Viola v. Kirshenbaum & Tambasco, P. C.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Viola v. Kirshenbaum & Tambasco, P. C.

281 A.D.2d 412, 721 N.Y.S.2d 289, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2047

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 5, 2001

StatusPublished

This text of 281 A.D.2d 412 (Viola v. Kirshenbaum & Tambasco, P. C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Viola v. Kirshenbaum & Tambasco, P. C., 281 A.D.2d 412, 721 N.Y.S.2d 289, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2047 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for architectural malpractice, the defendant Kirshenbaum & Tambasco, P. C., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (I. Aronin, J.), dated June 14, 2000, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

[413]*413The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Although the appellant contends that the plaintiffs claim for architectural malpractice is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]), the record is insufficient to determine when the appellant’s professional relationship with the plaintiff ended (see, Methodist Hosp. v Perkins & Will Partnership, 203 AD2d 435).

The appellant’s remaining contention is without merit. Friedmann, J. P., Florio, Luciano and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for architectural malpractice, the defendant Kirshenbaum & Tambasco, P. C., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (I. Aronin, J.), dated June 14, 2000, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

[413]*413The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Although the appellant contends that the plaintiffs claim for architectural malpractice is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]), the record is insufficient to determine when the appellant’s professional relationship with the plaintiff ended (see, Methodist Hosp. v Perkins & Will Partnership, 203 AD2d 435).

The appellant’s remaining contention is without merit. Friedmann, J. P., Florio, Luciano and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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281 A.D.2d 412, 721 N.Y.S.2d 289, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2047, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/viola-v-kirshenbaum-tambasco-p-c-nyappdiv-2001.

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