Vires v. Dawkins Log Mill Company

42 S.W.2d 721, 240 Ky. 550, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 440
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedMay 19, 1931
StatusPublished

This text of 42 S.W.2d 721 (Vires v. Dawkins Log Mill Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vires v. Dawkins Log Mill Company, 42 S.W.2d 721, 240 Ky. 550, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 440 (Ky. 1931).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Willis

Affirming.

Arch Yires made application to the Workmen’s Compensation Board for adjustment of a compensation claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Law (Ky. Stats., c. 137, secs. 4880-4987). The basis of the claim was dependency upon Chester Yires, son of the claimant, who had been killed while working for Fugate Bros., a partnership composed of Bufus Fugate and Lewis Fugate. The application for adjustment of compensation was not made against the partnership that had employed applicant’s deceased son, but against the Dawkins Log & Mill Company and Bufus Fugate, individually.

The board dismissed the claim against the Dawkins Log &JV1Í11 Company upon the ground that Fugate Bros, were independent contractors. A petition for review was filed in the circuit court against the Dawkins Log & Mill Company, Fugate Bros., as a firm, and the individual members of the Workmen’s Compensation Board. It will be noted that the firm of Fugate Bros. Was not a party to the proceeding before the board, and the judgment *552 did not determine the rights of Yires, if any he had, against the partnership.

The circuit court affirmed the action of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, and Yires has prosecuted the present appeal.

Fugate Bros., had a written contract with the Dawkins Log & Mill Company, by the terms of which they agreed to cut, haul, skid, and deliver all of the merchantable timber on a tract of land in Breathitt county, Ky. It is tacitly conceded that Fugate gros^were independi ent contractors, and the evidence in that respect was j uncontraScted'. The finding of the board to that effect ’■was supported by evidence, and,^in_that situation, the result reached by the board is conclusive upon the courts. Black Mountain Corp. v. Murphy, 218 Ky. 40, 290 S. W. 1036; Wallins Creek Collieries Co. v. Cole, 218 Ky. 116, 290 S. W. 1049; King Harlan Coal Co. v. Helton, 219 Ky. 546, 293 S. W. 1056; Golden Ash Coal Co. v. Davis, 220 Ky. 224, 294 S. W. 1029; Broughton’s Adm’r v. Congleton Lumber Co., 235 Ky. 534, 31 S. W. (2d) 903. The contract reserved no control whatever over the work, or the employment or discharge of the hands, or otherwise, and in the actual conduct of the business no direction or control was exercised, except to see that the contract was carried out according to its terms. It is settled that the principal is not liable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law for compensation to the servants of- an independent contractor. Employers’ Liability Association Corp. v. Hereford, 209 Ky. 188, 272 S. W. 380; Wright v. Wilkins, 222 Ky. 144, 300 S. W. 342; Buckhorn Coal & Lumber Co. v. Georgia Casualty Co., 222 Ky. 683, 2 S. W. (2d) 383; Raponi v. Consolidation Coal Co., 224 Ky, 167, 5 S. W. (2d) 1043. Independent contractors are not covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Acts generally, and they cannot claim its benefits against their principals. An independent contractor is one who is independent of his employer in the execution of his work, and may labor at the times and in the manner he prefers, and may employ and discharge workmen in his discretion. Wright v. Wilkins, 222 Ky. 144, 300 S. W. 342; Messmer v. Bell 6 Coggeshall Co., 133 Ky. 19, 117 S. W. 346, 19 Ann. Cas. 1; Maggard v. Louisville Cooperage Co., 232 Ky. 20, 22 S. W. (2d) 279. But it is insisted that a provision of the written contract between Fugate Bros, and the Dawkins Log & Mill Company worked a change in the conventional *553 relation of the parties. By that section of the contract Fugate Bros, agreed:

“To carry compensation for all employees and to be responsible to them for same. To furnish the Workmen’s Compensation Board of the State proof of ability to pay compensation by insuring in some recognized, reliable insurance company or failing-in this to permit second party to arrange for this and to deduct for any amount due under this agreement seven and one-half (7%) per' cent of amount due all labor. To have all employees to sign regular compensation cards to be furnished by second party. To furnish second party as demanded full and complete list of all employees and their rates, together with complete information-of all accidents and any information desired pertaining to same.”

The second party mentioned in the contract was the Dawkins Log & Mill Company.

The Dawkins Log & Mill Company exacted a covenant on the part of the partnership to carry compensation for all the employees of the latter, to be responsible to them for injury according- to the Workmen’s Compensation Law, and to furnish the Workmen’s Compensation Board proof of their ability to pay compensation by insuring- the risk with a responsible insurance carrier. It is .argued that Fugate Bros, had an alternative option by which “they could permit the Dawkins Log & Mill Company to arrange for the compensation insurance and deduct from any amount due the partnership a certain percentage of the pay roll. It is said then that such provision amounted to an agreement to carry the risk for the partnership. It appeared in evidence that the percentage of the pay roll specified in the contract had_begn. deducted by the Dawkins Log- & Mill Company. The contention of the appellant is that the Dawkins Log & Mill Company by the contract agreed to assume liability for compensation to employees of Fugate Bros., and in effect became the insurance carrier for them. The argument rests upon a strained construction of the contract which its terms do not authorize. The section of the contract we have quoted imposed upon the firm of Fugate Bros, the obligation to carry compensation' insurance for the protection of their employees in the event of an injury to any of them.

*554 The provision which authorized the deduction of a portion of the pay roll was a means of paying the premiums due the insurance carrier, and it did not constitute the Dawkins Log & Mill Company the.insurance carrier. It merely constituted that company the agent of Fugate Bros, to obtain the insurance protection and to pay the premiums to the insurance carrier, if the firm failed to do so. It is to be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the money deducted from the pay roll was used to pay the premiums due an insurance carrier. If the Dawkins Log & Mill Company failed to obtain the insurance, or to pay therefor, and Fugate Bros, or their servants suffered a loss by reason thereof, they might have a cause of action against the company. But no such case is presented, and could not, in any event, be determined by the Workmen’s Compensation Board. All that appears is the contract itself and testimony that the deductions from the pay roll were made, as authorized by the contract. But the contract is not susceptible to the construction that the Dawkins Log & Mill Company was to be responsible in any event as an insurance carrier for Fugate Bros. The contract contemplated coverage of the risk by a recognized, reliable, and authorized insurance company at the expense of Fugate Bros.

The Workmen’s Compensation Law requires all employers under the act to be insured in companies qualified according to the provisions of the act itself. Sections 4946, 4947, 4950, 4951, 4952, 4953, 4954 and 4955, Ky. Stats.

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Related

Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Hereford
272 S.W. 380 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1925)
Wallins Creek Collieries Co. v. Cole
290 S.W. 1049 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1927)
Diamond Block Coal Company v. Sparks
272 S.W. 31 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1925)
Raponi v. Consolidation Coal Company
5 S.W.2d 1043 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1928)
Maggard v. Louisville Cooperage Co.
22 S.W.2d 279 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1929)
Ramey Fidelity Guaranty Company v. Broady
272 S.W. 740 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1925)
Gibson v. Commonwealth
293 S.W. 1056 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1927)
Wright v. Wilkins
300 S.W. 342 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1927)
King Harlan Coal Company v. Helton
293 S.W. 1096 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1927)
Black Mountain Corporation v. Murphy
290 S.W. 1036 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1927)
Buckhorn Coal & Lumber Co. v. Georgia Casualty Co.
2 S.W.2d 383 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1928)
Golden Ash Coal Company v. Davis
294 S.W. 1029 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1927)
Broughton's Administrator v. Congleton Lumber Co.
31 S.W.2d 903 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1930)
Messmer v. Bell & Coggeshall Co.
117 S.W. 346 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1909)
Ramey v. Broady
209 Ky. 279 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1925)

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Bluebook (online)
42 S.W.2d 721, 240 Ky. 550, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 440, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vires-v-dawkins-log-mill-company-kyctapphigh-1931.