Virgil, Margaret v. Nissan North America

2016 TN WC 7
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedJanuary 13, 2016
Docket2015-05-0274
StatusPublished

This text of 2016 TN WC 7 (Virgil, Margaret v. Nissan North America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Virgil, Margaret v. Nissan North America, 2016 TN WC 7 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2016).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT MURFREESBORO

MARGARET VIRGIL ) Docket No.: 2015-05-0274 Employee, ) v. ) State File Number: 43911-2015 NISSAN NORTH AMERICA ) Employer. ) Judge Dale Tipps )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER DENYING REQUESTED MEDICAL BENEFITS

This matter came before the undersigned workers’ compensation judge on January 5, 2016, on the Request for Expedited Hearing filed by the employee, Margaret Virgil, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 (2015). The present focus of this case is the compensability of Ms. Virgil’s back and right leg injury and her entitlement to medical benefits. The central legal issue is whether Ms. Virgil is likely to establish she suffered an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds Ms. Virgil is not entitled to the requested medical benefits at this time.

History of Claim

Ms. Virgil is a fifty-eight-year-old resident of Rutherford County, Tennessee. She has worked for Nissan for thirty years. Since May 2015, she has worked as a PQA, a quality assurance position. Before then, she worked in material handling for sixteen or seventeen years. She described both jobs as physically demanding.

Ms. Virgil described the onset of low back and right leg pain during her last year in material handling. Her problems worsened when she began her new duties in May 2015, leading her to report a work injury to Nissan in June 2015. Nissan provided a medical panel to Ms. Virgil, and she selected Dr. Jeffrey Hazlewood. (Ex. 8.)

Dr. Hazlewood saw Ms. Virgil on June 17, 2015. He noted she had a twenty-year

1 history of occasional low back pain. She began having low back pain after she began a job requiring more standing and “a lot of bending.” Dr. Hazlewood characterized Ms. Virgil’s pain as 60% in her low back and 40% in her right thigh. After examining Ms. Virgil, his impression was “[m]echanical low back pain non-specific.” He did not feel Ms. Virgil’s pain was discogenic and noted she had no radicular symptoms. He indicated this was “non-specific back pain with probably some musculoligamentous component, probably degenerative spine disease with a history of pre-existing back problems intermittently.” (Ex. 2.)

Dr. Hazlewood addressed causation as follows:

I cannot state there is a structural injury here or relation to her work given the total assessment. Per page 1991, ‘The presence of non-specific low back pain cannot be construed as indicative of low back injury.’ There has been no association scientifically of lifting, awkward postures, or repetitive bending to idiopathic/non-specific back pain. . . . In summary, I cannot state this is a work related injury given this presentation.

Id.

After receiving Dr. Hazlewood’s office note, Nissan denied Ms. Virgil’s claim on June 23, 2015. (Ex. 9.) She sought treatment under her health insurance with Dr. William Newton. Dr. Newton’s note of December 21, 2015, shows Ms. Virgil complained of pain mostly in the posterior aspect of her right hip and gluteal area. He noted, “a several year history of pain affecting the lower back but this [has] gotten progressively worse over the past several weeks.” Dr. Newton reviewed Ms. Virgil’s pelvic MRI and noted some evidence of partial tearing of the gluteous minimus insertion on the right. He felt this was consistent with where she was having pain. He also noted this was not likely to require surgery, but referred Ms. Virgil to Dr. Michael Jordan for a surgical opinion. (Ex. 5.)

At the request of Ms. Virgil’s attorney, Dr. Newton filled out a questionnaire on January 4, 2015. He indicated that Ms. Virgil’s lower back and upper leg pain is the result of lumbar spondylosis. He also opined that her condition was not primarily caused by her employment at Nissan. (Ex. 4.)

Ms. Virgil filed a Petition for Benefit Determination seeking medical benefits. The parties did not resolve the disputed issues through mediation, and the Mediating Specialist filed a Dispute Certification Notice. Ms. Virgil filed a Request for Expedited Hearing, and this Court heard the matter on January 5, 2016.

1 Of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Disease and Injury Causation, Second Edition.

2 At the Expedited Hearing, Ms. Virgil asserted she is entitled to medical benefits for a repetitive motion condition arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. She acknowledged that Dr. Hazlewood was her authorized physician, but testified that his examination was cursory, lasting less than an hour and including no MRI or diagnostic tests. She argued that his opinion is thus medically and legally insufficient to merit the statutory presumption of correctness. Regarding Dr. Newton’s causation opinion, Ms. Virgil notes that he only addressed whether her work caused her lumbar spondylosis, not whether her work aggravated that pre-existing condition. She contends that she has a proven injury, and the most likely cause of that injury or its aggravation is many years of heavy physical work at Nissan.

Nissan countered that Ms. Virgil is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because she failed to present evidence that her injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. It disputes that there are two distinct injuries, noting the proof indicates Ms. Virgil reported a single injury to her low back and right leg. Nissan contends Dr. Hazlewood’s opinion, as the authorized treating physician, is entitled to a presumption of correctness and is supported by Ms. Virgil’s own doctor.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The Workers’ Compensation Law shall not be remedially or liberally construed in favor of either party but shall be construed fairly, impartially and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction favoring neither the employee nor employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2015). In general, an employee bears the burden of proof on all prima facie elements of his or her workers’ compensation claim. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6); see also Buchanan v. Carlex Glass Co., No. 2015-01-0012, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *5 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 29, 2015). At an expedited hearing, an employee need not prove every element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence, but must come forward with sufficient evidence from which the trial court can determine that the employee is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(1) (2015). McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06- 0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). This lesser evidentiary standard “does not relieve an employee of the burden of producing evidence of an injury by accident that arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment at an expedited hearing, but allows some relief to be granted if that evidence does not rise to the level of a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’” Buchanan, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *6.

To be compensable under the workers’ compensation statutes, an injury must arise primarily out of and occur in the course and scope of the employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2015). Injury is defined as “an injury by accident . . . arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes death, disablement or the

3 need for medical treatment of the employee.” Id.

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Related

§ 50-6-102
Tennessee § 50-6-102(14)
§ 50-6-116
Tennessee § 50-6-116
§ 50-6-239
Tennessee § 50-6-239(c)(6)

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2016 TN WC 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/virgil-margaret-v-nissan-north-america-tennworkcompcl-2016.