Viral Bhagat v. Anuja Sharad Shah

• Court: District Court, S.D. New York
• Decided: October 20, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-01424
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

VIRAL BHAGAT, Plaintiff, 24-CV-1424 (VEC) (RET) -against- ORDER ANUJA SHARAD SHAH, Defendant.

ROBYN F. TARNOFSKY, United States Magistrate Judge: Pending before me is Defendant’s application for sanctions on Plaintiff for “continuing non-compliance with ECF 174 and 542” and/or for my reassignment or recusal (ECF 558). This case is referred to me for general pretrial supervision and dispositive motions. (See ECF 59, Order of Ref.) These applications fall within the scope of my reference. Plaintiff is ORDERED to (1) provide Defendant’s counsel with a copy of the documents in the file sent to Dordi’s counsel in a state court litigation; and (2) respond to Defendant's application for sanctions by October 21, 2025. For the reasons set forth below, the application for me to recuse myself is DENIED. As relevant here, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). “The purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.” Green v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 343 F. App’x 712, 713 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)). “In determining whether Section 455(a) requires recusal, the appropriate standard is objective reasonableness — whether an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts, would entertain

significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal.” United States v. Carlton, 534 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1038 (2008). For recusal to be appropriate, the moving party must demonstrate an “objectively reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality.”

In re Int’l Bus. Machs.Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 644 (2d Cir. 1995). The decision whether to recuse is in the first instance within the discretion of the judge whose recusal is sought. “The judge presiding over a case is in the best position to appreciate the implications of those matters alleged in a recusal motion.” In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988). “[T]here exists a strong presumption of a judge’s impartiality which may only be

overcome by adequate proof to the contrary.” Freeman v. Deebs-Elkenaney, No. 22-CV-2435 (LLS) (SN), 2023 WL 4409474, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2023). Defendant’s dissatisfaction with my recommendations and rulings does not qualify as a sufficient factual basis for demonstrating my supposed bias. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), judicial rulings alone “almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality [recusal] motion.” Id. at 555. “Generally, claims of judicial bias must be based on extrajudicial matters, and adverse rulings, without more, will rarely suffice to provide a reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality.” Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009). The parties may challenge any of my rulings with which they disagree by lodging an objection with Judge Caproni; objections rather than requests for recusal are the appropriate response to unfavorable decisions. Defendant is well aware of her ability to object — | reminded the parties of this option multiple times at discovery conferences, and Defendant has in the past sought review of my rulings. DATED: October 20, 2025 New York, NY so Aw ROBYN F. TARNOFSKY United States Magistrate Judge