Virapen v. Eli Lilly, S.A.
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
September 22, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 95-1407
JOHN VIRAPEN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ELI LILLY, S.A., ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Jorge Miguel Suro Ballester on brief for appellants. ___________________________
Carl Schuster and Schuster Aguilo Rivera & Santiago on brief _____________ _________________________________
for appellees.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. This appeal stems from a suit alleging Per Curiam ___________
employment discrimination in violation of federal statutes and
local law. The principal plaintiff, John Virapen, who was born
in British Guyana and is of Indian descent, alleges that his
employer, Eli Lilly S.A., a pharmaceutical firm, discharged him
from an executive position because of his skin color, race, and
national origin. The other plaintiffs are Virapen's wife and
conjugal partnership; their claims are wholly derivative of his
claim, and need not be addressed separately.
The district court conducted a four-day bench trial
concerning Virapen's allegations. The court thereafter wrote a
meticulously reasoned opinion in which it concluded that Virapen
had failed to prove his case. See Virapen v. Eli Lilly, S.A., ___ _______ _______________
No. 90-1453, slip op. (D.P.R. March 23, 1995). Having read the
record and carefully considered the parties' briefs, we find no
basis to disturb the district court's decision. To the precise
contrary, we regard this as a suitable case in which to put into
practice our stated belief that, when "a trial court has produced
a first-rate work product, a reviewing tribunal should hesitate
to wax longiloquent simply to hear its own words resonate." In __
re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st ___________________________________________
Cir. 1993). Consequently, we affirm the judgment for
substantially the reasons elucidated in the opinion below. We
add only a few brief comments.
First: Virapen essentially asks that we reweigh the _____
facts de novo. Our standard of review, however, is much more
3
circumscribed. Following a bench trial, an appellate tribunal is
not warranted in rejecting the trial court's "findings of fact or
conclusions drawn therefrom unless, on the whole of the record,
[the court of appeals] form[s] a strong, unyielding belief that a
mistake has been made." Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 ________ _____________________
F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990). Findings concerning an employer's
intent are subject to review under this standard, and can be set
aside only for clear error. See id. (citing authorities). The ___ ___
record, read objectively, does not yield a conviction that a
mistake has been made, and no error clear or otherwise is
discernible.
Second: Virapen's complaint that he was wrongfully ______
denied the opportunity to adduce rebuttal evidence rings hollow.
The trial court has the right to exercise reasonable control over
the mode and manner of presenting evidence, see Fed. R. Evid. ___
611, and the court did not abuse its broad discretion here. See, ___
e.g., Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 190 (3d ____ _____ _________________________
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991) (explaining that _____ ______
"a trial judge's decision regarding the scope of rebuttal may not
be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion");
Hickok v. G.D. Searle & Co., 496 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir. 1974) ______ __________________
(explaining that the determination of what constitutes proper
rebuttal evidence lies within the district court's sound
discretion).
What is more, Virapen has not identified any evidence,
unavailable to him during the presentation of his case in chief,
4
that the court precluded him from presenting after the defense
rested. Nor has he pointed to any specific excluded evidence,
the need for which could not and should not have been
anticipated from the outset. That ends the matter. See, e.g., ___ ____
Cates v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1991) _____ ____________________
(warning that rebuttal evidence "is not to be used as a
continuation of the case-in-chief"); Pignons S.A. de Mecanique v. _________________________
Polaroid Corp.,
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