Vinson v. Levy

372 So. 2d 694
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 29, 1979
Docket12625
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 372 So. 2d 694 (Vinson v. Levy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vinson v. Levy, 372 So. 2d 694 (La. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinion

372 So.2d 694 (1979)

Joseph D. VINSON and Louis B. Graham, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
David P. LEVY, Mark P. Banjavich, Vincent P. Robin, III, John B. Wilkinson, and Balehi Marine, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 12625.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

May 29, 1979.
Rehearing Denied July 16, 1979.

*695 Ralph R. Miller, Wayne W. Foley, Norco, J. B. Kiefer, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Maurice J. Le Gardeur, Jr., Covington, John B. Wilkinson, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.

Before LANDRY, COVINGTON and PONDER, JJ.

COVINGTON, Judge.

This matter arose on a petition for injunctive relief filed by the plaintiffs, Joseph D. Vinson and Louis B. Graham, to enjoin the defendants, David P. Levy, Mark P. Banjavich, Vincent P. Robin, III, John B. Wilkinson and Balehi Marine, Inc., from violating recorded restrictive covenants by using for commercial purposes Lots 27 and 29 in Oaklawn Subdivision, Section 39, Township 8 South, Range 13 East, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, as well as a 40-foot strip of land adjacent to Lot 27 (lying between Lots 27 and 47) in said section, with the plaintiffs obtaining an ex parte temporary restraining order and having a rule for a preliminary injunction set for hearing.

The scheduled rule was postponed with the parties agreeing to continue in effect the temporary restraining order until a hearing on the merits could be held. Thereafter, the defendants filed an exception of no right of action on the ground that the strip was a dedicated street which was not subject to the restrictive covenants. The plaintiffs then filed a rule for contempt of court for the defendants' violation of the temporary restraining order by storing oil drums and machinery on the subject property in connection with the commercial activities of defendant Balehi Marine, Inc. The defendants responded by filing a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order.

From a judgment granting to the plaintiffs a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from conducting any nonresidential activity on the lots and a portion of the 40-foot strip, ordering removal of commercial equipment from the said property, and finding the defendants in contempt of court for violating the temporary restraining order, the defendants have devolutively appealed. The plaintiffs have answered the appeal, seeking more extensive injunctive relief.

The trial court properly overruled the exception of no right of action. Plaintiffs have an interest in determining whether injunctive relief should be granted to prohibit the defendants from conducting any business or commercial activities on the subject property. See Bamber Contractors, Inc. v. Henderson Brothers, Inc., 345 So.2d 1212 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1977). The trial court also properly overruled the exception of res judicata. The first suit involving these parties was a declaratory judgment action in which the defendants in the instant suit sought to have the restrictive covenants in the deed from Louis B. Graham to Rose Marie Frazier Morrison and Henry Toomer Morrison declared to be inapplicable to Lots *696 27 and 47 and the 40-foot strip of land. No question as to the application of the restriction of the strip was presented in the first suit. The case was decided on motions for summary judgment filed by both parties based on the pertinent language of the restrictive covenants in the Graham-Morrison sale. The instant suit is not founded on the same cause of action as the first suit, and there is no identity of the thing demanded in the two suits. See Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 359 So.2d 154 (La. 1978).

Taking the facts of this case into consideration, we find that we are unable to agree with the conclusion of the court below that there was a dedication of the particular strip of land in question. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The record reflects that Balehi Marine, Inc. is the owner of a certain tract of land, Lots 46 and 47, fronting on Bayou Lacombe in St. Tammany Parish, on which it conducts shipyard operations. Immediately adjacent to the shipyard property is the property in question, Lots 27 and 29 and the 40-foot strip of land, which is owned by David P. Levy, Mark P. Banjavich, Vincent P. Robin, III, and John B. Wilkinson, each of them having acquired an undivided one-fourth interest from Mr. and Mrs. Henry T. Morrison on November 24, 1975, whose deed of acquisition had first contained the restrictive covenants at issue. Joseph D. Vinson owns Lot 31, which is immediately adjacent to the property in question, and Louis B. Graham is the owner of Lot 35, which is adjacent to the Vinson property.

These restrictive covenants were created by one of the plaintiffs, Louis B. Graham, in his deed to Mrs. Rose Marie Frazier, wife of, and Henry Toomer Morrison (Mr. and Mrs. Henry T. Morrison) on October 8, 1968, conveying Lots 27 and 29 of Oaklawn Subdivision in St. Tammany Parish, together with a 40-foot strip adjacent to Lot 27. The restrictive covenants limited the use of the property to "residential purposes only" and required the unanimous consent of the owners of the conveyed property as well as the owners of adjacent lots (Lots 31, 33 and 35) for alteration of the restrictions. The validity and meaning of these restrictive covenants have already been ruled upon by this Court in Levy v. Graham, 347 So.2d 1180 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1977), where we held that the restrictive covenants in the deed transferring the property created a real obligation which was binding on the successors in title of Mr. and Mrs. Henry T. Morrison, so that the property could only be used for residential purposes unless use for other purposes was permitted by unanimous consent of the adjacent landowners. See LSA-C.C. art. 2015; Gremillion v. Rapides Parish School Board, 242 La. 967, 140 So.2d 377 (1962); McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960).

On appeal, the defendants-appellants do not question the injunctive relief granted as to Lots 27 and 29, conceding that the use of those lots is limited to residential purposes. Appellants, however, do strongly contend that the restrictive covenants have no application to the 40-foot strip of land, because at the time of the imposition of the restrictive covenants the vendor, Louis B. Graham, was not the owner of the strip, it having been statutorily dedicated[1] as a public street (Clesi Avenue) by an act of dedication executed by Henry J. Robbert and John C. Dodt on May 24, 1911.

The applicable statute relative to dedication in the instant case is Act 134 of 1896 (now, after several amendments, LSA-R.S. 33:5051), which provides:

"Whenever the owner of any real estate desires to lay off the same into squares or lots with streets or alleys between the squares or lots and with the intention of selling or offering for sale any of the squares or lots, he shall, before selling any square or lot or any portion of same, *697

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Related

Estate of Graham v. Levy
636 So. 2d 287 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1994)
Bickham v. Airlie Corp.
468 So. 2d 658 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1985)
Nailor v. International Harvester Co.
430 So. 2d 784 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1983)
Vinson v. Levy
375 So. 2d 942 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1979)

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372 So. 2d 694, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vinson-v-levy-lactapp-1979.