Villalovos (Tomas) v. State

Nevada Supreme Court

Villalovos (Tomas) v. State

DecidedApril 9, 2013

Docket61378

StatusUnpublished

This text of Villalovos (Tomas) v. State (Villalovos (Tomas) v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Villalovos (Tomas) v. State, (Neb. 2013).

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Opinion

was not substantial evidence of his guilt, the reliability of other inmates was not independently evaluated, the hearing officer was not impartial, and the amount of credits forfeited was in excess of that permitted. 2 Appellant failed to demonstrate a violation of due process because he received: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) written statement of the fact-finders of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for disciplinary action; and (3) a qualified right to call witnesses and present evidence. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974). Confrontation and cross-examination in prison disciplinary proceedings are not required because these procedures present "greater hazards to institutional interests." Id. at 567-68. Some evidence supported the decision by the prison disciplinary hearing officer. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Appellant failed to demonstrate that the hearing officer was not impartial due to "command influence," particularly in light of the fact that the hearing officer was assigned to a different facility than the associate warden who drafted the notice of charges. The amount of credits forfeited did not exceed that permitted by the Code.

2 To the extent that appellant challenged his placement in disciplinary segregation and restitution, appellant's challenge was not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Bowen v. Warden, 100 Nev. 489, 686 P.2d 250 (1984); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (holding that the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which imposes an atypical and signification hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) I947A

NEM= N.D.O.C. A.R. 707.1(6)(H). Therefore, appellant failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3

J.

cc: Hon. Gary Fairman, District Judge Tomas Villalovos Attorney General/Carson City Attorney General/Ely White Pine County District Attorney White Pine County Clerk

3 We have reviewed all documents that appellant has submitted in proper person to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude that no relief based upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent that appellant has attempted to present claims or facts in those submissions which were not previously presented in the proceedings below, we have declined to consider them in the first instance.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

3 (0) I947A

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was not substantial evidence of his guilt, the reliability of other inmates was not independently evaluated, the hearing officer was not impartial, and the amount of credits forfeited was in excess of that permitted. 2 Appellant failed to demonstrate a violation of due process because he received: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) written statement of the fact-finders of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for disciplinary action; and (3) a qualified right to call witnesses and present evidence. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974). Confrontation and cross-examination in prison disciplinary proceedings are not required because these procedures present "greater hazards to institutional interests." Id. at 567-68. Some evidence supported the decision by the prison disciplinary hearing officer. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Appellant failed to demonstrate that the hearing officer was not impartial due to "command influence," particularly in light of the fact that the hearing officer was assigned to a different facility than the associate warden who drafted the notice of charges. The amount of credits forfeited did not exceed that permitted by the Code.

2 To the extent that appellant challenged his placement in disciplinary segregation and restitution, appellant's challenge was not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Bowen v. Warden, 100 Nev. 489, 686 P.2d 250 (1984); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (holding that the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which imposes an atypical and signification hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life).