AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed June 5, 2014.
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-13-00339-CR
VIVEK SHARMA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80989-2012
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, O'Neill, and Brown Opinion by Justice Brown Appellant Vivek Sharma was indicted for the offense of driving while intoxicated with a
child passenger. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, appellant entered into a plea
agreement with the State. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment in
accordance with the agreement at eighteen months’ confinement, probated for four years, and a
$1,000 fine. In four issues, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Appellant’s issues on appeal involve the applicability of the mandatory blood draw
provision found in the Texas Transportation Code. Section 724.012 of the transportation code
provides:
(b) A peace officer shall require the taking of a specimen of a person’s breath or blood under any of the following circumstances if the officer arrests the person for an offense under Chapter 49, Penal Code, involving the operation of a motor vehicle or watercraft and the person refuses the officer’s request to submit to the taking of a specimen voluntarily:
....
(2) the offense for which the officer arrests the person is an offense under Section 49.045, Penal Code.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b) (West 2011). Section 49.045 of the penal code,
applicable in this case, makes it a state jail felony to drive while intoxicated with a passenger
younger than fifteen years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.045 (West 2011). An intentional
failure to give a specimen is considered refusal of an officer’s request for a specimen. See TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 724.032(a), 724.061 (West 2011); see also State v. Marrs, 104 S.W.3d
914, 918-19 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cuellar,
58 S.W.3d 781, 784 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
After appellant was involved in two back-to-back car accidents, he was charged with the
offense of driving while intoxicated with a child passenger. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to
suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test, among other things. He asserted the blood evidence
should be suppressed because his blood was taken in violation of his rights under the
transportation code, as well as the Fourth Amendment, the Texas Constitution, and the code of
criminal procedure.
At the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, Frisco Police Officer Kevin
Kryczkowski testified that on January 11, 2012, he was dispatched to the scene of an accident.
When he arrived, Lisa Baini informed him that someone in a Honda Odyssey rear ended her.
She pulled into a parking lot assuming the person who hit her would follow. When he didn’t, she
pulled out of the parking lot and followed his car. She saw the Honda hit another vehicle that
was stopped at a traffic light.
–2– Officer Kryczkowski made contact with appellant, the driver of the Honda. The officer
noticed appellant’s lips appeared to be stained with wine and his eyes were bloodshot. He also
smelled an “alarmingly strong” odor of alcohol on appellant. There were two children, ages
eight and ten, in appellant’s car. Officer Kryczkowski began to administer field sobriety tests.
Administering the HGN test was “exceedingly difficult” because appellant was unable to follow
the instructions. The officer had to restart the test twenty-three times and was not able to
complete the whole test. Officer Kryczkowski next administered the walk-and-turn test and the
one-leg-stand test. In the officer’s opinion, appellant did not have normal use of his mental and
physical faculties due to intoxication from alcohol. Officer Kryczkowski arrested appellant and
took him to the Frisco jail.
At the jail, Officer Kryczkowski read appellant his Miranda rights and read the statutory
warnings on the DIC-24 form. After reading the DIC-24, appellant agreed to provide a breath
sample. The officer testified that appellant did not blow adequately for the Intoxilyzer
equipment to take a specimen. There were multiple attempts made to get a breath sample.
Although the officer was not sure about the exact number of attempts made, he stated it was
more than two, but not more than five. In Officer Kryczkowski’s opinion, appellant did not
really try to provide a sample. The officer indicated he had had this happen on a couple of
occasions in previous DWI arrests. The State introduced into evidence a written document,
signed by the Intoxilyzer operator who administered the test to appellant that indicated “Invalid
Test” and “Deficient Sample.” Although Officer Kryczkowski could have videotaped
appellant’s attempts to give a breath sample, he did not.
The officer took appellant to a hospital, where a registered nurse drew a sample of
appellant’s blood about three hours after the accidents. On cross-examination, the officer
testified that appellant never consented to the blood test. He further explained that department
–3– procedures dictate that if a person does not give a sample when he consents to it, it is considered
a refusal.
The DIC-24 form signed by Officer Kryczkowski indicates that the officer requested a
specimen of appellant’s breath and blood. It also contains a handwritten note: “Breath provided
was deficient. Mandatory draw taken.” When a subject refuses to allow the taking of a
specimen, the form contains boxes to check to indicate if the subject refused and signed the form
or refused and “signed below.” Neither box was checked.
Appellant testified that he tried with his “best effort” to provide a breath sample. He
thought he tried to provide a sample three times. He stated that he told the person administering
the test that he was a smoker and could not “blow so frequently.”
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant later pleaded guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. This appeal followed.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. We
give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts and we review
de novo the court’s application of the law to the facts. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under this standard, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of
the witnesses and their testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
In his first issue, appellant contends the mandatory blood draw provision of the
transportation code did not apply in this case. Before a person can be subjected to a mandatory
blood draw, he must first refuse the officer’s request to submit to the taking of a specimen
voluntarily. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b). Appellant maintains that because he
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AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed June 5, 2014.
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-13-00339-CR
VIVEK SHARMA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80989-2012
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, O'Neill, and Brown Opinion by Justice Brown Appellant Vivek Sharma was indicted for the offense of driving while intoxicated with a
child passenger. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, appellant entered into a plea
agreement with the State. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment in
accordance with the agreement at eighteen months’ confinement, probated for four years, and a
$1,000 fine. In four issues, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Appellant’s issues on appeal involve the applicability of the mandatory blood draw
provision found in the Texas Transportation Code. Section 724.012 of the transportation code
provides:
(b) A peace officer shall require the taking of a specimen of a person’s breath or blood under any of the following circumstances if the officer arrests the person for an offense under Chapter 49, Penal Code, involving the operation of a motor vehicle or watercraft and the person refuses the officer’s request to submit to the taking of a specimen voluntarily:
....
(2) the offense for which the officer arrests the person is an offense under Section 49.045, Penal Code.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b) (West 2011). Section 49.045 of the penal code,
applicable in this case, makes it a state jail felony to drive while intoxicated with a passenger
younger than fifteen years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.045 (West 2011). An intentional
failure to give a specimen is considered refusal of an officer’s request for a specimen. See TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 724.032(a), 724.061 (West 2011); see also State v. Marrs, 104 S.W.3d
914, 918-19 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cuellar,
58 S.W.3d 781, 784 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
After appellant was involved in two back-to-back car accidents, he was charged with the
offense of driving while intoxicated with a child passenger. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to
suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test, among other things. He asserted the blood evidence
should be suppressed because his blood was taken in violation of his rights under the
transportation code, as well as the Fourth Amendment, the Texas Constitution, and the code of
criminal procedure.
At the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, Frisco Police Officer Kevin
Kryczkowski testified that on January 11, 2012, he was dispatched to the scene of an accident.
When he arrived, Lisa Baini informed him that someone in a Honda Odyssey rear ended her.
She pulled into a parking lot assuming the person who hit her would follow. When he didn’t, she
pulled out of the parking lot and followed his car. She saw the Honda hit another vehicle that
was stopped at a traffic light.
–2– Officer Kryczkowski made contact with appellant, the driver of the Honda. The officer
noticed appellant’s lips appeared to be stained with wine and his eyes were bloodshot. He also
smelled an “alarmingly strong” odor of alcohol on appellant. There were two children, ages
eight and ten, in appellant’s car. Officer Kryczkowski began to administer field sobriety tests.
Administering the HGN test was “exceedingly difficult” because appellant was unable to follow
the instructions. The officer had to restart the test twenty-three times and was not able to
complete the whole test. Officer Kryczkowski next administered the walk-and-turn test and the
one-leg-stand test. In the officer’s opinion, appellant did not have normal use of his mental and
physical faculties due to intoxication from alcohol. Officer Kryczkowski arrested appellant and
took him to the Frisco jail.
At the jail, Officer Kryczkowski read appellant his Miranda rights and read the statutory
warnings on the DIC-24 form. After reading the DIC-24, appellant agreed to provide a breath
sample. The officer testified that appellant did not blow adequately for the Intoxilyzer
equipment to take a specimen. There were multiple attempts made to get a breath sample.
Although the officer was not sure about the exact number of attempts made, he stated it was
more than two, but not more than five. In Officer Kryczkowski’s opinion, appellant did not
really try to provide a sample. The officer indicated he had had this happen on a couple of
occasions in previous DWI arrests. The State introduced into evidence a written document,
signed by the Intoxilyzer operator who administered the test to appellant that indicated “Invalid
Test” and “Deficient Sample.” Although Officer Kryczkowski could have videotaped
appellant’s attempts to give a breath sample, he did not.
The officer took appellant to a hospital, where a registered nurse drew a sample of
appellant’s blood about three hours after the accidents. On cross-examination, the officer
testified that appellant never consented to the blood test. He further explained that department
–3– procedures dictate that if a person does not give a sample when he consents to it, it is considered
a refusal.
The DIC-24 form signed by Officer Kryczkowski indicates that the officer requested a
specimen of appellant’s breath and blood. It also contains a handwritten note: “Breath provided
was deficient. Mandatory draw taken.” When a subject refuses to allow the taking of a
specimen, the form contains boxes to check to indicate if the subject refused and signed the form
or refused and “signed below.” Neither box was checked.
Appellant testified that he tried with his “best effort” to provide a breath sample. He
thought he tried to provide a sample three times. He stated that he told the person administering
the test that he was a smoker and could not “blow so frequently.”
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant later pleaded guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. This appeal followed.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. We
give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts and we review
de novo the court’s application of the law to the facts. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under this standard, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of
the witnesses and their testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
In his first issue, appellant contends the mandatory blood draw provision of the
transportation code did not apply in this case. Before a person can be subjected to a mandatory
blood draw, he must first refuse the officer’s request to submit to the taking of a specimen
voluntarily. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b). Appellant maintains that because he
–4– did not refuse the officer’s request for a sample, he was not subject to a mandatory blood draw
under section 724.012(b) and a warrant was required.
Appellant asserts the evidence does not show he intentionally failed to provide a breath
sample. We disagree. Officer Kryczkowski testified that, although appellant consented to give a
breath sample, he did not really try to provide a sample. This testimony was evidence that
appellant intentionally failed to give an adequate breath sample. 1 On the other hand, appellant
testified that he tried to give a breath sample with his best effort. The trial court, as exclusive
judge of the credibility of the witnesses, could have properly credited the officer’s testimony and
discredited appellant’s and determined appellant’s failure to provide a breath sample was
intentional and therefore constituted a refusal to give a specimen. See Cuellar, 58 S.W.3d at 784
(in appeal from order suspending driver’s license, conflicts in evidence regarding defendant’s
response to officer’s request for breath specimen are matters for administrative law judge to
decide). Because the court could have properly determined that appellant refused to voluntarily
provide a breath sample, the provisions of section 724.012(b) requiring a mandatory blood draw
applied in this case. Appellant’s first issue is without merit.
In his second, third, and fourth issues, appellant contends the warrantless blood draw
violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, article 38.23 of
the code of criminal procedure, and his right against unlawful searches and seizures guaranteed
by the Texas Constitution. Appellant’s argument under these issues is merely an extension of his
first issue. He contends that because the State did not prove he was subject to a mandatory blood
draw under the transportation code, it needed a warrant to obtain his blood. We have rejected
1 Appellant contends the officer’s testimony is insufficient to show he deliberately failed to provide a breath sample because the officer gave “no specific articulable facts.” Citing the law applicable to Terry stops, appellant urges us to conclude there was “no reasonable suspicion to believe the failure was deliberate because there were no specific facts in the record.” See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We decline to adopt this analysis. Officer Kryczkowski’s testimony provided sufficient information for the trial court to conclude appellant intentionally failed to give an adequate sample.
–5– appellant’s argument that the mandatory blood draw provisions of the transportation code did not
apply.
We recognize that other courts of appeals have recently determined that, in the absence of
a warrant or exigent circumstances, a blood draw under section 724.012(b) violates a defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights. See Weems v. State, No. 04-13-00366-CR, slip op. at 14 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio May 14, 2014, pet. filed); Holidy v. State, No. 06-13-00261-CR, 2014 WL
1722171, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 30, 2014, pet. filed) (mem. op.); Sutherland v.
State, No. 07-12-00289-CR, 2014 WL 1370118, at *10 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 7, 2014, no
pet. h.); State v. Villarreal, No. 13-13-00253-CR, 2014 WL 1257150, at *11 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi Jan. 23, 2014, pet. granted). 2 But see Perez v. State, No. 01-12-01001-CR, 2014
WL 943126, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] March 11, 2014, no pet. h.) (warrantless
blood draw under section 724.012(b) did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights). But
that issue is not before us, as appellant has not made this argument in his appellate brief. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. Appellant argues only that a warrant was needed because the prerequisites
to a mandatory blood draw under the transportation code were not met. He does not go on to
argue that, even if the requirements of section 724.012(b) were met, a warrant was still needed.
We express no opinion on this issue as it is not properly before us. Appellant’s second, third,
and fourth issues are without merit.
2 Most of these decisions are based on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), in which the Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not categorically support a finding of exigent circumstances. Instead, whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1563.
–6– We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Ada Brown/ ADA BROWN JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47
130339F.U05
–7– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
VIVEK SHARMA, Appellant On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas No. 05-13-00339-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 296-80989-2012. Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Bridges and O'Neill participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 5th day of June, 2014.
–8–