Virginia Commonwealth University v. Gail H. Blowe
This text of Virginia Commonwealth University v. Gail H. Blowe (Virginia Commonwealth University v. Gail H. Blowe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1034-97-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY NOVEMBER 18, 1997 GAIL HOWARD BLOWE
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Ingrid E. Olson (Richard Cullen, Attorney General; Peter R. Messitt, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellant. Gregory Camden (John H. Klein; Matthew H. Kraft; Rutter & Montagna, L.L.P., on brief), for appellee.
Virginia Commonwealth University (employer) appeals an award
of temporary total disability, and related benefits, by the
Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) to Gail H. Blowe
(claimant). Employer argues that the evidence failed to
establish that claimant's "psychological problems were a
compensable consequence" of an earlier injury which was
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). We
disagree and affirm the award.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
Guided by well-established principles, we construe the
* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing
below, claimant in this instance. Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner
Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. App, 503, 504, 339 S.E.2d 916, 916 (1986).
"If there is evidence, or reasonable inferences can be drawn from
the evidence, to support the commission's findings, they will not
be disturbed on review, even though there is evidence in the
record to support a contrary finding." Morris v. Badger
Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 279, 348 S.E.2d 876,
877 (1986); Code § 65.2-706(A). This Court does not "retry the
facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its own
determination of the credibility of the witnesses." Wagner
Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35
(1991) (citation omitted). A "determination of causation is a
factual finding." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 684,
688, 376 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). [W]here a causal connection between the initial compensable injury and the subsequent injury is established, the doctrine of compensable consequences extends the coverage of the [Act] to the subsequent injury . . . "as if it occurred in the course of and arising out of the . . . employment."
Bartholow Drywall Co. v. Hill, 12 Va. App. 790, 794, 407 S.E.2d
1, 3 (1991) (citation omitted). Thus, psychological injury
resulting from compensable physical injury is likewise
compensable, Teasley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 14 Va. App. 45,
48-49, 415 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1992), provided claimant establishes
the requisite nexus. Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va. App. 357,
- 2 - 362, 412 S.E.2d 185, 188 (1991).
Claimant was originally awarded benefits resulting from
carpal tunnel syndrome. 1 Subsequently, she was compensated for
several periods of related temporary total and partial
disability, the most recent award concluding on May 19, 1995. On
March 20, 1996, claimant again sought temporary total benefits,
commencing February 29, 1996, for a psychiatric disability and
attendant treatment, as a "reasonable and natural consequence of
her work-related injury . . . ." The commission concluded that
claimant had "met her burden of proving a compensable consequence
of the industrial accident" and awarded benefits, prompting this
appeal by employer. Immediately before claimant's psychiatric consult, she had
visited Dr. Adelaar, her treating orthopaedic/hand surgeon,
complaining of "a lot of swelling in her hand," which had
persisted for a "period of time," and "continu[ed] . . . problems
in her employment position." 2 Dr. Adelaar "detect[ed]" no
"problems" and claimant began treating with Dr. Agarwal, a
psychiatrist, on February 29, 1996, following a referral by her
"primary care physician."
Dr. Agarwal initially noted that claimant reported
1 Employer does not challenge this award in the instant proceeding. 2 In an effort to accommodate claimant's restrictions and discomfort, employer changed her work assignment on several occasions.
- 3 - "work-related stress" and "continue[d] . . . pain" and
"disability due to pain" which rendered her "[un]able to do
original work." In correspondence to claimant's counsel, Dr.
Agarwal observed that claimant was "still . . . encountering much
pain" in "doing her job" and "daily duties" as a result of her
"work-related injury," "creat[ing] much difficulty," including
"depression-related . . . job stress," and the need for
psychiatric care. Dr. Agarwal's evidence was consistent with
claimant's testimony and other evidence before the commission. Accordingly, the commission's finding that claimant's
psychological disorder was a compensable consequence of an
earlier compensable injury is supported by the record, and we
affirm the attendant award.
Affirmed.
- 4 -
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