Vinkov v. Superior Court CA4/2
Opinion
Filed 8/28/26 Vinkov v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
SERGEI VINKOV, Petitioner, E089131 v. (Super.Ct.No. CVRI2604778)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
CHRISTI BARRETT et al., Real Parties in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge. Petition granted.
Sergei Vinkov, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Aaron M. Rubin, Donald S. Field, and Sarah Y. Shyy, for Real Parties in Interest, Christi Barrett, Hemet Unified School District, and the Governing Board of the Hemet Unified School District.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, and Jonathan A. Mango, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest, Art Tinoco.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner challenges the ballot title and ballot question for Measure I, which is to be placed on the ballot for the November 3, 2026 election. His petition for writ of mandate in the superior court was denied, and he now petitions this court for an order overturning the denial. Among other things1, petitioner contends that both the current ballot title, “‘Hemet Unified School District No-Tax-Rate-Increase School Repair, Improvement, Health and Safety Measure’” and the ballot question are impermissibly argumentative and misleading. This court invited respondent and real parties in interest to respond on an expedited time schedule and issued a Palma notice (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180) advising the parties that this court was considering issuing a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance. We also stayed the submission of the ballot title and question to the printer until further order of this court. Real parties in interest filed an opposition, and petitioner filed a reply. Having considered the parties’ positions, we agree with petitioner that the use of the term “no-
1 Petitioner raises several other claims which we find to lack merit. The petition is summarily denied as to those claims.
tax-rate-increase,” in the ballot title and question is impermissibly misleading, and therefore we issue a peremptory writ in the first instance.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 28, 2026, the governing board of the Hemet Unified School District (the District) adopted resolution No. 4183 to place on the ballot a question of whether the District should issue and sell bonds for the purpose of raising money. The proposed measure, designated as “Measure I,” would add to the declining debt service payments from Measure X, so that the combined tax rate as projected for old and new bonds together does not exceed the current tax rate.
Citing Elections Code2 sections 9051, 9509, 13119, and 13314, petitioner sought a writ of mandate in superior court, alleging, as relevant here: (1) the term “no-tax-rate- increase” is argumentative and misleading.
On August 19, 2026, respondent court issued a tentative ruling indicating it would grant petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate in part, finding the term “‘no-tax-rate- increase’” misleading. The tentative also indicated the language was not in compliance with Education Code section 15122, which requires “‘that the maximum rate of interest’” of the bond be identified in the ballot summary, not the “‘expected tax rate.’” On August 24, 2026, after oral argument, respondent court denied the petition in its entirety and signed a statement of decision finding petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing his claims for relief.
2 All further statutory citations are to the Elections Code unless otherwise noted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review questions of statutory interpretation governing the ballot language de novo, and “independently examine the question of whether the ballot title ‘substantially complies’ with [the standard that the measure not be false, misleading, or partial].” (See Osborne v. Logan (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1310; McDonough v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1174 (McDonough).) The drafters of ballot language are afforded “‘considerable latitude’” in composing the ballot title, and “we must presume its language to be accurate.” (McDonough, supra, at p. 1174.) “[I]f reasonable minds may differ as to the sufficiency of the title, the title should be held to be sufficient.” (Epperson v. Jordan (1938) 12 Cal.2d 61, 66.)
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the District argues petitioner is not entitled to relief because the circumstances are not exceptional and there is not unusual urgency requiring writ relief. However, the law is clear that challenges to the sufficiency and impartiality of ballot materials must be raised before an election. (Denny v. Arntz (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 914, 921 (Denny); Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 123.) Here, petitioner has timely raised this challenge and as such, this court elects to reach the merits. (§ 9509, subd. (b)(1).)
Section 13119, subdivision (c) states, “The statement of the measure shall be a true and impartial synopsis of the purpose of the proposed measure, and shall be in language that is neither argumentative nor likely to create prejudice for or against the measure. (§
13119, subd. (c).) Section 9509, subdivision (b)(2) precludes the issuance of a writ of mandate unless there is “clear and convincing proof that the material in question is false, misleading, or inconsistent with this chapter, and that issuance of the writ or injunction will not substantially interfere with the printing or distribution of official election materials as provided by law.” (§ 9509, subd. (b)(2).)
Here, petitioner argues there is clear and convincing proof that the term “no-tax-
rate-increase” is partial, argumentative, and misleading in violation of section 13119, subdivision (c), thus warranting relief pursuant to section 9509 subdivision (b)(2). The term “‘no-tax-rate-increase’” as used in the title and question suggests to the voter that the funding needed to repair or improve schools will not result in increased taxes or an increased tax rate. In their response, the District seemingly acknowledges the term “no- tax-rate-increase” is included in the title and question to assuage voter concerns that the funding needed to repair or improve schools will result in increased taxes. Specifically, the District argues, “Without this language, voters would likely assume that a new bond measure would increase the aggregate tax rate by adding a new rate on top of the rate being paid for outstanding bonds.”
However, the District does not acknowledge the average voter may be equally misled or influenced in favor of Measure I when reading “‘no-tax-rate-increase’” in the title and question, by erroneously concluding this term to definitively mean that their tax rate will not go up, nor be extended beyond what voters have previously approved. As acknowledged by the District, Measure I does not guarantee the tax rate will not increase,
it is simply the hoped for outcome “based on the District’s projections.” In briefing before the superior court, the District reiterated this point writing, “Measure I makes no promises … ‘the dollar amount of taxes’ or ‘tax burden will not increase.’” The District defended their position in the superior court explaining, “The full text explains the District intends to structure the bonds so the combined rate will not exceed the current rate based on the District’s projections, and explains the District’s assumptions underlying that plan.”
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