Vincent Brown v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 23, 2025
• Docket: 3D2025-1276
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 23, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-1276 Lower Tribunal No. F96-12195 ________________

Vincent Brown, Petitioner,

vs.

State of Florida, Respondent.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.

Vincent Brown, in proper person.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, for petitioner.

Before SCALES, C.J., and EMAS and GOODEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Vincent Brown files this petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging he

has done so to correct a “manifest injustice” related to his convictions and

life sentences for three counts of armed robbery in circuit court case number

F96-12195. We affirmed the judgments and sentences in 2001. Brown v.

State, 798 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

Since that time, Brown acknowledges that he “has engaged in a litany

of pro se postconviction pleadings to the point of being pro se banned in the

trial court.” Indeed, the trial court, in a July 2016 order, prohibited Brown

from proceeding pro se in circuit court case number F96-12195.

Upon our review, we determine that Brown filed the instant original

proceeding in a rather transparent attempt to circumvent the trial court’s bar

order, which requires any pleading or other document filed in the trial court

be reviewed and signed by a Florida Bar member in good standing.

Instead of filing an original proceeding with this court seeking habeas

corpus relief, Brown is instead required to seek relief in the first instance by

way of a motion filed in the trial court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.850 or 3.800. See Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Fla.

2004) (“‘The remedy of habeas corpus is not available as a substitute for

post-conviction relief under rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.’

Nor can habeas corpus be used as a means to seek a second appeal or to

2 litigate issues that could have been or were raised in a motion under rule

3.850.”) (quoting Leichtman v. Singletary, 674 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla. 4th DCA

1996)); Brown v. State, 316 So. 3d 743, 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“[A] petition

for writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for a postconviction motion under

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) or 3.850”) (quoting Lindo v.

State, 981 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)).

We do not reach the merits of any claim raised in the instant petition,

nor offer any opinion whether said claims are procedurally barred. Instead,

we dismiss the instant petition without prejudice to the filing of a proper and

timely motion in the trial court which, consistent with the trial court’s 2016

order barring Brown from proceeding pro se, requires that any such motion

be reviewed and signed by a Florida Bar member in good standing.

Petition dismissed.