Vincent Gallo v. United States

Eighth Circuit

Vincent Gallo v. United States

461 F.2d 1008, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8944

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedJune 16, 1972

Docket72-1018

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 461 F.2d 1008 (Vincent Gallo v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Vincent Gallo v. United States, 461 F.2d 1008, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8944 (8th Cir. 1972).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Vincent Gallo appeals from the denial of a motion to vacate his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the denial of a hearing thereon. His primary allegation is that, although he pleaded guilty to all counts upon which he was convicted, his guilt had not been properly adjudicated, and therefore a sentence to imprisonment could not be imposed. The transcript of Gallo’s pleas and sentencing clearly shows that his guilty pleas were entered and accepted in accordance with Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the record demonstrates the voluntariness of his pleas, no evidentiary hearing was required. See Bongiorno v. United States, 424 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1970). Furthermore, because the guilty pleas were actually Gallo’s consent that a judgment be entered without trial, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the imposition of a sentence to imprisonment was proper.

Gallo also contends that he was improperly denied access to his pre-sentence report. Rule 32(c) (2), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, vests the court with discretion to disclose all or part of the material contained in the report. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Gallo or his retained counsel requested access to the report, and it cannot be said that the sentencing judge abused this discretion.

We accordingly find these issues to be without merit, and we affirm the denial of the § 2255 motion without an eviden-tiary hearing.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

Vincent Gallo appeals from the denial of a motion to vacate his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the denial of a hearing thereon. His primary allegation is that, although he pleaded guilty to all counts upon which he was convicted, his guilt had not been properly adjudicated, and therefore a sentence to imprisonment could not be imposed. The transcript of Gallo’s pleas and sentencing clearly shows that his guilty pleas were entered and accepted in accordance with Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the record demonstrates the voluntariness of his pleas, no evidentiary hearing was required. See Bongiorno v. United States, 424 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1970). Furthermore, because the guilty pleas were actually Gallo’s consent that a judgment be entered without trial, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the imposition of a sentence to imprisonment was proper.

Gallo also contends that he was improperly denied access to his pre-sentence report. Rule 32(c) (2), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, vests the court with discretion to disclose all or part of the material contained in the report. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Gallo or his retained counsel requested access to the report, and it cannot be said that the sentencing judge abused this discretion.

We accordingly find these issues to be without merit, and we affirm the denial of the § 2255 motion without an eviden-tiary hearing.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

461 F.2d 1008, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8944, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vincent-gallo-v-united-states-ca8-1972.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack