Vindiola v. San Diego County Sheriff's Department

District Court, S.D. California·Decided August 11, 2025·No. 3:24-cv-02070·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GINO VINDIOLA, Case No.: 3:24-cv-2070-CAB-MSB CDCR #BR9953, 12 ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANT Plaintiff, 13 SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S vs. DEP’T PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 14 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b) AND

15 SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DIRECTING USMS TO EFFECT 16 DEPARTMENT; ROMO, Corporal; SERVICE OF FIRST AMENDED 17 GONZALEZ, Deputy COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS ON 18 Defendants. DEFENDANTS ROMO AND GONZALEZ PURSUANT TO 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915(d) & FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3) 20 21 22 I. INTRODUCTION 23 Plaintiff Gino Vindiola (“Plaintiff” or “Vindiola”) is proceeding pro se with a civil 24 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 7, 2024, the Court granted Vindiola 25 leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed the original complaint for failure to state a 26 claim, and granted him leave to file an amended complaint. [Doc. No. 3.] After an 27 extension of time, Vindiola filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 5, 2025. 28 [Doc. No. 7.] In it, Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were violated when Defendants 1 delayed providing him with medical care after he suffered a heart attack. [See id.] For the 2 reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department 3 as a defendant and directs U.S. Marshal service of the FAC as to Defendants Romo and 4 Gonzalez. 5 II. SCREENING 6 A. Standards 7 As with his original complaint, the Court must screen Vindiola’s FAC and sua sponte 8 dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages 9 from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). “The 10 standard for determining whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can 11 be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th 13 Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter . . 14 . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 15 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are not 16 required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 17 conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. Id. The “mere possibility of 18 misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short 19 of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 20 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both (1) deprivation 21 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 22 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 23 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 24 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 25 In his FAC, Vindiola alleges that on February 20, 2022, while he was detained at 26 George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”), he was involved in a “mutual combat 27 incident.” [Doc. No. 7 at 3.] After the incident, Vindiola received no medical attention. 28 Id. Instead, he was placed in a “holding cell” for several hours. [Id.] 1 While in the holding cell, Vindiola began having severe chest pains. He told 2 Deputies Romo and Gonzalez about his symptoms and asked for medical attention, but 3 Romo and Gonzalez refused to take him to “medical.” [Id.] The chest pain continued and 4 Vindiola also began “sweating profusely,” and having “difficulty time with [his] 5 breathing.” [Id.] Plaintiff persisted in asking Romo and Gonzalez for help, explaining that 6 he was short of breath and experiencing extreme chest pain. [Id. at 6.] He also pressed the 7 “emergency assistance” button several times, but Romo and Gonzalez refused to summon 8 medical attention and told Vindiola to “shut up and stop being a little bitch.” [Id.] 9 According to Plaintiff, he remained in the cell “in [the] fetal position, sweating 10 profusely, in agonizing pain” for “hours” until the “next shift came on” and other staffers 11 called 911. [Id.] Vindiola was taken to the hospital where he learned he had suffered a 12 heart attack. [Id.] He received treatment, including “stents,” and was later released. One 13 doctor told Plaintiff that had he been “delayed further from getting to the hospital, [he] 14 would have certainly died.” [Id. at 4.] Vindiola claims that he now suffers from post- 15 traumatic stress syndrome as a result of the alleged incident. [Id.] 16 C. Analysis 17 Plaintiff alleges Defendants San Diego County Sheriff’s Department (“SDCSD”), 18 Romo and Gonzalez violated his constitutional right to adequate medical care. [Id. at 1– 19 2.] 20 As discussed in this Court’s previous order, because he was a pretrial detainee at the 21 time of the incident, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides the 22 legal basis for Vindiola’s claims of inadequate medical care. These claims are evaluated 23 under the “objective deliberate indifference standard,” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 24 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018), which requires that detainees show: 25 (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined [including a decision with respect to 26 medical treatment]; 27 (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious 28 1 harm;

2 (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that 3 risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the 4 defendant’s conduct obvious; and 5 (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 6

7 Id. at 1125; see also Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 669 (9th Cir. 2021). 8 1. San Diego County Sheriff’s Department 9 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the SDCSD for the same reason discussed 10 in this Court’s previous dismissal order. City or county governments, including 11 departments within them such as the sheriff’s department, cannot be held liable under 12 section 1983 for the acts of an employee. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New 13 York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, (1978). And as noted in the Court’s prior dismissal order, to state 14 a § 1983 claim against a government entity like the SDCSD, a plaintiff must identify a 15 custom, policy, or practice and plausibly allege a “direct causal link between a municipal 16 policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Collins v. County of Harker 17 Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992). There is no vicarious liability under § 1983. Iqbal, 18 556 U.S. at 676.

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