Villarruel v. Dudek

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 24-1233
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 3 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN A. VILLARRUEL, No. 24-1233 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-00347-CLB v. MEMORANDUM*

LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Carla Baldwin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 1, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: HURWITZ, KOH, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

John A. Villarruel appeals a district court judgment affirming the Social

Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability benefits under

Title II of the Social Security Act. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). not recount them here. We review de novo a district court’s order affirming the

denial of social security benefits, Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1199 (9th

Cir. 2024), and “will not overturn the Commissioner’s decision unless it is either

not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Woods v.

Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not improperly discount the

testimony of Drs. Littlepage and Greenwald. Dr. Littlepage issued guidance to

Villarruel one week after he underwent back surgery in 2015. The ALJ found that

there was no indication from Dr. Littlepage that this guidance was intended to be

permanent. This is a reasonable interpretation of the record.

In 2016, Dr. Greenwald opined that Villarruel was “permanently or at least

partially disabled” and could not return to “his previous work status.” Months later,

Dr. Greenwald indicated that Villarruel was “Totally Incapacitated.” None of these

statements qualifies as a medical opinion, which is defined in the governing

regulation as a “judgment[] about the nature and severity of” a claimant’s

impairments, including symptoms, diagnoses, and prognoses, and “what [the

claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [his] physical or mental

restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). The ALJ reasonably found that Dr.

Greenwald’s opinions were on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

2 24-1233 2. The ALJ did not improperly discount Dr. Alpern’s testimony in part. An

ALJ “may disregard medical opinion that is brief, conclusory, and inadequately

supported by clinical findings.” Britton v. Colvin, 787 F.3d 1011, 1012 (9th Cir.

2015) (per curiam). Here, the ALJ gave only partial weight to Dr. Alpern’s

testimony that Villarruel is limited to “less than the full range of sedentary work,”

because that opinion was inconsistent with other evidence in the record describing

Villarruel’s symptoms as “controlled with medication” and “stable.” This finding

is supported by substantial evidence.

3. The ALJ did not err in discounting Villarruel’s testimony. After

considering Villarruel’s testimony, the ALJ found that his medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. But the

ALJ also found that Villarruel’s statements “concerning the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects” of his symptoms during the relevant period were “not fully

supported” because “the record supports that the claimant retained significant

residual functioning.”

An ALJ may reject a claimant’s testimony about the severity of his

symptoms only by offering “clear and convincing reasons for doing so.”

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the

claimant’s subjective testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533

3 24-1233 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the ALJ pointed to specific contradictions

between Villarruel’s testimony and the medical records and to inconsistencies

within Villarruel’s testimony. For example, Villarruel stated that “he was not in

any acute distress” while alleging he was experiencing “significant pain.”

Villarruel also stated that he could only walk two or three steps without a cane, but

medical records describe him as walking with a normal gait without a walking

assistive device. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that

Villarruel retained significant residual functioning prior to December 31, 2020, and

this record evidence is inconsistent with Villarruel’s testimony, the ALJ did not err

in rejecting Villarruel’s testimony.

4. Any error on the part of the ALJ in rejecting the testimony of Villarruel’s

spouse was harmless. “Where lay witness testimony does not describe any

limitations not already described by the claimant, and the ALJ’s well-supported

reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony apply equally well to the lay witness

testimony,” the ALJ’s failure to discuss the lay witness testimony is harmless error.

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012).1 Here, the statement from

Villarruel’s spouse is substantively similar to Villarruel’s self-report.

1 Although amendments to the Social Security Administration’s regulations have since rendered it unnecessary for an ALJ to provide an explanation for discounting lay testimony, see Hudnall v. Dudek, No. 23-3727, 2025 WL 729701, at *1-2 (9th Cir. March 7, 2025), those changes only impact claims “filed on or

4 24-1233 5. The ALJ did not err in determining that Villarruel could perform his past

relevant work during the relevant period. On appeal, Villarruel argues that the ALJ

failed to comply with the mandate of the district court’s prior remand order to

determine how much time Villarruel spent doing office manager duties versus

insurance sales duties. But during the hearing on remand, the vocational expert

testified that Villarruel’s past work was only as an office manager. Because there

was no ambiguity, there was no need to develop the record to determine how much

time Villarruel spent performing office manager versus insurance agent duties. Cf.

McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, the ALJ did not err in

finding that Villarruel was not disabled prior to December 2020 because he could

perform the “functional demands and job duties of the [past] occupation as

generally required by employers throughout the national economy.” Pinto v.

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).

AFFIRMED.

after March 27, 2017,” id. at *1, and Villarruel filed his application for disability benefits in 2015.

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