Filed 9/1/26 Virdi v. Brown CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHEEP VIRDI et al., F090235
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Super. Ct. No. BCV-22-101851)
v.
KELLY BROWN et al., OPINION Defendants and Appellants.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Bernard C.
Barmann, Jr., Judge.
Sean Brown and Kelly Brown, in pro. per, for Defendants and Appellants. No appearance for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Snauffer, J. and DeSantos, J.
Sean Brown and Kelly Brown (collectively, defendants) appeal from a postjudgment order denying their claims of exemption to levies. Because they have not demonstrated trial court error, we affirm the order.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 9, 2022, Maheep Virdi, M.D., and Rasham Sandhu, M.D., (collectively, plaintiffs) filed a first amended complaint in the Orange County Superior Court on behalf of Organic Energy, LLC (Organic Energy), a California limited liability company, against defendants arising from a failed business venture. The first amended complaint alleges that plaintiffs entered into a partnership with Sean1 to start up Organic Energy (an organic energy product company) with each of the three partners to contribute one-third of the capital to fund it. Plaintiffs invested approximately $1.3 million in Organic Energy, but Sean did not. According to the first amended complaint, Sean abused his position of trust as an officer and managing partner of Organic Energy by misappropriating the $1.3 million capital investment and using all the monies for defendants’ personal benefit, purchasing personal vehicles, paying off personal credit card debt, and making other expenditures that did not pertain to Organic Energy. Based on these allegations, the first amended complaint included causes of actions for civil theft (Pen. Code, § 496), embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and unfair business practices.
The superior court judge transferred the action to Kern County Superior Court by order dated June 1, 2022. On February 10, 2023, defendants filed their answer to the first amended complaint. Plaintiffs answered defendants’ cross-complaint on April 19, 2023. Thereafter, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ “Motion for Terminating Sanctions, or, in the
1 We refer to defendants by their first names for clarity and convenience, because they share a last name. No disrespect is intended.
Alternative, Issue Evidentiary, and Monetary Sanctions” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) and ordered defendants’ answers to the first amended complaint be stricken, their defaults entered, and Sean’s cross-complaint dismissed on September 2, 2023.
The trial court entered judgment against defendants on December 21, 2023, and ordered them to pay $3,316,125 in actual and treble damages pursuant to Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c); $25,000 in actual damages; $299,913 in attorney fees; $7,789.21 in costs; $173,619.59 in prejudgment interest; $2,967.86 in additional interest; and postjudgment interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum. The abstracts of judgment were entered on January 17, 2024, and reflect a total judgment in the amount of $3,825,414.66.
The court issued writs of execution to the sheriffs of Orange, Kern, San Bernardino, and Los Angeles Counties. On March 18, 2025, the Orange County Sheriff’s Department served an “Execution-Bank Levy” on JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (Chase Bank). Sean returned a claim of exemption to the sheriff’s department for the Chase Bank account ending in 5613 on March 27, 2025. He returned a second claim of exemption to the sheriff’s department for Morgan Stanley individual retirement accounts (IRAs) ending in 877, 879, and 881 on April 15, 2025. Kelly returned a claim of exemption to the sheriff’s department for the Morgan Stanley IRA ending in 878 on April 15, 2025. All three claims of exemption described the properties as private retirement accounts exempt from levy pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 704.115.2 The boxes indicating the claims were made pursuant to a provision exempting property to the extent necessary for the support of the judgment debtor or his spouse or dependents were not checked, and financial statement forms were not attached.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs returned notices of opposition to defendants’ claims of exemption to the sheriff’s department on April 11, 2025,3 and April 29, 2025. Plaintiffs argue in Attachments 6 to the notices of opposition to Sean’s claims of exemption that amounts held in self-employed retirement plans or IRAs are exempt from levy only to the extent necessary to provide for the support of the judgment debtor and the debtor’s spouse and dependents upon retirement, but defendants’ claims of exemption failed to provide any financial analysis showing the funds were necessary for support in retirement.4 Plaintiffs also describe three other IRAs identified by defendants with The Charles Schwab Corporation (Charles Schwab), in 2024: (1) $242.007.60 in Kelly’s name; (2) a Roth account in Sean’s name in the amount of $57,895.43; and (3) a second account in Sean’s name in the amount of $46,960.68.
While the Charles Schwab accounts were initially levied, defendants claimed exemptions for the accounts, and Charles Schwab released the restrictions on the accounts when plaintiffs failed to object to the claims of exemption. These accounts are presumably available to defendants for their retirement needs. However, plaintiffs also argue that defendants received distributions from those accounts that demonstrate the accounts are not being used for retirement as follows: withdrawals totaling $24,000 in 2021 and 2022 from Kelly’s account (ending in 8436); a $25,500 withdrawal in 2022 from Sean’s account (ending in 5364); and withdrawals totaling $439,200 in 2018, 2021, and 2022 from Sean’s account (ending in 9280).
3 Plaintiffs also filed the notice of oppositions to the claims of exemption with the trial court on April 8, 2025, and April 28, 2025. 4 Plaintiff’s oppositions to Sean’s claims of exemption each have an “Attachment 6” that are nearly identical and provide a brief factual history and legal argument supported by five documentary exhibits, including a letter from Charles Schwab relating to four accounts held there and Internal Revenue Form 1099-Rs showing distributions from those accounts. Plaintiffs’ opposition to Kelly’s claim of exemption does not have “Attachment 6” but does have the same documents relating to the Charles Schwab accounts and Internal Revenue Form 1099-Rs.
Plaintiffs further argue that defendants failed to meet their burden of proof that the accounts are exempt because, while defendants described the accounts as IRAs, they failed to provide documentation that the accounts complied with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules. For example, defendants have several accounts that they described as IRAs but failed to provide any documentation that proves the nature of the accounts, compliance with IRS regulations at the inception of multiple accounts in 2003, and whether the accounts comply with IRS limits on the annual contribution amounts. Defendants had the burden to provide documentation for each account showing the dates the accounts were established, amounts contributed each year, yearly balances, and yearly withdrawals but failed to do so.
Defendants’ initial reply to plaintiffs’ opposition regarding the Chase accounts primarily addresses plaintiffs’ arguments relating to defendants’ Charles Schwab accounts and withdrawals from the accounts. Sean submitted a declaration that explained: the accounts were opened in 2003 and established to secure “a stable financial future for our family and IRAs were selected based on the advice from our financial advisors”; the accounts were created and maintained in compliance with IRS regulations according to Charles Schwab; and Sean had complied with IRS regulations in paying all taxes and penalties associated with early withdrawals. Sean claimed that the incremental withdrawals from the accounts were necessary to support his family in 2018 after some members moved to Orange County from Kern County and expenses exceeded his income due to a downturn in his business. He stated, “[E]conomic hardship made it necessary to withdrawal [sic] funds from our retirement accounts to support our family. All the IRA withdrawals were done incrementally and out of strict necessity.”
Defendants filed an additional reply to plaintiffs’ oppositions addressing Sean’s claims of exemption to the Chase account and three Morgan Stanley accounts. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ opposition to the claims of exemption was not supported by a statement of facts. Defendants’ further argue that IRAs are not disqualified from exempt status just because funds are withdrawn and used for nonretirement purposes. Rather, the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that the retirement accounts were not established or used to avoid creditors and, therefore, did not lose their exempt status. Defendants’ argue that the accounts in question were created in 2003 and 2004, 20 years before their financial difficulties, with the intent to provide for the support and welfare of their family, held in trust and not controlled by them personally, and withdrawals were necessary and complied with IRS regulations.
Sean’s declaration asserts that the retirement accounts at Morgan Stanley and Chase Bank were established to secure a stable financial future for his family and retirement as a result of advice from advisors at the banks and his certified public accountant. These accounts were managed by a third party trustee.
Although he does not have personal knowledge as to the formation of the accounts due to the passage of time, based on Sean’s review of documents and conversations with individuals at Morgan Stanley, he provided the following information: (1) Kelly’s account ending in 878 was opened with $2,000 on March 31, 2000, and was valued at $4,932;5 (2) Sean’s account ending in 879 was opened with $3,000 on March 31, 2000, and was valued at $3,875; Sean’s account ending in 877 was opened with $1,500 on February 11, 2000, and was valued at $1,900; and Sean’s account ending in 881 (a rollover account)6 was opened with $43,225.26 on April 18, 2001, and was valued at $10,668.
5 The values provided were as of April 20, 2025. 6 A private retirement plan is fully exempt without regard to the debtor’s retirement needs and retains its exempt status even if rolled over into an individual account or annuity. Defendants failed to provide any evidence as to the original source of the funds in the rollover plan except to state in Sean’s declaration that it came from a prior employer. Defendants did not provide sufficient facts from which one could discern that funds in the Chase account came from an exempt plan. Thus, Sean has not carried his burden to establish that this account is fully exempt.
Sean further stated that, based on information and belief, Kelly’s account ending in 878 received contributions “of about $3,000” after the account was opened and that his accounts received contributions, but he did not recall the amounts or frequency. Sean stated that he withdrew $35,000 from the account ending in 881 in 2022 in accordance with IRS regulations and was making installment payments on the penalties and taxes. He also withdrew $26,000 from the same account in 2025 and intends to comply with IRS regulations.
Regarding the account with Chase Bank, Sean stated that the account was opened in 2016 as a rollover from a previous employer and had a value of $15,681.23 as of April 11, 2025. On April 11, 2025, he withdrew $14,900 from the account to pay for oral surgery after bank employees advised him that the funds had not been levied and before receiving notice the following day of plaintiffs’ objection to the claim of exemption. He assumed that the account was exempt as a retirement account and believed that the levy had expired or had been withdrawn based upon his claim of exemption.
Sean’s declaration contains a financial statement (Judicial Council form WG-
007/EJ-185) executed by defendants under penalty of perjury. According to the financial statement, defendants had no monthly income, had been borrowing money and withdrawing money from their IRA’s (in an undisclosed amount), had $875 in checking and savings accounts, and $33,070 in monthly expenses.
In plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ filings, they argue that defendants lack any credibility because it is “humanly impossible” to pay $33,070 in monthly expenses with no reported income. Plaintiffs also argue that Sean’s declaration is not supported by any documentation that the accounts at Morgan Stanley or Chase are retirement accounts or in compliance with IRS regulations. They argue further that Sean’s withdrawal of the Chase funds shows fraud and should vitiate a claim of exemption for that account. The withdrawal history from the Charles Schwab accounts “shows a pattern by [d]fendants to use and abuse their retirement accounts in an attempt to shield their assets from [p]laintiffs[’] [j]udgment.”
At the May 29, 2025 hearing, the court provided the parties with a copy of its tentative ruling. The court described the ruling as going against defendants, but the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the ruling. Defendants’ counsel argued that Sean’s declaration established that the accounts were created for retirement, that the withdrawals were used for living expenses, and that counsel had possession of documentation to support the declaration but “it was difficult to justify producing [it] up front” given the age of the accounts. He further argued that defendants had previously provided plaintiffs documentation that they had borrowed $1.9 million from “good friends” who “loaned them money in these hard times.” Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that defendants’ counsel had not addressed the issues in the court’s tentative ruling. Plaintiffs’ counsel concluded that defendants’ credibility was in issue, especially in light of their financial statement. Defendants’ counsel advised the court that account documentation was available and had not been provided because plaintiffs’ opposition was “suspect.”
The court stated, “The Court considers the matter submitted. The Court is satisfied that its tentative should be the order of the Court. The Court will adopt the tentative as its ruling.” The court overruled defendants’ claims of exemption and directed plaintiffs’ counsel to prepare the order. The court’s order denied defendants’ claims of exemption as to all accounts held by Morgan Stanley and Chase Bank, prohibited defendants from transferring any monies from the accounts, and ordered the contents of the accounts turned over to the sheriff. The written order was filed on June 18, 2025.
Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal on July 31, 2025.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the court’s denial of the claim of exemption as to Kelly’s account (ending in 878) should be reversed because plaintiffs “did not satisfy the requirements with factual information for challenging Kelly’s IRA account,” plaintiffs “neglected to support allegations with statements of facts to support the opposition,” plaintiffs “did not present facts nor documents to determine if [Kelly’s] Morgan Stanley IRA was not exempt,” and the court “did not allow the additional documentation that would support [defendants’] declaration that was offered at the hearing.” Defendants also argue that substantial evidence shows that Kelly’s account met all requirements to be exempt from creditors. We affirm the court’s order.
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law “California’s Enforcement of Judgments Law (§ 680.010 et seq.) generally authorizes a creditor holding a ‘money judgment’ to ‘enforce[]’ that judgment against ‘all property of the judgment debtor’ through a ‘writ of execution.’ (§§ 695.010, subd. (a), 699.710.) However, to implement our Constitution’s command that ‘a certain portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of families’ be ‘protect[ed], by law, from forced sale’ (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 1.5), our Legislature has exempted various items of property from levy by creditors with money judgments. (See §§ 704.010–704.210 [setting forth exemptions]; [citation].) The debtor bears the burden of establishing that a particular exemption applies. (§ 703.580, subd. (b);[citation].)
“Section 704.115 exempts ‘[a]ll amounts held, controlled, or in process of distribution by a private retirement plan’ (§ 704.115, subd. (b)), but draws a distinction between two types of ‘private retirement plans’ and grants each of them a different type of exemption. [Citation.] Amounts held in ‘[p]rivate retirement plans’ ‘established or maintained by private employers or employee organizations, such as unions,’ including ‘closely held corporations,’ are fully exempt from levy. (§ 704.115, subds. (a)(1) & (b); [citation].) By contrast, amounts held in ‘[s]elf-employed retirement plans’ or ‘individual retirement … accounts’[7] are exempt from levy ‘only to the extent necessary to provide
7 The self-employed retirement plans and individual retirement annuities or accounts must be those “provided for in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, including individual for the support of the judgment debtor when the judgment debtor retires and for the support of the spouse and dependents of the judgment debtor.’ (§ 704.115, subds. (a)(3), (e); [citation].)
“Critically, however, neither type of exemption is available unless the plan or account holding the funds was, at the time of the levy, ‘principally’ or ‘primarily’ ‘designed and used for retirement purposes.’ [Citations.] This baseline requirement of a bona fide retirement purpose seeks to accommodate the constitutional mandate to ‘safeguard a source of income for retirees at the expense of creditors’ [citation], while at the same time guarding against the over-shielding of assets should the exemption apply to ‘anything a debtor unilaterally chooses to claim’ or label ‘as intended for retirement purpose.’ [Citations.]
“In assessing whether a plan or account was principally or primarily designed and used for retirement purposes, courts are to look at the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.] Relevant circumstances include (1) the ‘debtor’s subjective intent’ in designing and using the plan or account [citations]; (2) the ‘chronology’ or timing of the creation of the plan or account vis-à-vis other events [citation]; (3) the degree of control the debtor maintains ‘over contributions, management, administration, and use of funds’ in the plan or account [citation]; (4) whether the debtor violated or complied with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules or the plan’s rules in contributing to the plan [citations]; and, if the debtor withdraws money from the plan or account, (5) whether those funds were used for retirement or instead some other, nonretirement purpose [citations].” (O’Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics, LLC (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 553, 559–561, fn. omitted, first, second, third, sixth, eighth, & tenth bracketed insertions in original (O’Brien).)
retirement accounts qualified under Section 408 or 408A of that code, to the extent the amounts held in the plans, annuities, or accounts do not exceed the maximum amounts exempt from federal income taxation under that code.” (§ 704.115, subd. (a)(3).)
Courts may also consider whether the debtor overfunded the plan or violated other IRS rules in contributing to the plan, the contribution amount, and the debtor’s credibility and subjective intent, although such additional factors are neither required nor dispositive. (In re Rucker (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1155, 1162.)
“Orders granting or denying a claim of exemption are appealable. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 703.600.) A judgment or order of the trial court is presumed correct, and must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, no matter how slight it may be. [Citation.] Further, all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and all conflicts in evidence or in inferences must be resolved in favor of upholding the trial court’s judgment or order. [Citations.] Where sufficiency of the evidence is questioned, the duty of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination that there is in the record evidence legally sufficient to support the judgment or order.” (Schwartzman v. Wilshinsky (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 619, 626.)
II. Analysis Defendants argue that the court erred in denying their claim of exemption to Kelly’s account ending in 8788 because plaintiffs failed to provide documentation to support their opposition to the claims, the court failed to accept the documents defendants’ counsel had in his possession during the hearing, and substantial evidence supported the claim of exemption. Initially, we note that defendants have failed to present any legal analysis or case authority in support of their arguments.
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608– 609.) Thus, “[w]hen an appellant … asserts [a point] but fails to support it with reasoned
8 Defendants’ opening brief asks to only overturn the court’s order as to Kelly’s account.
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as forfeited.” (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075.) “The same rules apply to a party appearing in propria persona as to any other party.” (Flores v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 205.)
Even if we were inclined to reach defendants’ arguments, we would still reject their claims. We must reject defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs failed to prove the accounts were not exempt because it is not plaintiffs that have the burden of proof but rather, defendants bear the burden of establishing that a particular exemption applies pursuant to section 703.580, subdivision (b). The record on appeal does not include the court’s tentative ruling, which it later adopted, so we do not know the court’s reasons for denying the claim. However, since we must presume the order is correct, we examine the record to see if the court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. We note that Sean’s declaration provides the only evidence that Kelly’s account ending in 878 was created as an IRA, started with a deposit of $2,000, and included subsequent deposits totaling $3,000. However, the declaration specifically states that it is based on Sean’s information and belief as well as statements of financial institution representatives but not on Sean’s personal knowledge. Additionally, while Sean states that the funds in the account are held for retirement, he did not elaborate on this factual assertion nor attach any documents to support the claim. While defendants refer to the accounts at issue as IRA accounts, there is no evidence provided that the accounts were IRAs as opposed to savings or other types of financial accounts. Defendants provided no account documentation to prove the nature of the accounts or to establish the amounts deposited were within annual IRS contribution limitation.
Furthermore, Sean’s declaration that the accounts were intended as IRA’s, even if sufficient to prove they were set up for retirement purposes, fails to address whether the accounts continued to be used for retirement purposes after they were opened. (O’Brien, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 560 [exemption not available unless at the time of levy the account was holding funds “ ‘principally’ ” or “ ‘primarily’ ” designed and used for retirement purposes].) Without historical documentation as to the contributions and withdrawals of these accounts, as well as all defendants’ identified and unidentified retirement accounts, defendants failed to provide evidence that the accounts qualify for exemption from levy.
To prove defendants’ claims of exemption, they were required to provide evidence that the accounts were, “at the time of the levy, ‘principally’ or ‘primarily’ ‘designed and used for retirement purposes.’ ” (O’Brien, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 560.) The limited information provided by Sean’s declaration fails to provide evidence of factors relevant to inquiry: specifically, whether the debtor violated or complied with IRS rules or the plan’s rules in contributing to the plan and if funds were withdrawn from the plan, whether they were used for retirement or some other purpose. (See id. at p. 561.)
Defendants argue that defense counsel had documentation at the hearing to support Sean’s declaration, but the court refused to review it. First, “[a] trial court has broad discretion under rule 3.1300(d) of the California Rules of Court to refuse to consider papers served and filed beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good cause for late submission.” (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765.) To the extent that defendants claim their counsel’s oral statements regarding the documents were part of their claim of exemption, submission of the documents during the hearing was exceedingly untimely, and plaintiffs’ counsel, who appeared by video, would not have had access to any new documentary submissions.
More importantly, defense counsel never addressed the content, source, or importance of the documents, and the record fails to show that the documents were even properly authenticated. Evidence received at a law and motion hearing must be by declaration, and documents require a declaration of authentication to prove they are reliable and admissible. Otherwise, the documents are simply inadmissible hearsay. (Code Civ. Proc, §§ 2015.5, 2009; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(a); Evid. Code, §§ 250, 702, 1270 et seq., 1401, subd. (b); Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 608–610; In re Marriage of Reese & Guy (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1222, disapproved on another ground in Laborde v. Aronson (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 459, 466; Stockinger v. Feather River Community College (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1025–1027, disapproved on another ground Regents of the University of California (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 634, fn. 7.) Defendants desired to introduce oral testimony in support of the documents, and they were required to seek permission three days before the hearing (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(b)), but the record shows this was not done.
Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s failure to review defendants’
documents during the hearing.
Additionally, the trial court could have discounted Sean’s declaration and believed that he lacked credibility, as plaintiffs argue. Sean had withdrawn substantially all of the funds in the account ending in 881 before the time for plaintiffs to oppose it had expired. Although Sean claimed that he believed the funds were no longer subject to levy when withdrawn, the court could have disbelieved him and found that his deception cast doubt on the truth of other matters in his declaration. Additionally, defendants claimed that they were subsisting on $1.9 million of undocumented personal loans from friends but failed to include the loans in the list of debts as part of the financial statement they submitted to the court, again casting doubt on the veracity of Sean’s declaration. The task of assessing the credibility of witnesses lies with the trier of fact. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479.) We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own deductions for those of the trial court. (Lenk v. Total–Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968; Rupf v.Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 429–430, fn. 5.)
Apart from whether the levied accounts were designed and used for retirement purposes, section 704.115 exempts IRAs from collection “only to the extent necessary to provide for the support of the judgment debtor when the judgment debtor retires and for the support of the spouse and dependents of the judgment debtor, taking into account all resources that are likely to be available for the support of the judgment debtor when the judgment debtor retires.” (§ 704.115, subd. (e)(1); accord, O’Brien, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 560.) Defendants had to demonstrate the accounts were necessary to provide for their support and the support of their dependents upon retirement. (§ 703.580, subds. (b)(c).) Although defendants provided information that they had $33,070 in monthly expenses and no income, they failed to address their future financial prospects and whether they would have resources in the future to support themselves in retirement given the length of time until their retirement. (In re Vigghiany (Bankr. S.D.Cal. 1987) 74 B.R. 61, 63 [court required to consider all resources likely to be available for support of the debtor at retirement, such as social security payments and other income assets].) The court could have also concluded, in the absence of analysis by defendants, that the approximately $347,418.44 in the four Charles Schwab accounts that were not levied would be sufficient to meet their future retirement needs and that their living expenses of $33,070 a month indicates they possessed undisclosed assets.
Therefore, we conclude the court’s denial of defendants’ claims of exemption is supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The court’s May 29, 2025 ruling and June 18, 2025 written order denying defendants’ claims of exemption are affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.9
9 Because plaintiffs did not file a respondents’ brief, we decline to award them costs as the prevailing parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)