Vinicor v. Brown

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Vinicor v. Brown

158 A.D.2d 349, 551 N.Y.S.2d 827, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1366

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 13, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 158 A.D.2d 349 (Vinicor v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Vinicor v. Brown, 158 A.D.2d 349, 551 N.Y.S.2d 827, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1366 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

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Opinion

Plaintiffs sued their alleged subtenant and the building’s corporate owner and president for damages for conversion of loft fixtures. Contrary to plaintiffs’ allegations, summary judgment was properly granted as they are not entitled to protection under the Loft Law because the loft has not been their primary residence since 1981 (Multiple Dwelling Law § 286 [6]; New York City Loft Board Regulations [Relating to Subletting, Subdivision, & Assignment] §B [4]; see Pendias v 3 E. 69th St. Assocs., 119 AD2d 467 [1st Dept 1986]). Nor have plaintiffs established the existence of material triable issues of fact as to whether the owner’s president acted in other than his [350]*350corporate capacity to preclude the grant of summary judgment (Capelin Assocs. v Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 NY2d 338 [1974]). Concur—Rosenberger, J.P., Asch, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ.

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Plaintiffs sued their alleged subtenant and the building’s corporate owner and president for damages for conversion of loft fixtures. Contrary to plaintiffs’ allegations, summary judgment was properly granted as they are not entitled to protection under the Loft Law because the loft has not been their primary residence since 1981 (Multiple Dwelling Law § 286 [6]; New York City Loft Board Regulations [Relating to Subletting, Subdivision, & Assignment] §B [4]; see Pendias v 3 E. 69th St. Assocs., 119 AD2d 467 [1st Dept 1986]). Nor have plaintiffs established the existence of material triable issues of fact as to whether the owner’s president acted in other than his [350]*350corporate capacity to preclude the grant of summary judgment (Capelin Assocs. v Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 NY2d 338 [1974]). Concur—Rosenberger, J.P., Asch, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

158 A.D.2d 349, 551 N.Y.S.2d 827, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1366, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vinicor-v-brown-nyappdiv-1990.

Opinion

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