Vinh Nguyen v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided April 17, 2024·No. SF-4324-19-0603-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

VINH K. NGUYEN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-4324-19-0603-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: April 17, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Vinh K. Nguyen , San Jose, California, pro se.

Vanessa Lichtenberger , Esquire, San Francisco, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). On petition for review, the appellant alleges the following: (1) the agency discriminated against him as a result of his military service; (2) the agency engaged in disability discrimination; (3) the administrative judge exhibited bias; and (4) he was 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

prejudiced by the failure of two witnesses to appear at the hearing. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 6 at 3. 2 Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). The appellant alleges that the agency discriminated against him as a result of his prior military service. PFR File, Tab 6 at 3. To this end, he seemingly reasserts that his supervisor treated other employees more favorably. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. These assertions, which amount to mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s explained factual findings and legal conclusions therefrom, do not provide a basis to disturb the initial decision. See Riggsbee v. Office of Personnel Management, 111 M.S.P.R. 129, ¶ 11 (2009). The appellant asserts that he “was discriminated [against] based on [his] disability and veteran status.” PFR File, Tab 6 at 3. He also states that his supervisor “disregard[ed his] medical needs and [his] mental stage [sic].” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. To the extent the appellant alleges that his status as a disabled

2 The appellant’s petition for review was untimely filed on February 12, 2020, 5 days after the filing deadline. PFR File, Tab 1. We do not reach the issue of the timeliness of the appellant’s petition for review, however, because the appellant’s petition does not meet the Board’s criteria for review. 3

veteran was a motivating factor in the agency’s decision to remove him during his probationary period, his allegation is unavailing insofar as he fails to identify any evidence in the record to support his allegation. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 11-23; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)(2) (stating that a petitioner who alleges that the administrative judge made erroneous findings of material fact must explain why the challenged factual determination is incorrect and identify specific evidence in the record that demonstrates the error). To the extent he alleges disability discrimination unrelated to his status as a disabled veteran, his allegation is necessarily unavailing for purposes of corrective action under USERRA. See McGuffin v. Social Security Administration, 942 F.3d 1099, 1107-08 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that USERRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of military service). Thus, a different outcome is not warranted. The appellant states that the administrative judge “did not listen to the testimony carefully” and he avers that he did not receive “a fair trial.” 3 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 6 at 3. He also states that he was “the only male in the room” during the hearing. PFR File, Tab 6 at 3. We construe these statements as claims that the administrative judge exhibited bias. The Board has consistently held that, in making a claim of bias against an administrative judge, the appellant must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies all administrative adjudicators. Washington v. Department of the Interior , 81 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 7 (1999) (citing In re King, 1 M.S.P.R. 146, 151 (1979)). This presumption can be overcome only by a substantial showing of personal bias. Williams v. U.S. Postal Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 12 (2000). An administrative judge’s conduct during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if the administrative judge’s comments or actions

3 To this end, the appellant ostensibly asserts that the Board should provide him with the assistance of counsel so that he can have a “fair” hearing. PFR File, Tab 6 at 3. Insofar as there is no law, rule, or regulation requiring the Board to appoint counsel to represent a party, this assertion is unavailing. See Raymond v. Department of the Army, 102 M.S.P.R. 665, ¶ 4 n.1 (2006). 4

indicate a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible. Simpkins v. Office of Personnel Management, 113 M.S.P.R. 411, ¶ 5 (2010). Here, the record is devoid of any indication of personal bias; thus, the appellant’s unsubstantiated assertions are insufficient to rebut the presumption of the administrative judge’s honesty and integrity. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 6 at 3; see Washington, 81 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 7. Last, the appellant asserts that he was prejudiced because two witnesses “decide[d] not to show up to the court.” PFR File, Tab 6 at 3. Here, the record reflects that the agency sought, and the administrative judge approved, the testimony of these two witnesses; however, they did not appear at the hearing. IAF, Tab 14 at 8-9, Tab 15 at 1, Tab 19 at 1. To the extent the appellant argues that he was deprived of his right to question these witnesses as a result of their nonappearance, his argument is necessarily unavailing insofar as the appellant neither requested nor subpoenaed the subject witnesses. IAF, Tab 15 at 1; see Lohr v. Department of the Air Force, 24 M.S.P.R. 383, 386 (1984).

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