ 7. Her 12 testimony is corroborated by the auctioneer’s script for the 13 postponement of the foreclosure sale that she created on November 14 26, 2014, concurrently with postponing the sale of the 15 neighboring property. Haemmig Decl. ¶ 8. This document was 16 maintained by her employer, Summit Ridge Services, Inc., as part 17 of its records on the foreclosed property. See Ex. 1 to Haemmig 18 Decl. Haemmig’s script postpones the sale until December 1, 19 2014, specifies that two people were present when she made the 20 announcement, and explains that trustee discretion was the reason 21 for postponement. Id. 22 Meanwhile, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that 23 directly refutes or contradicts Haemmig’s declaration or the 24 auctioneer’s script. Plaintiff alleges that his agent, Michael 25 Nudelman, appeared at the Nevada County courthouse in time for 26 the November 26, 2014 sale, but that he did not hear Haemmig’s 27 announcement. Opp’n to Def. Mot. at 7. It is not alleged that 28 Haemmig did not, in fact, announce the postponement. Plaintiff 1 makes reference in his opposition to a declaration from Mr. 2 Nudelman, Opp’n to Def. Mot. At 6-7; but Plaintiff failed to file 3 this declaration along with his opposition. Portions of 4 Nudelman’s deposition testimony are however attached to 5 Defendant’s motion. The Court notes that nowhere in this 6 testimony does Nudelman directly contend that Haemmig did not 7 make an announcement. See Nudelman Dep. Tr., ECF No. 60-2. 8 The Court cannot rely on conclusory or speculative testimony 9 from a declaration that was not filed or on unsupported 10 allegations in opposing papers to find genuine issues of material 11 fact. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 12 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Fed. R. of Civ. Pro. 56(e)); see 13 Crescenzo v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, Case No. 11-CV-02507, WL 510045 14 at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (finding evidence of a supposed 15 cancellation of a foreclosure sale insufficient to create a 16 genuine issue of material fact as to whether the auctioneer 17 publicly announced the postponement of the sale). Plaintiff has 18 failed to make a sufficient showing to establish that Defendant 19 did not comply with the requirements of § 2924g. See Reynolds v. 20 SunTrust Mortg., Inc., Case No. 10-CV-1508, WL 5884258 at *4 21 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (plaintiffs declaration stating he never 22 received or saw notices of a foreclosure sale was insufficient 23 to: (1) overcome the common law presumption that a nonjudicial 24 foreclosure sale is properly conducted; (2) dispute defendant’s 25 claim that it complied with nonjudicial foreclosure procedures; 26 and, thus, failed to raise a triable issue of material fact). 27 /// 28 /// 1 Defendant, by contrast, has shown, as a matter of law, that 2 the postponement complied with the notice requirements and the 3 foreclosure sale was therefore valid. Accordingly, the Court 4 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on part (A) of 5 Plaintiff’s first claim for declaratory relief. 6 ii. Plaintiff’s Easement 7 Plaintiff asks the Court to declare he is vested in title 8 and interest in an easement over the neighboring property “to 9 access Mosquito Creek and Deer Creek for purposes of 10 recreation[,] to maintain a defensible fire protection 11 perimeter[,] and as an emergency water source.” FAC ¶ 24(B). 12 Defendant argues Plaintiff already holds a recorded easement that 13 allows him “access and recreation over the westerly five feet and 14 the northerly fifty feet” of the neighboring property. Def. Mot. 15 at 9 (citing Easement Deed, Ex. 4 to Def. RJN, ECF No. 61). As a 16 result, there is no present controversy and Plaintiff has not 17 stated a claim for declaratory relief. Id. 18 Article III limits judicial adjudication to actual cases or 19 controversies. Thus, “[w]hen presented with a claim for a 20 declaratory judgment, [] federal courts must take care to ensure 21 the presence of an actual case or controversy, such that the 22 judgment does not become an unconstitutional advisory opinion.” 23 Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 24 2007). “To determine whether a declaratory judgment action 25 presents a justiciable case or controversy, courts consider 26 “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show 27 that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having 28 adverse legal interests, or sufficient immediacy and reality to 1 warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Shell Gulf of 2 Mexico, Inc. v. Center for Biological Diversity, Inc., 771 F.3d 3 632, 635 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation 4 omitted). 5 It is undisputed that Plaintiff holds an express easement 6 “for access and recreation” over a portion of the neighboring 7 property. See Easement Deed, Ex. 4 to Def. RJN. Plaintiff’s 8 easement gives him access to the westerly five feet and the 9 northerly fifty feet of the neighboring property. Id. 10 Nonetheless, Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment that he is 11 vested in title and interest in an easement over the neighboring 12 property. See FAC ¶ 24(B). Plaintiff’s FAC describes how, on 13 July 12, 1988, he became vested in title with an easement over 14 the neighboring property and then, on September 27, 1988, he 15 became vested with a further easement over the property. FAC 16 ¶ 11. These allegations are uncontroverted. As a result, there 17 is no substantial controversy or need for declaratory relief. 18 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks an expansion of this 19 easement—to give him the ability to “maintain a defensible fire 20 protection perimeter,” see FAC ¶ 24(B)—the Court declines to do 21 so. In effect, Plaintiff requests, in part (B) of his first 22 claim, the same relief he requests in his second claim, i.e., an 23 easement by implication. “An implied easement may arise when, 24 under certain specific circumstances, the law implies an intent 25 on the part of the parties to a property transaction to create or 26 transfer an easement even though there is no written document 27 indicating such an intent.” Mikels v. Rager, 232 Cal. App. 3d 28 334, 357 (1991). Here, there is a written document setting forth 1 the grantor’s intent. See Easement Deed, Ex. 4 to Def. RJN. 2 Moreover, Defendant admits the grantor “wanted [him] to stop 3 removing the dangerous brush, underwood and trees.” Vodonick 4 Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 64. Thus, the grantor’s intent is clear. 5 The existence of the express easement detailing the scope of 6 Plaintiff’s access to the neighboring property therefore obviates 7 the need for the Court to declare Plaintiff is vested in title 8 and interest in an easement over the neighboring property. 9 Moreover, the express easement precludes the Court from expanding 10 its scope by way of granting an easement by implication. 11 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary 12 Judgment on part (B) of Plaintiff’s first claim for declaratory 13 relief. 14 b. Quiet Title Easement by Implication 15 For the reasons set forth above, the Court does not, as a 16 matter of law, find there exists an easement by implication. See 17 Hansen v. Danielson, 136 Cal. App. 2d 653, 656 (1955) (“[A] 18 judgment quieting title cannot enlarge the grant made by the 19 parties.”) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for 20 Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s second claim for quiet title 21 easement by implication. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// WAS VY EAINIT ER RP RUT PI vey PY tO te 2 Til. ORDER 3 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES 4 Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the First Amended Complaint and 5 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's 6 | remaining claims. The Clerk of the Court is therefore directed 7 to close the case. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: June 2, 2020 10 kA 1 teiren staves odermacr 7008 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17