Vinson Johnson v. David Shinn
This text of Vinson Johnson v. David Shinn (Vinson Johnson v. David Shinn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 21 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VINSON TREMAYNE JOHNSON, No. 21-15954
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00080-GMS-JZB
v. MEMORANDUM* DAVID SHINN, Director, Director of the A.D.O.C.R.R. at Central Office; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2021**
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Vinson Tremayne Johnson, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from
the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
process claims arising from a disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014). We reverse and remand.
The district court dismissed Johnson’s due process claims on the ground that
the sanctions imposed on Johnson through the disciplinary proceeding finding him
guilty of arson did not implicate Johnson’s constitutionally protected interests.
However, Johnson has a protected property interest in the $500 penalty levied
against him. See Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting
that an inmate’s account funds are a protected property interest). Moreover,
Johnson alleged that the arson conviction resulted in a twelve-month term of
maximum-security custody, involving solitary confinement for over twenty-three
hours each day with almost no interpersonal contact and denial of most privileges
afforded inmates in the general population. See Brown v. Or. Dep’t. of Corr., 751
F.3d 983, 987-99 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding a protected liberty interest existed
where two-year term of detention in solitary confinement was imposed on a
prisoner as a sanction for misconduct). Liberally construed, these allegations are
sufficient to warrant ordering defendants to file an answer. See Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “where the petitioner is pro se,
particularly in civil rights cases, [courts should] construe the pleadings liberally
and [ ] afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-69
(1974) (prisoner must be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary
2 21-15954 evidence in his defense during disciplinary proceedings, unless limited exceptions
apply).
Johnson’s motions for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 4),
injunctive relief pending appeal (Docket Entry No. 5), and to expedite (Docket
Entry Nos. 14 and 15) are denied as moot.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
3 21-15954
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