Vintilla v. Safeco Insurance

417 F. Supp. 2d 922, 2006 WL 481642
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedFebruary 28, 2006
Docket1:05CV666
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 417 F. Supp. 2d 922 (Vintilla v. Safeco Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vintilla v. Safeco Insurance, 417 F. Supp. 2d 922, 2006 WL 481642 (N.D. Ohio 2006).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

BOYKO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs and Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment. Viewing the facts of this case and all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff on Defendant’s Motion, and in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs Motion, this Court finds there is no genuine issue for trial. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and grants Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant Safeco Insurance Company.

*923 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs claim stems from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on December 10, 2000 in Rocky River, Ohio. The undisputed facts, taken from Plaintiffs Complaint, indicate Plaintiff and the other driver involved were both traveling south on Wooster Road in Rocky River. As Plaintiff turned right to enter the parking lot of her church, the passenger side of her vehicle was struck by the front driver’s side of the other vehicle. Officer Bird of the Rocky River Police Department responded to the scene where he determined, after speaking to both Plaintiff and the other driver involved, Plaintiff had caused the accident. Plaintiff received a Summons in Lieu of Warrant ordering her to appear in Rocky River Municipal Court to answer to the charge she violated Section 331.11(a) of the Traffic Code of Rocky River by not making her turn “as close as practicable to the right hand curb or edge of roadway.” 1

On the morning of the trial date, March 1, 2001, Officer Bird dismissed his complaint upon verifying Plaintiffs insurance company (Defendant in this case) had compensated the other driver involved in the accident. 2 Subsequently, Plaintiff received a letter dated August 27, 2001, from Defendant Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois (hereinafter Defendant or Defendant Safeco) advising her that her automobile insurance policy would be non-renewed on October 1, 2001, due to the at-fault accident of December 10, 2001. 3 Plaintiff protested the non-renewal successfully, and was issued a substitute policy. 4

Plaintiff unsuccessfully sued Officer Bird and the City of Rocky River for violating her constitutional right to due process by “arbitrarily usurping] the function of a judicial tribunal and improperly pro-nounc[ing] the plaintiff ‘at fault’ for the accident.” See Vintilla v. City of Rocky River, No. 02-2291 (Def.’s Ex. D at p. 5.) This court determined the fact “[t]hat Officer Bird disagreed with [Plaintiffs] assessment of who caused the accident does not render his investigation, the issuance of a citation to her or the criminal proceeding that was dismissed, a violation of due process.” Id. at 6.

Plaintiff is now before this Court alleging, in her Complaint, Defendant breached their contract of insurance by settling the other driver’s damages claim despite “no suit ha[ving] been filed in court by the opposing party to establish ... that plaintiff was legally responsible for the damages” and, in doing so, Defendant violated her right to due process. (Pl.’s Compl. at *924 ¶¶ 8-11.) Despite procedural irregularities within Plaintiffs prosecution of her case, this Court is considering the merits of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant has also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A fact is not material unless it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An opponent of a motion for summary judgment may not rely on the mere allegations of the complaint, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. When no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party, no genuine issue exists for trial. Id. However, in evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gen. Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 29 F.3d 1095, 1097-98 (6th Cir.1994).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

For purposes of evaluating both parties’ motions for summary judgment, this Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. However it is apparent from the brief and supporting materials that Defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.

A. The Law Establishes that Settling Claims Within Policy Limits is a Right Reserved Solely to the Insurance Company

In Plaintiffs first cause of action, she claims that Defendant “breached the contractual provisions of the insurance policy issued to the [Pjlaintiff, and its duty of good faith in its relationship with the [Pjlaintiff.” (Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 10.) She claims this breach resulted in a violation of Plaintiffs right to due process. (Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff states that both claims were the direct result of Defendant’s paying the other driver’s damages claim arising from the accident of December 10, 2000, “without just or reasonable cause....”

Settled law in Ohio and elsewhere provides that:

where a contract of insurance provides that the insurer may, as it deems appropriate, settle any claim or action brought against its insured, a cause of action alleging a breach of the insurer’s duty of good faith will not lie where the insurer has settled such claim within the monetary limits of the insured’s policy.

Marginian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 18 Ohio St.3d 345, 348, 481 N.E.2d 600 (1985); see also Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949) (liability insurance company which reserves the right to settle, as it deems expedient, any claim against its insured is not liable to the insured for negligence in settling or refusing to settle such a claim) (syllabus by the court); see also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford,, 72 N.J. 63,

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
417 F. Supp. 2d 922, 2006 WL 481642, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vintilla-v-safeco-insurance-ohnd-2006.