No. 95-006 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1995
DARLENE M. VINCELETTE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. and BILLINGS SHERATON HOTEL, Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Randy S. Laedeke, Laedeke Law Office, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Calvin J. Stacey, Stacey & Walen, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 27, 1995
Decided: October 12, 1995 Filed: Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Appellant brought suit against respondents in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, seeking to recover for
injuries sustained when she fell in the Billings Sheraton Hotel.
At the close of discovery, respondents moved for summary judgment, claiming no material issues of fact remained in dispute, and therefore they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law. After the motion was briefed by both parties, the District Court entered summary judgment in respondents' favor. Appellant appeals and we reverse.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court
erred in granting summary judgment.
On March 20, 1989, appellant fell while entering the Billings
Sheraton Hotel (the Hotel). According to her complaint, she was in
the foyer of the parking lot entrance, between the inner and outer sets of doors. She approached the inner doors and then stepped
backwards to allow them to be opened out towards her. As she stepped back, she fell and injured her back. Appellant believes she fell because she had caught the heel of her high-heeled shoe in
a small hole in the carpet and could not maintain her balance as
she stepped back. She therefore alleges her fall was caused by either a defect in the carpet or negligent maintenance of the
carpet.
The Hotel generally denied the allegations, and both sides
conducted discovery. At the end of discovery, respondents moved
for summary judgment, which was granted by the District Court.
2 Did the District Court err in granting respondents' motion for
summary judgment?
Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Brown v. Demaree (1995), __ Mont. __, _, 52 St.Rep. 819, 820; White v. Murdock
(1994), 265 Mont. 386, 389, 877 P.2d 474, 476. In summary judgment cases, this Court's standard of review is identical to the trial
court's, and we will utilize the same criteria employed by the
trial court to determine whether summary judgment should have been
granted. Brown, 52 St.Rep. at 820; Minnie v. City of Roundup
(1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431, 849 P.2d 212, 214.
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine factual issues. If the moving
party demonstrates such an absence, then the burden shifts to the
non-moving party, who must show that a genuine issue of fact does
exist. First Security Bank of Bozeman v. Jones (1990), 243 Mont. 301, 303, 794 P.2d 679, 681. All inferences which may be
reasonably drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party. Simmons v. Jenkins (1988), 230 Mont. 429, 432,
750 P.2d 1067, 1069; Reaves v. Reinhold (1980), 189 Mont. 284, 287,
615 P.2d 896, 898.
A cause of action in negligence consists of four elements: (1) duty; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages.
Brown, 52 St.Rep. at 820, citation omitted. Negligence cases are
generally not susceptible to summary judgment. Brown, 52 St.Rep.
3 at 820; See also Dillard v. Doe (1992), 251 Mont. 379, 382, 824 P.2d 1016, 1018-19; Brohman v. State (1988), 230 Mont. 198, 201, 749 P.2d 67, 69. In particular, negligence cases where the
question of causation is in dispute are rarely amenable to summary
judgment because "it is axiomatic that questions of causation are
for the finder of fact to decide." Bossard v. Johnson (19941, 265
Mont. 272, 281, 876 P.2d 627, 632 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
In the case at bar, appellant was at the Hotel as a guest,
and, as such the Hotel owed to her a duty of due care. " [Tlhe
owner of a premises has a duty to use ordinary care in maintaining
his premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn of any
hidden or lurking dangers." Brown -, 52 St.Rep. at 820 (citations
omitted). Under this standard, the element of duty is clear and
the parties do not contest it. Likewise, the parties do not
contest that appellant fell while at the Hotel. But respondents
contend the Hotel's carpet was not the cause of her fall. However,
"when a duty is imposed upon the defendant and the plaintiff's
allegations, if proven, would support a finding of a breach of the
duty, summary judgment is improper." Cereck v. Albertson's Inc.
(1991), 195 Mont. 409, 412, 637 P.2d 509, 511, citing Rennick v.
Hoover (19801, 186 Mont. 167, 606 P.2d 1079. "Liability should not
be adjudicated upon a motion for summary judgment where factual
issues concerning negligence and causation are presented."
Dillard, 824 P.2d at 1018, citing Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County
(1971), 158 Mont. 369, 377, 492 P.2d 926, 931. Because causation is the issue in dispute, this case is particularly ill-suited for summary judgment.
Respondents cite several cases where this Court has found
summary judgment to be appropriate. See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health Services Corp. and St. James Community Hospital, Inc. (1994), 265 Mont. 205, 075 P.2d 352; Fauerso v. Maronick Const. Co (1983), 203 Mont. 106, 661 P.2d 20;
and Krone v. McCann (1982), 196 Mont. 260, 638 P.2d 397. However,
in both Cooper and Fauerso the issue was duty, not causation, and
they are therefore distinguishable. Causation was the issue in Krone, but that case is also distinguishable.
The incident in Krone took place in a rural open field, where
the plaintiff acknowledged she had seen common debris such as logs
and mounds of dirt lying around before she fell. Krone, 638 P.2d
at 400. The court therefore agreed that the danger had been open
and obvious. The incident in this case took place in a hotel, and appellant contends her fall was caused by a small hole in the
carpeting--a hole that was not obvious and that could not
reasonably have been anticipated.
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No. 95-006 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1995
DARLENE M. VINCELETTE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. and BILLINGS SHERATON HOTEL, Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Randy S. Laedeke, Laedeke Law Office, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Calvin J. Stacey, Stacey & Walen, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 27, 1995
Decided: October 12, 1995 Filed: Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Appellant brought suit against respondents in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, seeking to recover for
injuries sustained when she fell in the Billings Sheraton Hotel.
At the close of discovery, respondents moved for summary judgment, claiming no material issues of fact remained in dispute, and therefore they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law. After the motion was briefed by both parties, the District Court entered summary judgment in respondents' favor. Appellant appeals and we reverse.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court
erred in granting summary judgment.
On March 20, 1989, appellant fell while entering the Billings
Sheraton Hotel (the Hotel). According to her complaint, she was in
the foyer of the parking lot entrance, between the inner and outer sets of doors. She approached the inner doors and then stepped
backwards to allow them to be opened out towards her. As she stepped back, she fell and injured her back. Appellant believes she fell because she had caught the heel of her high-heeled shoe in
a small hole in the carpet and could not maintain her balance as
she stepped back. She therefore alleges her fall was caused by either a defect in the carpet or negligent maintenance of the
carpet.
The Hotel generally denied the allegations, and both sides
conducted discovery. At the end of discovery, respondents moved
for summary judgment, which was granted by the District Court.
2 Did the District Court err in granting respondents' motion for
summary judgment?
Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Brown v. Demaree (1995), __ Mont. __, _, 52 St.Rep. 819, 820; White v. Murdock
(1994), 265 Mont. 386, 389, 877 P.2d 474, 476. In summary judgment cases, this Court's standard of review is identical to the trial
court's, and we will utilize the same criteria employed by the
trial court to determine whether summary judgment should have been
granted. Brown, 52 St.Rep. at 820; Minnie v. City of Roundup
(1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431, 849 P.2d 212, 214.
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine factual issues. If the moving
party demonstrates such an absence, then the burden shifts to the
non-moving party, who must show that a genuine issue of fact does
exist. First Security Bank of Bozeman v. Jones (1990), 243 Mont. 301, 303, 794 P.2d 679, 681. All inferences which may be
reasonably drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party. Simmons v. Jenkins (1988), 230 Mont. 429, 432,
750 P.2d 1067, 1069; Reaves v. Reinhold (1980), 189 Mont. 284, 287,
615 P.2d 896, 898.
A cause of action in negligence consists of four elements: (1) duty; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages.
Brown, 52 St.Rep. at 820, citation omitted. Negligence cases are
generally not susceptible to summary judgment. Brown, 52 St.Rep.
3 at 820; See also Dillard v. Doe (1992), 251 Mont. 379, 382, 824 P.2d 1016, 1018-19; Brohman v. State (1988), 230 Mont. 198, 201, 749 P.2d 67, 69. In particular, negligence cases where the
question of causation is in dispute are rarely amenable to summary
judgment because "it is axiomatic that questions of causation are
for the finder of fact to decide." Bossard v. Johnson (19941, 265
Mont. 272, 281, 876 P.2d 627, 632 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
In the case at bar, appellant was at the Hotel as a guest,
and, as such the Hotel owed to her a duty of due care. " [Tlhe
owner of a premises has a duty to use ordinary care in maintaining
his premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn of any
hidden or lurking dangers." Brown -, 52 St.Rep. at 820 (citations
omitted). Under this standard, the element of duty is clear and
the parties do not contest it. Likewise, the parties do not
contest that appellant fell while at the Hotel. But respondents
contend the Hotel's carpet was not the cause of her fall. However,
"when a duty is imposed upon the defendant and the plaintiff's
allegations, if proven, would support a finding of a breach of the
duty, summary judgment is improper." Cereck v. Albertson's Inc.
(1991), 195 Mont. 409, 412, 637 P.2d 509, 511, citing Rennick v.
Hoover (19801, 186 Mont. 167, 606 P.2d 1079. "Liability should not
be adjudicated upon a motion for summary judgment where factual
issues concerning negligence and causation are presented."
Dillard, 824 P.2d at 1018, citing Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County
(1971), 158 Mont. 369, 377, 492 P.2d 926, 931. Because causation is the issue in dispute, this case is particularly ill-suited for summary judgment.
Respondents cite several cases where this Court has found
summary judgment to be appropriate. See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health Services Corp. and St. James Community Hospital, Inc. (1994), 265 Mont. 205, 075 P.2d 352; Fauerso v. Maronick Const. Co (1983), 203 Mont. 106, 661 P.2d 20;
and Krone v. McCann (1982), 196 Mont. 260, 638 P.2d 397. However,
in both Cooper and Fauerso the issue was duty, not causation, and
they are therefore distinguishable. Causation was the issue in Krone, but that case is also distinguishable.
The incident in Krone took place in a rural open field, where
the plaintiff acknowledged she had seen common debris such as logs
and mounds of dirt lying around before she fell. Krone, 638 P.2d
at 400. The court therefore agreed that the danger had been open
and obvious. The incident in this case took place in a hotel, and appellant contends her fall was caused by a small hole in the
carpeting--a hole that was not obvious and that could not
reasonably have been anticipated. Moreover, in Krone, the Court
noted that the plaintiff had been unable to specifically describe
what caused her injury; she could not say what had caused her to
trip. Krone, 638 P.2d at 400. In this case, appellant specifically alleges a small hole in the carpet to be the cause of
her fall. She has therefore raised causation as a genuine issue,
which the plaintiff in Krone apparently could not do.
5 The court found appellant had not brought forth evidence
showing the carpet to be the cause of her fall. But the initial burden in the summary judgment proceeding should have been on
respondents. It was up to them to show that no genuine issue of
material fact existed. Only when and if they successfully made
such a showing would the burden properly shift to appellant.
Absent such an affirmative showing on the part of respondents, the
moving party, it was error to shift the burden of proof to
appellant, the non-moving party.
Respondents presented no evidence proving the fall was not
caused by the carpeting. Instead they focused on the small amount
of proof appellant offered to show that it was the carpeting. They
correctly noted that appellant relied almost wholly on her own
deposition and sworn affidavit. In response, respondents pointed
out it was snowy and icy that night, and appellant had been
drinking. Appellant has alleged it was the carpet that made her
fall, thereby creating a genuine issue of material fact as to what
caused the fall. Respondents have not shown that it was not the
carpet. They have failed to dispose of this genuine issue of
material fact. If there is any genuine issue of material fact, summary
judgment is inappropriate. "The question to be decided on motion
for summary judgment is whether there is a genuine issue of a fact
and not how that issue should be determined. The hearing on the
motion is not a trial." Duchesneau, 492 P.Zd at 930 (citation
omitted).
6 Because appellant has raised a genuine issue of material fact that respondents have failed to rebut, summary judgment is not
warranted. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
We concur:
‘-‘\/ Chief Justiced