Vineyard Investigations v. E. & J. Gallo Winery

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 12, 2024·No. 1:19-cv-01482·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5

6 VINEYARD INVESTIGATIONS, Case No. 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO

7 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING THE PARTIES’ NOTICE AND JOINT REQUEST TO 8 v. SEAL DOCUMENTS

9 E. & J. GALLO WINERY, (Doc. 118)

10 Defendant. . 11 _____________________________________/

12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 14 On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff Vineyard Investigations (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant E. & J. Gallo 15 (“Defendant”) filed a “Notice of Joint Request to Seal Documents” (the “Notice”) and submitted to 16 the Court a “Joint Request to Seal Documents,” pursuant to E.D. Cal. Local Rule 141, seeking to 17 seal their joint statement, appendix, and exhibits relating to Plaintiff’s “Motion re Discovery 18 Dispute” (the “Joint Request”). (Doc. 118.) The Court has reviewed the Notice and Joint Request, 19 and the documents sought to be sealed, and has determined that the Notice and Joint Request lack 20 the requisite good cause and cannot be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES 21 the Notice and Joint Request, with leave re-file a request that corrects the deficiencies set forth in 22 this order. 24 All documents filed with the court are presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. 25 v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). This is because “the courts of this country 26 recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 27 records and documents.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 28 2016) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of 1 overcoming the strong public access presumption. Id. 2 Two standards generally govern requests to seal documents: the “compelling reasons” 3 standard for documents directly related to the underlying causes of action, such as documents 4 attached to summary judgment motions, and the lesser “good cause” standard for documents only 5 tangentially related to the underlying causes of action, such as those offered in support of non- 6 dispositive, discovery type motions: 7 [J]udicial records attached to dispositive motions [are treated] differently from records attached to non-dispositive motions. Those who seek to maintain the 8 secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must meet the high threshold 9 of showing that “compelling reasons” support secrecy. A “good cause” showing under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed records attached to non-dispositive 10 motions. 11 Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see 12 also Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1098; Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 677 (9th 13 Cir. 2009). 14 The good cause standard, applicable here, “comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the 15 issuance of protective orders in the discovery process.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, LLC, 809 F.3d at 1097. 16 Rule 26(c) states that the court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 17 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see 18 also Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (stating that the good cause standard under Rule 26(c) asks “whether 19 ‘good cause’ exists to protect the information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the 20 needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality.”). 21 As the Ninth Circuit has stated, a blanket protective order does not by itself demonstrate 22 “good cause” for sealing specific information and documents. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 23 (“Although the magistrate judge expressly approved and entered the protective order, the order 24 contained no good cause findings as to specific documents that would justify reliance by the United 25 States....”); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] party 26 seeking the protection of the court via a blanket protective order typically does not make the ‘good 27 cause’ showing required by Rule 26(c) with respect to any particular document.”); San Jose Mercury 28 News, Inc., 187 F.3d at 1103; Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1 1992) (“Further, because the protective order was a stipulated blanket order, International never had 2 to make a ‘good cause’ showing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) of the need for protection of the 3 deposition transcripts in the first place. Nor does it allege specific prejudice or harm now. Broad 4 allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy 5 the Rule 26(c) test.”) (citations omitted); see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 6 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Even if the parties agree that a protective order should be entered, they 7 still have the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order. It is equally 8 apparent that the obverse also is true, i.e., if good cause is not shown, the discovery materials in 9 question should not receive judicial protection.”) (citations omitted). 11 The parties seek to seal the following documents relating to Plaintiff’s “Motion re Discovery 12 Dispute” (Doc. 117): (1) the parties’ “Joint Statement re: Discovery Disagreement” pursuant to E.D. 13 Cal. L.R. 251(c) (the “Joint Statement”); (2) the “Appendix” to the Joint Statement; (3) Exhibits 1– 14 2 and 5–11 to the Declaration of Corey Johanningmeier in support of the Joint Statement; and (4) 15 Exhibits D, D-1-D-4, F, and H–J to the Declaration of Matthew Chung in support of Joint Statement. 16 The parties’ sole stated justification for sealing these documents is that they are either designated as 17 “Confidential”1 or “Trade Secret Model and Algorithm Information”2 or contain material so 18 designated under the parties’ stipulated protective order. (See Doc. 118 at 2. See also Docs. 117-1, 19 117-4.) 20 As set forth above, a blanket protective order does not establish good cause to file documents 21 under seal. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. This Court did not make findings of good cause as to any 22 specific document in the litigation, see id. at 1133, and the parties have not explained why the 23

24 1 “Confidential” information is defined in the parties’ stipulated protective order as “information that qualifies for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), including information that a Producing Party, including any 25 Party to this action and any Non-Party producing information or material voluntarily or pursuant to a subpoena or a court order, considers in good faith to constitute or contain confidential technical, sales, marketing, financial, or other 26 commercially sensitive information, whether embodied in physical objects, documents, or the factual knowledge of persons, and which has been so designated by the Producing Party.” (Doc.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Vineyard Investigations v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

Vineyard Investigations v. E. & J. Gallo Winery (Vineyard Investigations v. E. & J. Gallo Winery) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Pintos v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS'N
605 F.3d 665 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Cotto Aponte
30 F.3d 4 (First Circuit, 1994)
Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC
809 F.3d 1092 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Ervine v. Warden, San Quentin State Prison
214 F. Supp. 3d 917 (E.D. California, 2016)